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J. M. COETZEE: ETHICS, SUBALTERNITY, AND THE CRITIQUE OF 
HUMANISM 
Deepa Jani, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2013 
 
In the era of globalization, postcolonial studies is again confronted with the question 
of Western humanism and its attendant project of universalizing Eurocentric assumptions 
about the human.  My dissertation argues that J. M. Coetzee’s postmodern novels 
deliberately reconstruct a literary genealogy of this project from the colonial through the 
postcolonial periods in order to disrupt it.  My thesis addresses four novels of Coetzee that 
cover his entire oeuvre: the early novel Waiting for the Barbarians (1980), the novel of the 
middle phase Foe (1986), and the later novels— Disgrace (1999) and Diary of a Bad Year 
(2007).  Each chapter elaborates on the intertextual nature of Coetzee’s novels and explores 
the rich dialogue between him and the canonical Western writers—Daniel Defoe, Franz 
Kafka, and Michel de Montaigne.  I argue that through metafictional literary forms such as 
allegory, parody, and the essay, Coetzee’s postmodern novels simultaneously construct and 
interrupt the Eurocentric humanist universals of progress, reason, rights, the sovereign 
subject, democracy, and universal history.  The totalizing and humanizing impulses of these 
metanarratives have shaped much of the history of apartheid and colonialism, and continue 
to do so in our era of neo-imperial globalism.  Coetzee’s fiction, with the exception of 
Dusklands (1974), exclusively stages the relationship between the figure of the liberal 
humanist and the subaltern, a self-other dynamic based on hegemony rather than pure 
domination.  My analysis demonstrates that, in the figure of the representative humanist, 
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Coetzee’s oeuvre stages the tendency of the humanizing discourses to produce gendered and 
racialized subaltern bodies.  The novels also dramatize the resistance of the subalterns to the 
epistemic violence of these narratives, resulting in the eventual failure of the intellectual to 
grant voice to them.  Thus, I propose that Coetzee’s work gestures towards an ethics of the 
other, in which the Eurocentric self is called into question by the other of history.  In the 
tradition of postmodernism, the relationship between fiction and history is unstable and 
insecure.  His fiction does not stand witness to or represent history, but ceaselessly re-
presents the relationship between fiction and fiction, fiction and history, and fiction and the 
self-of-writing.   
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INTRODUCTION 
I hope I have shown that here the master differs basically from the master described by 
Hegel.  For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the consciousness of the 
slave.  What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work. 
—Frantz Fanon1 
 
In a society of masters and slaves, no one is free.  The slave is not free, because he is not his 
own master; the master is not free, because he cannot do without the slave. . . .  How do the 
masters of South Africa experience their unfreedom today? 
—J. M. Coetzee2 
 
The deformed and stunted relations between human beings that were created under 
colonialism and exacerbated under what is loosely called apartheid have their psychic 
representation in a deformed and stunted inner life … South African literature is a literature 
in bondage. . . .  It is less than fully human literature, unnaturally preoccupied with power 
and the torsions of power, unable to move from elementary relations of contestation, 
domination, and subjugation to the vast and complex human world that lies beyond them.  It 
is exactly the kind of literature you would expect people to write from a prison. 
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—J. M. Coetzee3 
 
Tragedy, J. M. Coetzee reminds us, was the dominant mode of liberal white South 
African writing under apartheid.4  In his essay on the neglected coloured South African 
writer Alex la Guma,5 Coetzee bemoans the dominance of the apolitical and the ahistorical 
mode of tragedy, both in its naturalistic and religious forms, in white writing in English.6  
These tragedies often stage the tragic suffering of interracial lovers, who commit hamartia 
in the white supremacist apartheid system when they love across “the color line.”  The tragic 
plot often ends with the death or exile of the hero.  The function of art is to stand witness to 
the suffering and the triumph of love that runs afoul of the apartheid laws against 
miscegenation.  Coetzee elaborates on the apolitical nature of these tragic fables in the 
following quote: “The overt content of the fable here is that love conquers evil through 
tragic suffering when such suffering is borne witness to in art [emphasis mine]; its covert 
content is the apolitical doctrine that defeat can turn itself, by the twist of tragedy, into 
victory.”7  The defeat of the tragic hero, who has become a sacrificial lamb, is also his 
victory.  For this to happen, the tragic suffering needs to have the character of universality 
that is governed by the laws of probability or necessity, rather than the character of 
particularity that is governed by chance or coincidence, which is the domain of history, so 
that the audience can empathize with the hero’s suffering and feel pity, but also fear, 
because they can see themselves as running afoul of the Law.8  Since the Law, both God’s 
law and man’s law (apartheid), is inscrutable and unshakeable (and thus cannot be 
challenged or questioned), our emotions of pity and fear for the hero’s tragic suffering can 
be purged in the representation, or imitation, of that suffering in art: “Nevertheless . . . that 
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the dispensation under which man suffers is unshakeable, but that our pity for the hero-
victim and our terror at his fate can be purged by the ritual of reenactment.”9  For Coetzee, 
this fatalism in the face of the unshakeable Law is a characteristic feature of both forms of 
tragedy, religious tragedy and naturalistic tragedy, which have been widely employed by 
Western writers and white South African writers.  Religious tragedy “reconciles us to the 
inscrutable dispensation by giving meaning to suffering and defeat”10; naturalistic tragedy, 
influenced by the fatalistic determinism of Emile Zola’s literary naturalism which believed 
that the laws of environment and hereditary can scientifically determine one’s character, also 
evokes pity and terror in the representation of the “inscrutable dispensation” of society and 
genes.  In Coetzee’s essay, Alan Paton’s novel Cry, the Beloved Country (1948) is an 
example of the former, and Theodore Dreiser’s novel An American Tragedy (1925) is an 
example of the latter.   
I have begun my dissertation in negation, expounding upon a genre favored by South 
African writers that Coetzee categorically rejects.11  What Coetzee, who I will argue writes 
postmodernist metafictions rather than tragedies, is rejecting is the apolitical and the 
ahistorical conception of art as propounded in the classical Aristotelean formulations of 
tragedy.  In the essay on La Guma, where Coetzee only briefly elaborates on his criticisms 
of tragedy, what he is attacking is the function of art as bearing witness to the fatalistic 
determinism of the Law, both divine and social, which gives rise to the suffering of the 
tragic hero.  Moreover, the spectators bear witness too to the tragic actions as they unfold 
before their eyes.  Towards the end of the tragic plot, these witnessing spectators experience 
katharsis, that is, the purgation (or purification) of the feelings of terror and pity.  The 
feeling of terror arises both from a fatalistic view of the laws of God, Nature, and man as 
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being inscrutable, inexorable, and impenetrable, and from the recognition that such a fate 
could befall them.  The feeling of pity arises from sympathy for the suffering of the 
interracial lovers.  Art’s imitative quality, mimesis, allows it to bear witness to the suffering 
of the hero under the inexorable laws of apartheid.  Thus, it is in the act of witnessing that 
the two qualities of tragedy are combined—mimesis and katharsis.  In his own fiction, 
Coetzee characteristically rejects the mimetic and the cathartic art of tragedy, and replaces it 
with the non-mimetic and the non-cathartic aesthetics of postmodernist metafiction, a term I 
will explain in due time.    
It is important to note here that Coetzee’s abandonment of the popular form of 
tragedy is also a rebuff of the type of literature, often called, “witness literature,” or 
“literature of (as) witness.”  In South African literary cultures, much literary writing, 
especially under apartheid but not exclusive to that period, can be characterized as literature 
of witness, as writing that bears witness to, and narrates, the truth about South Africa.  
Given the traumatic legacy of the twentieth century world history, the predominance of 
witness writing is not exclusive to South Africa.  In the reconstructions of the twentieth 
century history from the Nuremberg Trials to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Trials, we have witnessed the emergence and the development of the genre of testimony at 
various historical sites of trauma—the World Wars and the Holocaust, the Vietnam War, 
South African apartheid, the struggles for decolonization, and the numerous dictatorships in 
Latin America.  Hayden White suggests that witness literature is “generated by those 
experiences of ‘extreme situations’ peculiar to our time, of which the Holocaust . . . is of 
course emblematic.”12  Witness literature lays claim to direct access to the traumatic events; 
it speaks with the voice of authority and authenticity, representing facts not muddled by 
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rhetoric.  Thomas Vogler defines witness literature as, “most bound up with notions of 
authenticity and referentiality, a poetry that puts us in touch with raw facts of existence 
rather than effects produced by rhetorical technique.”13  Acknowledging the important 
function of the role of witness in diverse reconstructions of the traumatic history of 
twentieth century, the Swedish Academy organized a symposium in Stockholm in December 
2001 in celebration of the centennial year of the Nobel Prize in Literature on the theme of 
“witness literature.”  The objective of the symposium was to examine the nature, history, 
and practice of such a literature, which, the Academy claimed, has not been thoroughly 
studied by literary criticism and scholarship.  Several Nobel Laureates in Literature from 
Asia, Africa, and Europe were invited, including Nadine Gordimer, Imre Kertész, 
Kenzaburō Ōe, and Gao Xingjian, to speak on two aspects of witness literature: its claims to 
the truth and the liberating transformation of the victim into a writer.14   
In the politically charged milieu of South Africa, the essential role of the writer has 
been to bear witness to, and to narrate, the crimes of apartheid and colonialism, and those 
who have failed to fulfill their social responsibility of bearing witness have often been 
accused of being politically and historically deaf.  Witness writing does not end with the fall 
of the apartheid regime in South Africa, but only resurges in the context of the reenactments 
of the confessional mode of witness accounts during the post-apartheid Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission trials.  Speaking of South Africa’s most prominent writer of 
“witness literature,” Nadine Gordimer, David Attwell summarizes the dominant view of the 
role of a writer in South Africa (as propounded by Gordimer and others): “For Gordimer, the 
essence of the writer’s role lies in her social responsibility, and responsibility is treated 
primarily as a form of witness.  Fiction will ultimately be tested by its accountability to the 
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truth of its society. . . .”15  Gordimer, in her recent essay “Literary Witness in a World of 
Terror: The Inward Testimony,” which is largely derived from her talk at the Nobel 
Centennial Symposium on witness literature, reflects on the role she has performed of the 
writer-as-witness to the crimes of apartheid: 
I grew up in the Union that came out of wars for possession between the British and 
descendants of the Dutch, the Boers.  The African had already been dispossessed by 
both.  I was the child of the white minority, blinkered in privilege as conditioning 
education, basic as ABC.  But because I was a writer – for it’s an early state of being, 
before a word has been written, not an attribute of being published – I became 
witness to the unspoken in my society [emphasis mine].  Very young I entered a 
dialogue with myself about what was around me; and this took the form of trying for 
the meaning in what I saw by transforming this into stories based on what were 
everyday incidents of ordinary life for everyone around me. . . .  As time and 
published books confirmed that I was a writer, and witness literature, if it is a 
particular genre of circumstance of my time and place, was mine, I had to find how 
to keep my integrity to the Word, the sacred charge of the writer.  I realized . . . [that] 
the existential condition of witness was enlarging, inspiring aesthetic liberty 
breaching the previous limitations of my sense of form and use of language through 
necessity; to create form and use anew.16 
Gordimer describes witness writing as her calling, as an ethical response that emerges from 
the particular circumstance and history of her time and place.  For Gordimer, this ethical 
injunction that fiction stand as witness to history only gets louder at the turn of the twenty-
first century when the world witnessed the terrifying events of September 11, 2001 and their 
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aftermath in the global war on terror.  Gordimer concludes her essay insisting on the 
continued importance of the “inward testimony” of witness literature for “post-9/11” writers 
writing under the shadow of the war on terror. 
I started my introduction expounding upon a popular form of witness writing in 
South Africa—tragedy.  There is another popular aesthetic form of witness writing, that has 
generated far more debate and conflict among members of the South African literary 
intelligentsia—realism.  South African literary writers have borne witness to, and narrated, 
the truth about South African society largely through two aesthetics forms of fiction—
tragedy and realism.  Documentaries, autobiographies, and journalistic writings are other 
popular nonfictional forms of “witness writing.”  Coetzee has not only rejected the form of 
tragedy to narrate the truths of apartheid and colonialism, but also the form of the realist 
novel, along with other popular modalities of nonfictional witness writing.  Till date, he 
remains a controversial figure, although an esteemed one, in South Africa.  Coetzee’s 
apartheid-era and post-apartheid fiction rejects this essential function of the writer-as-
witness.  In an interview conducted by Alan Thorold and Richard Wicksteed, “Grubbing for 
the Ideological Implications: A Clash (More or Less) with J. M. Coetzee,” Coetzee insists 
that “making sense of life inside a book is different from making sense of real life—not 
more difficult or less difficult, just different” (as quoted in David Attwell).17  Such 
pronouncements against witness writing had often landed him in hot water.  While much has 
been said by critics and scholars about the postmodernist Coetzee’s criticism of one of the 
aesthetic forms of literature of witness, i.e. realism, an important issue that I will shortly 
discuss, there is absolutely no discussion of his rejection of the form of tragedy.  Coetzee’s 
rejection of the apolitical and the ahistorical genre of tragedy is ironic given that his 
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metafictional novels have often been accused of being ethically and politically evasive.  Due 
to the political and ethical stresses of life in South Africa, more so under apartheid, such 
criticisms of his metafictional work forced Coetzee to defend his writing in several critical 
essays, interviews, and lectures.  This study will read Coetzee’s refusal to incorporate the 
popular aesthetic forms of literature of witness, both tragedy and realism, as a deeply 
political and ethical gesture. 
The form of tragedy has remained important in South African writing, both during 
and after apartheid.18  But it is the fate of realism that has generated intense debate among 
members of the South African intelligentsia, involving such august figures as J. M. Coetzee, 
Nadine Gordimer, Njabulo Ndebele, and Lewis Nkosi.  During the political exigencies of 
apartheid the dominant view was that fiction should “realistically” document the horrors of 
apartheid.  Attwell says, “Both the white liberal tradition since Olive Schreiner, continuing 
down to the radicalism of Nadine Gordimer today, and contemporary black prose narrative 
since the era of Drum magazine in the 1950s have adopted the various forms of realism as 
the unquestioned means of bearing witness to, and telling the truth about, South Africa.”19  
Various forms of realism—naturalism, critical and social realism—have been adopted by 
black and white writers to bear witness to the historical truth in fiction.  In his essay, “The 
Novel Today,” Coetzee narrates in caustic tone the tendency among South African writers to 
adopt the realist aesthetic mode of witness writing: “Instead I would like to narrow my focus 
considerably and talk about the novel and history in South Africa today, and in particular 
about what I see as a tendency, a powerful tendency, perhaps even dominant tendency, to 
subsume the novel under history. . . .”20  This formulaic opinion that apartheid demands a 
realistic report or documentation of oppression generated intense debate in the country, 
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especially from the 1960s through the 1980s.  Lewis Nkosi, prominent writer and essayist, 
has been the loudest critic of this demand for realism made of writers in South Africa: he 
notes, “whether written by white or blacks the literature of Southern Africa is committed to 
the notion that certain ‘tasks’ are the legitimate function of socially responsible writers.  
Protest, commitment, explanation: South African readers and critics expect these qualities of 
their authors. . . . From its writers the nation, including the organs of state oppression, has 
always expected not so much art as confidential reports about the condition of society. . . .”21  
Here and elsewhere, Nkosi offers his scathing criticism of the literature of witness, of, what 
Vogler calls, “literature of facts” not subservient to the shaping spirit of the imagination.  
Although in the above quote Nkosi asserts that witness writing is demanded by readers and 
critics of both white and black writers, in several essays Nkosi is particularly critical, and at 
times in a dogmatic manner, of the dominant tendency in black writing to parade journalistic 
fact as imaginative writing.  In his famous essay “Fiction by Black South Africans,” he 
characterizes black fiction as such: “What we do get from South Africa . . . is the journalistic 
fact parading outrageously as imaginative literature.  We find here a type of fiction which 
exploits the ready-made plots of racial violence, social apartheid, interracial love affairs 
which are doomed from the beginning, without any attempt to transcend or transmute these 
given ‘social facts’ into artistically persuasive works of fiction.”22  In another famous essay 
“Turkish Tales and Some Thoughts on South African Fiction” by the critic, writer, and 
chancellor of the University of Johannesburg, Njabulo Ndebele, we hear echoes of Nkosi’s 
criticism of literature of fact.  Ndebele asserts, “The truth is that the average African writer . 
. . produces an art of anticipated surfaces rather than one of processes: processes in character 
development or in social evolution.  He produces an art . . . where scenes of social violence 
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and a host of examples of general social oppression become ends in themselves.  As a result 
. . . the only reader faculty engaged is the faculty of recognition.  Recognition does not 
necessarily lead to social transformation: it simply confirms.”23  Realist art confirms rather 
than interrupts reality.  Nkosi further elaborates on his criticism of realism in his later essay 
on postmodernism, suggesting that black writing has resisted experimental fiction due to the 
deprivation and the isolation of the black writer from universities, where such writing is 
taught, thus concluding that experimental writing among black South African writers can 
only emerge from their own conditions and contexts, rather than as merely a derivative of 
such writing from the European metropolises.24 
Coetzee too entered this debate on realism early on through his essays on La Guma 
in the 1970s, while partly agreeing with Nkosi’s criticism of realism, he opens a more 
philosophical line of questioning—“What value does the experimental line in modern 
Western literature hold for Africa?”25  Throughout his career he tries to grapple with this 
question in his own experimental fiction (more so as a white writer writing under apartheid).  
Meanwhile, the essay on La Guma, where he poses the key question of the value of 
experimentalism for Africa, Coetzee defends La Guma’s fiction against Nkosi’s attack on 
his “naturalistic tendencies” by reading La Guma’s novels through György Lukács’ theory 
of critical realism, suggesting that his characters are not determined by a fixed social reality 
but are caught in the flux of that reality, thus unwittingly discovering lines of social forces 
unknown to them.26 
Despite these criticisms of the demand for realism from stalwart writers—Nkosi, 
Ndebele, and Coetzee—, it was a dominant tendency under apartheid, defended by such 
world-renowned realist writers as Gordimer.  Realism remained an important medium for 
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protest writing.  Thus, Coetzee’s experimentalism was often criticized for its oblique rather 
than direct engagement with the injustices of South African reality.  Referring to Coetzee’s 
choice of writing experimental fiction in the context of apartheid South Africa, Attwell 
states, “If we are to speak of a lonely poetics in South Africa, Coetzee’s of the 1970s and 
80s was perhaps the loneliest of all.”27  After the Sharpeville massacre of blacks protesting 
pass laws (1960), and after the banning of African National Congress (1960) and Pan 
Africanist Congress (1960), and the Rivonia Trials (1963-64) resulting in the imprisonment 
of Nelson Mandela on the infamous Robben Island, South Africa witnessed, from mid-
1960s to mid-1970s, the emergence of radical anti-apartheid ideas, movements, and 
organizations.  Influenced by the American civil rights and Black Power movements, South 
Africa’s Black Consciousness movement, under the charismatic leadership of the medical 
student, Steve Biko, who was influenced by such intellectuals as W. E. B. Du Bois and 
Frantz Fanon and whose slogan “Black man, you are on your own” became the rallying cry, 
emphasized the restoration of African consciousness through psychological and physical 
liberation from racism.  The members of the movement also engaged in direct conflict with 
the apartheid security state, which resulted in the confrontation with the police on 16 June 
1976 during the Soweto Uprising, when students protested the use of Afrikaans language in 
schools.  This led to the banning of the movement and the murder of Biko during police 
custody in 1977.  The massacre of approximately 200 students led to numerous school 
boycotts in the early 1980s.  After the Soweto Uprising, the banned ANC aimed to make 
black townships ungovernable.  As political violence grew and anti-apartheid struggles 
intensified, the South African government imposed a State of Emergency in the mid-1980s 
(1985-86).  This brief history of South Africa of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s highlights the 
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political contexts in which Coetzee’s major works were produced that brought him to world 
attention.  In the above quote, Attwell is reminding us that Coetzee’s novels of the 1970s 
and 1980s—Dusklands (1974), In the Heart of the Country (1977), Waiting for the 
Barbarians (1980), Life & Times of Michael K (1983), and Foe (1986)—, written during the 
periods when the South African political landscape was undergoing great upheavals, were 
some of his most abstruse, self-reflexive metafictional novels.  Two of these novels Waiting 
for the Barbarians and Foe, which I will analyze in my dissertation, brought him world-
renown.   
Coetzee of the 1970s and 1980s was the loneliest writer in South Africa, whose 
experimental fiction was mocked by writers like Gordimer.  Gordimer, a die-hard social 
realist, criticizes Coetzee’s use of allegory in her review of Life & Times of Michael K, 
which for her, is necessarily an apolitical form.  I quote the passage in full:  
J. M. Coetzee, a writer with an imagination that soars like a lark and sees from up 
there like an eagle, chose allegory for his first few novels.  It seemed he did so out of 
a kind of opposing desire to hold himself clear of events and their daily, grubby, 
tragic consequences in which, like everyone else living in South Africa, he is up to 
the neck, and about which he had an inner compulsion to write.  So here was 
allegory as a stately fastidiousness; or a state of shock.  He seemed able to deal with 
the horror he saw written on the sun only—if brilliantly—if this were to be projected 
into another time and plane.  His Waiting for the Barbarians was the North Pole to 
which the agitprop of agonized black writers (and some white ones hitching a lift to 
the bookmart on the armored car) was the South Pole; a world to be dealt with lies in 
between.  It is the life and times of Michael K, and Coetzee has taken it up now.28 
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As if it were, Coetzee’s novels escape to the Northern most point so as to cope with the 
horrifying ground realities of the Southern most point of Africa, where his imagination can 
soar in the timeless and placeless allegories.  My dissertation argues against such readings.  
In my analysis of the novels of Coetzee, I show that Coetzee’s self-reflexive and intertextual 
metafictional works are deeply political and ethical.   
I have been calling Coetzee’s fiction postmodern, a term that needs some 
examination.  Postmodernism is often associated with, what Richard Rorty famously called, 
the “linguistic turn” in the humanities, emphasizing the centrality of language in the 
reconstructions of reality.29  Our knowledge of the world is mediated through language.  In 
the field of literature, the practice of writing called metafiction, writing about writing, a style 
that proliferated since the 1960s, emphasizes the linguistic and the narrative character of 
fiction.  The term metafiction originated, as Patricia Waugh reminds us, in an essay by the 
American novelist William H. Gass, and, according to Waugh, is “a term given to fictional 
writing which self-consciously and systematically draws attention to its status as an artefact 
in order to pose questions about the relationship between fiction and reality.”30  In such a 
fiction, the relationship between fiction and reality is uncertain and insecure.  Metafiction 
emerges as a style of fiction during the cultural, political, and social turmoil of the 1960s, 
leading to questions about how human beings construct and mediate their experience of the 
world: Waugh asserts, “Metafiction pursues such questions [about reality as a construct] 
through its formal self-exploration, drawing on the traditional metaphor of the world as 
book, but often recasting it in terms of contemporary philosophical, linguistic or literary 
theory. . . .  If our knowledge of this world is now seen to be mediated through language, 
then literary fiction (worlds constructed entirely of language) becomes a useful model of 
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learning about the construction of ‘reality’ itself.”31  Similar to other postmodernist writers 
and philosophers, Coetzee has been greatly influenced by the various movements in the 
twentieth-century modern linguistics and philosophy—semiotics, structuralism, 
poststructuralism, and deconstruction.  His academic training was in linguistics and 
mathematics; after working as a computer programmer for three years in United Kingdom 
from 1962-65, where he briefly worked for IBM, he migrated to U. S. and earned his Ph.D. 
in linguistics on the stylistics analysis of the works of Samuel Beckett from the University of 
Texas at Austin in 1969.  Coetzee’s metafictional novels self-consciously stage the process 
of the construction and mediation of reality through language in their dramatization of the 
figures, themes, and, realities of apartheid and colonialism.  The linguistic orientation of 
Coetzee’s works challenge the mimetic and the testimonial nature of the aesthetic forms of 
realism and tragedy.  The relationship between fiction and the unjust South African reality is 
uncertain and insecure in Coetzee’s novels.  Due to this lack of direct relationship between 
fiction and reality, members of the South African intelligentsia, as in the example of 
Gordimer, bemoaned the uncertainty of his political leanings.  They went so far as to suggest 
that several of his key works—Life and Times of Michael K and Waiting for the 
Barbarians—were not censored due to this uncertainty, and in fact praised by the censors 
because they could not see any direct parallels with the South African reality.32  Instead of 
writing realist novels or tragedies, Coetzee often writes allegories, parodies, and essayistic 
novels.  Although I will show that Disgrace is perhaps his most realist novel, it is also partly 
allegorical.  Postmodernist writers, along with Coetzee, have often employed each of these 
forms to disrupt the verisimilitude of realist fiction, and dramatize the fictionality of fiction, 
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the uncertainty of the relationship between fiction and history, and challenge the authorial 
voice. 
In “The Novel Today” Coetzee frustratingly asks, “Why should a novelist—
myself—be speaking here . . . in terms of enmity with the discourse of history?  Because, as 
I suggested earlier, in South Africa the colonisation of the novel by the discourse of history 
is proceeding with alarming rapidity.”33  It is tempting to say here that in his fiction Coetzee 
tries to decolonize the novel from the discourse of history.  But I will refrain from such 
schematic readings.  In the above essay Coetzee goes on to suggest that the novel occupies 
an autonomous place, by which he means a novel “that evolves its own paradigms and 
myths, in the process . . . perhaps going so far as to show up the mythic status of history— . . 
. demythologizing history.”34  While the central argument of my dissertation agrees with and 
elaborates on Coetzee’s argument here, mine goes further than his: in demythologizing 
history, Coetzee’s novels interrupt it.  In this regard, Coetzee clearly severs himself from the 
dominant tradition of the literature of witness.  My argument is that in Coetzee’s writing 
fiction does not confirm (or conform to) reality, but disrupts it; fiction does not stand as 
witness to history but stands in an ethical relation to it, calling it into question.  In other 
words, fiction interrupts rather than imitates reality.  Furthermore, I show that his fiction 
calls itself into question; in his novels, fiction interrupts not only reality but also itself, 
ceaselessly putting the writing and the self-of-writing into question.  To put it in different 
words, his metafictional fiction does not represent the silent, subaltern voices of those 
wronged by the history of apartheid and colonialism, but ceaselessly re-presents, re-writes, 
re-constructs, and re-interrogates the relationship between fiction and fiction, fiction and 
history, and fiction and the self-of-writing.  This has lead to (mis)readings that vehemently 
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criticize Coetzee for silencing the subalterns in his novels.  One such is by Benita Parry, 
who reads the silences of the subaltern figures not in terms of the resistance to 
appropriations by the dominant discourses but, echoing Gordimer’s reading of Coetzee’s use 
of allegory, in terms of the author’s renunciation of and escape from worldly matters.  
Parry’s reading of the silent subaltern figures is as follows: “I will suggest that the various 
registers in which silence is scored in the novels speak of things other than the structural 
relationship of oppressor/oppressed, or the power of an unuttered alterity to undermine a 
dominant discourse, and that these other things are signs of the fiction’s urge to cast off 
worldly attachments, even as the world is signified and estranged.”35  In contrast to Parry, I 
maintain that in Coetzee’s novels the figure of the subaltern is not constructed either as a 
subject-of-revolt or an object-of-oppression.  To do so is to reinscribe and to rehearse neo-
imperial, Eurocentric impulses of political and ideological domination, economic 
exploitation, and cultural erasure.36  Instead, I suggest that in Coetzee’s novels the figure of 
the subaltern is the figure of the radical other, of alterity, who calls into question history and 
the subjects writing that history, either through facts or myths.  His novels employ such 
literary forms as allegory, parody, and the essay, each of which occupies an important place 
in the tradition of postmodern metafiction, in order to simultaneously question the authority 
of the historical discourse and the narrative discourse.  In this I suggest lies the ethical 
gesture of his work.  My reading of Coetzee’s ethics is informed by Emmanuel Levinas’ 
understanding of ethics.  Levinas’ notion of ethics is markedly different from the traditional 
conception of ethics as a branch of moral philosophy; for him, ethics is an event, the relation 
between the same and the radically other that cannot be reduced to the same, what he calls 
“an ethical event.”  For Levinas ethics is the putting into question of the knowing subject, 
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the ego, self-consciousness, by the other.  Levinas defines ethics as “a calling into question 
of the same—which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same—is brought 
about by the other.  We name this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of 
the Other ethics.”37  The domain of the same maintains a relation with otherness, but it is a 
relation in which the ego reveals its totalizing tendencies and struggles to reduce the 
distance between the same and the other and absorb all otherness into itself.  Coetzee’s 
writing performs such an “ethical event,” in which the universalist propensity of the 
sovereign subject of knowledge is called into question by the other of history.38 
Thus, my dissertation’s main argument is that Coetzee’s fiction calls into question 
history and its own constructions of that history.  The metafictional novels of Coetzee, 
through literary forms such as allegory, parody and the essay, simultaneously construct and 
disrupt history.  More specifically, I will show that Coetzee self-consciously employs these 
literary forms in order to disrupt the universalist metanarratives of the history of modernity: 
narratives of progress, reason, rights, the sovereign subject, democracy, and universal 
history.  The totalizing and humanizing impulses of these universal narratives have shaped 
much of the history of apartheid and colonialism, and continue to do so in our era of neo-
imperial globalism.  In my analysis of the four novels of Coetzee—Waiting for the 
Barbarians, Foe, Disgrace (1999), and Diary of a Bad Year (2007)—, I argue that Coetzee’s 
novels deliberately reconstruct a discursive genealogy of the history of apartheid and 
colonialism, from eighteenth-century European colonialism to the emergent forms of neo-
imperialism, in order to interrupt that history.  Each chapter of the dissertation elaborates on 
the intertextual nature of Coetzee’s novels and explores the rich dialogue between him and 
the canonical Western writers—Daniel Defoe, Franz Kafka, and Michel de Montaigne.   
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My dissertation begins with a quote from Frantz Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks 
that appears in the chapter titled, “The Negro and Recognition.”  In this chapter, Fanon 
criticizes the Hegelian master-slave dialectic for formulating the disparate, unequal, and 
antithetical relationship between the master and the slave on the basis of reciprocity, 
recognition, and mutual dependence.  Fanon’s book is an attempt to reformulate the 
Hegelian master-slave dialectic in terms of absolute domination and power in the 
postcolonial context.  In the above chapter that appears towards the near end of the book, 
Fanon says, “I hope I have shown that here the master differs basically from the master 
described by Hegel.  For Hegel there is reciprocity; here the master laughs at the 
consciousness of the slave.  What he wants from the slave is not recognition but work”39  
This Fanonian reformulation of the master/slave dialectic in terms of absolute domination, 
rather than hegemony, haunts Coetzee’s oeuvre.  Readers of both these writers can 
immediately recognize Fanon’s influence on Coetzee’s novels, which often depict the 
master/slave dynamic in terms of pure domination.  In his first novel Dusklands (1974) 
Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee are bloodthirsty servants of the Empire, the mid-20th 
century American Empire in the case of the former and the early 18th century Dutch Empire 
in the case of the latter.40  In Waiting for the Barbarians, Colonel Joll, a handsome servant of 
the Empire, is a “seeker of truth” and a “doctor of interrogation,” who rules with torture.41  
In his novel Foe, a parody of Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, Coetzee’s Cruso rules over 
Friday with pure domination.  On a barren terrain where he expends labor without value, he 
has imposed near total silence on the island, interrupted only by functional speech.  He 
communicates with Friday exclusively in command words, who, like a dog, responds only to 
the words taught, having no knowledge of the complexity of human language.42  While 
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Coetzee depicts the master/slave relation in Fanonian terms, this relationship based on pure 
domination remains in the background in all the novels, with the first novel Dusklands being 
the only exception.  The context of pure domination is the condition of possibility for 
another kind of relationship, which the novels foreground.  After the first novel, Coetzee’s 
fiction almost exclusively stages the relationship between the figure of the liberal humanist 
and the subaltern, a self-other dynamic based on hegemony rather than domination.  In these 
novels the discursive struggle does not directly play out between the colonizer and the 
colonized, or the master and the slave, but between the liberal humanist figure and the 
subaltern.  If in its classical conception, as theorized within postcolonial studies, the colonial 
discourse analysis centers on the power/knowledge relationship between the colonizer and 
the colonized, Coetzee refocuses this classical colonial discourse, and its neo-imperial 
versions, as a power/knowledge nexus between the figure of the liberal humanist and the 
subaltern.  My dissertation foregrounds this discursive struggle.  It grapples with the 
modality of ethics that can call into question the pieties of the humanist discourses and 
meditates on the ways in which literature can simultaneously construct and interrupt such a 
discursive regime.  While secondary literature on Coetzee is rapidly growing, more so after 
he won the Nobel Prize in Literature in 2003, my dissertation is the first study to examine 
Coetzee’s works in relation to the question of humanism in postcoloniality.   
In foregrounding the humanist-subaltern dynamic, I suggest that Coetzee is drawing 
our attention to the Western legacy of humanism in the context of colonialism, and its 
continued effects in the postcolonial world.  Gayatri Spivak captures this legacy quite 
succinctly in her assertion that “there is an affinity between the imperialist subject and the 
subject of humanism.”43  Coetzee’s novels ceaselessly try to put into question this alliance 
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between the imperialist subject and the subject of humanism.  My analysis of the face-to-
face encounter between the figure of the liberal humanist and the subaltern in the novels 
demonstrates that Coetzee’s oeuvre stages the tendency of the humanizing discourses of the 
civilizing and the democratizing missions to produce gendered and racialized subaltern 
bodies.  The figure of the liberal humanist, basking in the warm light of metropolitan 
benevolence, is perpetually engaged in the task of granting voice-consciousness to the 
subaltern.  These guardians of humanism eventually fail in speaking for the oppressed.  
What Benita Parry fails to see is that the novels are not allegorizing the drama of the binaries 
of speech and of silence, of subject and of object, but are allegorizing an impasse at the 
moment of speaking.  For, to speak is to not hear.  The novels painstakingly establish 
distance between the self and the other, not for reflection, but to produce a gap of difference 
between the humanist and the subaltern.  They constitute a face-to-face encounter with the 
radical alterity of the other of history, whose absolute otherness cannot be collapsed into the 
law of the same.  In staging the failure of the liberal humanist discourse, Coetzee is also 
staging the failure of his own writing.  His self-reflexive metafictional novels dramatize the 
failure of authorial authority.  Coetzee, the author, does not stand as witness to history, 
representing the voices of the victims of apartheid and colonialism (more so as a white 
South African).  But in fiction, he interrupts history and his own discursive constructions of 
that history. 
In the context of the geopolitics of the past decade, postcolonial studies is once again 
confronted with the project of humanism and its universalization of the Eurocentric 
assumptions about the other.  If the humanizing hegemonic discourse of civilization justified 
colonialism, then the humanizing hegemonic discourse of democracy justifies imperialism 
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today.  In the latter half of the twentieth-century scholars and writers have tried to grapple 
with this legacy, at least since the American invasion of Vietnam.  Noam Chomsky calls the 
neo-imperialist ventures “military humanism,” military invasions justified on the basis of 
spreading democracy and defending human rights, especially of “third-world” women.44  
One may ask here, why has the field of postcolonial studies not adequately responded to the 
rise of humanitarian imperialism in the post-9/11 era?  A bibliographic search reveals that 
although there have been several conferences and books on the question of the rise of neo-
imperialism and neo-colonialism in the past decade, none of them, with only a few 
exceptions, in any seriousness examines the humanistic discursive regime, and its legacy, 
that increasingly justifies neo-imperialistic acts.  This could be partly because of the field’s 
own agonistic and ambivalent relationship to this legacy.  Anthony Alessandrini, in his 
recent essay, “Humanism Effect: Fanon, Foucault, and Ethics without Subjects,” suggests 
that since its inception the field has been torn between the anti-humanist theorizing of 
Michel Foucault and the call for a new humanism of Frantz Fanon.  He goes on to argue that 
both Foucault and Fanon, in their different ways, are vehemently critical of the sovereign 
subject of humanism.45  Coetzee’s oeuvre has been critical of the sovereign subject of 
humanism in no uncertain terms and has relentlessly examined the legacy of Western 
humanism in the postcolonial world.  His novels show that if the historical process of 
decolonization deterritorialized the universalist Enlightenment metanarratives of progress 
and reason, which were the basis of colonialism, then in our global age the new forms of 
imperialism reterritorialize the universalist metanarratives of liberty and democracy.  I 
suggest that his works gesture towards the possible futures of the field of postcolonial 
studies that currently lives in an ambiguous and agonistic relationship to this legacy. 
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In my first chapter “Empire, Allegorical Impulse, and Games of Truth: J. M. 
Coetzee’s Waiting for the Barbarians,” I argue that Coetzee’s novel dramatizes the 
allegorical mode of Empire’s knowledge-production and its regime of truth.  Arguing 
against critics such as Nadine Gordimer and David Attwell who read Coetzee’s fiction as 
either “moral allegories” (Gordimer) or “national allegories” (Attwell), I demonstrate that 
Coetzee self-consciously employs the form of allegory only to undermine its interpretative 
determinacy.  The liberal humanist magistrate eventually fails to translate the torture marks 
on the barbarian girl’s body into the imperial master codes.  In the magistrate’s crisis of 
interpretation, which is also the crisis of the allegorical mode, Coetzee’s novel highlights the 
fact that the liberal humanist discourse fails to recognize its discourse as discourse.   
In the second chapter “Writing a Counter-Memory of Empire: J. M. Coetzee’s Foe,” 
I argue that Coetzee’s parodic novel rewrites a general history of Empire, in opposition to 
the humanist project of universal history, by transforming the documents of the past into 
monuments, reality into parody, and memory into counter-memory.  I show that if Daniel 
Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe is a story of origin, then Coetzee rewrites this original English 
novel, which is also a novel about Empire, as a story of beginnings.  Unlike Defoe’s novel, 
the story of the racialized subaltern Friday is not a story of centralizing through recollection.  
It is a story of establishing distance, not for reflection, but to produce a gap of difference 
between the self and the other.  In the novel, the figure of the liberal humanist, Susan 
Barton, fails to civilize and humanize the mute Friday through the master discourses of 
civilization and progress.  Thus, I conclude that in Coetzee to write is not to represent the 
other, but to wrench the self from itself through dehumanizing effects of counter-memory.   
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In my third chapter “Justice, Ethics, and Practices of Freedom: J. M. Coetzee’s 
Disgrace,” I argue that the novel while staging the limits of the interpretative violence of 
justice as law, presents the irreducible idea of justice that addresses itself to the absolute 
singularity of the other, not only to the racially gendered human-other but also to the animal-
other.  This idea of justice, as an ethical relation to the other, exceeds the universalist 
discourses of law and rights.  It also escapes the gaze of the witness and the allegorist.  The 
novel stages the monumental fall of the liberal humanist professor David Lurie, from a state 
of grace to that of dis-grace, precipitated by the face-to-face encounter with the raped bodies 
of the racially gendered subaltern other—Lucy and Melanie—in the allegorized context of 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Trials in post-apartheid and postcolonial South 
Africa.   
In my last chapter “Essaying against Empire: J. M. Coetzee’s Diary of a Bad Year,” I 
show that the novel dramatizes the angst of the aging liberal humanist character-author J. C., 
who confronts the specter of torturing democracy (and his own mortality) in the neo-
imperial context of the global war on terror.  Coetzee’s novel meditates on the supra-
political Machiavellian principle of necessity of self-preservation that justifies the practice 
of torture within a democracy today.  Analyzing several essays in the novel on torture, 
terrorism, imperialism, and democracy, I demonstrate that through the essay form Coetzee 
attempts to disrupt the terror of torturing democracy.  In this context of the global war on 
terror, the liberal humanist discourse speaks the language of democracy and rights, which 
have replaced the language of civilization and progress.  With the phenomenal rise of 
“military humanism” in the past decade, Coetzee shows us that today the ethical function of 
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criticism in general, and postcolonial criticism in particular, is to democratize democracy 
itself. 
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1.0  EMPIRE, ALLEGORICAL IMPULSE, AND GAMES OF TRUTH: J. M. 
COETZEE’S WAITING FOR THE BARBARIANS 
All third-world texts are necessarily, I want to argue, allegorical, and in a very specific way: 
they are to be read as what I will call national allegories. . . . 
—Fredric Jameson1 
 
There is a powerful tendency . . . to subsume the novel under history, to read novels as what 
I loosely call imaginative investigations of real historical forces and real historical 
circumstances; and conversely, to treat novels that do not perform this investigation of what 
are deemed to be real historical forces and circumstances as lacking in seriousness.  
—J. M. Coetzee2      
 
I have no idea what they stand for. Does each stand for a single thing, a circle for the sun, a 
triangle for a woman, a wave for a lake; or does a circle merely stand for “circle”, a triangle 
for “triangle”, a wave for “wave”?  
—Magistrate in Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians3 
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Critical readings of J. M. Coetzee’s fiction oscillate between offering either moral or 
national truths.  Coetzee’s novels, more often than not, are timeless and placeless, with 
minimalist plot structure, peopled with reticent characters engaging in highly abstract 
discourse.  The allegorical nature of Coetzee’s fiction has often led critics to dig beyond the 
surface to look for moral or political messages.  Those who read his fiction as “moral 
allegories” translate the timeless and placeless narratives into universal truths; those who 
read it as “political allegories” translate the distant locales and periods into South Africa of 
the apartheid and the post-apartheid periods.  Nadine Gordimer is an example of the former: 
she critiques Coetzee’s use of allegory, which for her, is necessarily an apolitical form, 
“Allegory . . . clears the reader’s lungs of the transient and fill them with a deep breath of 
transcendence.  Man becomes Everyman (that bore)”4; David Attwell is an example of the 
latter: he reads Coetzee’s fiction as exploring the tension between history and text, and this 
history “is made up of key discourses produced by colonialism and apartheid” in South 
Africa.5   Whether critics invoke the realm of morality or of politics, both these approaches 
suffer from a tendency to allegorize, that is, to uncover that pure nugget of truth which 
might be hidden behind the literal.  They translate the literal level into in terms of a single, 
unifying, and totalizing meaning.  In their reading strategies, the particular is always already 
the general.  The novel preempts and disrupts the nostalgia his critics reveal for totalities.  In 
this essay, I will show that in Waiting for the Barbarians Coetzee stages the dangers of 
allegorization, of translating the literal into pre-exiting master codes.  In this novel he self-
consciously employs the form of allegory only to deconstruct its interpretive determinacy.  
Allegory is deeply embedded in the knowledge-production of Empire and its regime of 
truth.  Through the act of allegorization, the liberal magistrate attempts to appropriate the 
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subaltern into the pre-existing master codes of the Empire.  Furthermore, I will argue that 
even though he sees possibilities in the modern revisionist readings of the form, in echoes of 
Walter Benjamin and Paul de Man, his allegorical novels, only too aware of the dangers of 
allegorization, do not wish to recover and redeem the form. 
Allegory, in Western cultural history, has had a bumpy ride. After its initial 
popularity in the Medieval period as a key method for extracting Christian meanings from 
Classical texts, it was denounced by the Romantics, most notably Samuel Coleridge, for 
whom it was merely a human-made, mechanical and ordinary relative of the sublime, 
organic, unifying symbol.  During the first half of the twentieth century, Walter Benjamin in 
his book, The Origin of German Tragic Drama,6 and Paul de Man in his books, Allegories of 
Reading and Blindness and Insight,7 revived interest in allegory, albeit reading it against its 
traditional meanings.  Before we examine how modern allegory differs from its traditional 
form, let us briefly look at the latter.  In the simplest terms, allegory, from Greek allos 
(other) and agoreuein (to speak, in public) says one thing and means another.  The word 
allegory not only implies the use of figures but a making public, revealing, of something that 
would otherwise remain hidden.   It entails hidden meanings, great beyonds, or secret codes.  
It is a figurative mode of representation conveying a meaning other than and in addition to 
the literal: M. H. Abrams explains, “An allegory is a narrative fiction in which the agents 
and actions, and sometimes the setting as well, are contrived to make coherent sense on the 
‘literal,’ or primary, level of signification, and at the same time to signify a second, 
correlated order of agents, concepts and events.”8  Allegory is metaphorical in character; it 
entails identification between the literal and the symbolic levels; the latter is not overtly 
remarked on by the former.  It is a sustained and developed metaphor.  In other words, an 
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allegorical sign says one thing and means another.  It refers to a pre-existing set of signs.  
Allegorical activity relies upon recognition and translation; the effectiveness of allegory 
greatly depends upon the reader’s ability to recognize and decode the signs, interpreting 
their meanings through a process of translation.  It requires a discursive community that 
shares the values and can therefore decode a particular sign.  It is a process of signification 
in which the literal level is interpreted against an existing set of master codes. 
For several theorists of the form of allegory, interpretation itself is an allegorical act.  
Fredric Jameson asserts in his book The Political Unconscious, “Interpretation is here 
construed as an essentially allegorical act, which consists in rewriting a given text in terms 
of a particular interpretative master code.”9  Jameson’s book argues for the priority of 
Marxist interpretation above others—either psychoanalytic or stylistic or structural 
criticism—as “the absolute horizon of all reading and all interpretation.”10  History and 
politics are the ultimate horizon of cultural analysis; and more specifically, “Marxism can 
give us an adequate account of the essential mystery of the cultural past, which, like Tiresias 
drinking the blood, is momentarily returned to life and warmth and allowed once more to 
speak, and to deliver its long forgotten message in surroundings utterly alien.”11  In his 
position that interpretation is necessarily an allegorical act, Jameson echoes Northrop Frye, 
who in his seminal work Anatomy of Criticism states, “It is not often realized that all 
commentary is allegorical interpretation, an attaching of ideas to the structure of poetic 
imagery.  The instant any critic permits himself to make a genuine comment about a poem . . 
. he has begun to allegorize.”12  Thus, interpretation is an act of reading that “recognizes” 
events and characters to be analogous to specific points of reference in the master code.  
Interpretation is a quest for the transcendental signified in terms of which truth will be 
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revealed.  The interpreter decodes the literal level to uncover those pure truths hidden in the 
symbolic level.   
While the mode of allegory in its traditional form continues to remain dominant, 
which is how I will argue Coetzee’s critics read his allegories, there have been several 
trenchant criticisms of it.  Here are some of the mid-twentieth century criticisms of the form.  
Susan Sontag, in her famous essay “Against Interpretation,” critiques this tendency to 
“interpret” or “decode” works of art in order to uncover what the text is “saying” rather than 
what it is “doing”: “The task of interpretation is virtually one of translation.  The interpreter 
says, Look, don’t you see that X is really—or, really means—A? That Y is really B? That Z 
is really C?”13  In Western cultural history, since the mimetic theory proposed by Plato that 
art is merely an “imitation of an imitation” (as ordinary objects are imitations of 
transcendent structures), interpretation, has necessarily been an allegorical act—“A means 
B,” “A stands for B,” “A is not really A but B,” “A is B.”  This process of translation is a 
project of transforming the text in relation to the existing set of master codes: one can call 
these codes either Marxism or feminism or postcolonialism or nationalism. 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in their work Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and 
Schizophrenia, offer a damning critique of the unifying, reductive, interpretive operation of 
Freudian analysis as it attempts to rewrite the complexities of everyday life into the 
strategically contained terms of the master code— “the family narrative.”  For them, reading 
a text is never an act of decoding truths buried in the unconscious, as in Freudian analysis, 
but a productive activity: “For reading a text is never a scholarly exercise in search of what 
is signified, still less a highly textual exercise in search of a signifier.”14  For Deleuze and 
Guattari, literature is not about expression but production, not about what it is “saying” but 
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about what it is “doing.”  These above theorists are not against interpretation per se, but 
against interpretive or hermeneutic activity as a metaphysical enterprise that has persisted 
since Plato.  Sontag asserts, “I don’t mean interpretation in the broadest sense, the sense in 
which Nietzsche (rightly) says, ‘There are no facts, only interpretations.’  By interpretation, 
I mean here a conscious act of the mind which illustrates a certain code, a certain ‘rules’ of 
interpretation.”15; similarly, for Deleuze and Guattari literary interpretation “is a productive 
use of the literary machine, a montage of desiring-machines, a schizoid exercise that extracts 
from the text its revolutionary force.”16  Interpretation is about revealing, not transcendent 
truths, but the productive activity of the desiring-machine.  Desire, in their 
conceptualization, is always immanent to production, in that desiring-production and social 
production parallel each other.  Consequently, literature is a process and not a goal, 
production and not expression.  Deleuze, Guattari, and Sontag are criticizing the 
interpretative determinacy of the form and its totalizing and unifying tendency that preempts 
meaning.  Coetzee echoes these similar concerns in his South African context when he says, 
“a story is not a message with a covering, a rhetorical or aesthetic covering.”17  A story does 
not contain a nugget of pure, transcendent truth (in Jameson’s case the Marxist message) 
hiding behind the literal text that the interpreter needs to excavate. 
Despite criticisms of and discomfort with the traditional form of allegory, there are 
some powerful defenders of the form.  For Jameson, the traditional form has remained 
important and is central to his thinking.  This was more than evident in his infamous essay 
on what he called “third-world literature” in the era of multinational capitalism.  In the wake 
of what is often called the “postcolonial turn” in theory, Jameson declares, “All third-world 
texts are necessarily . . . allegorical [emphasis mine].”18  Since the publication of the essay 
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it has received much attention, especially from scholars in the field of postcolonial studies.  
For Jameson these so-called third-world texts written predominantly in western forms of 
representation (i.e. the novel) are to be read “necessarily as national allegories.”  That is, if 
the capitalist culture of the so-called first-world demonstrates a radical split between the 
private and the public, the third-world culture demonstrates blurring of the lines between the 
libidinal and the political; more specifically, the private energies of the third-world texts 
necessarily project a political dimension in the form of a national allegory: “the story of the 
private individual destiny is always an allegory of the embattled situation of the public 
third-world culture and society.”19  If Freud and Marx are arch-enemies in the first-world, in 
the third-world Freud is subsumed under Marx.  Such sovereign pronouncements from a 
first-world critic (albeit a Marxist one) that attempt to map a totality—“a theory of the 
cognitive aesthetics of third-world literature”20 —, constituting such disparate regions: Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America, have not been without their share of trouble.  For many critics 
Jameson’s “general theory of third-world literature” has become an epitome of the 
persistence of a deeply Eurocentric, imperialist impulse in the Western academy that 
universalizes, homogenizes, and constructs the Other of the West. The much-publicized 
criticism of Jameson along these lines is Aijaz Ahmad’s essay, “Rhetoric of Otherness and 
the National Allegory.”  While Ahmad agrees with Jameson’s plea for syllabus reform in the 
U. S. academy to teach not just “Western literature” but “World literature,” which is his 
broader concern in the essay, he is greatly critical of Jameson’s ambitious undertaking that 
presumes to offer a “general theory of third-world literature” based on a reading of a few 
third-world writers, generally expatriate writers living in the West writing in English.  
Furthermore, Ahmad’s key objection, being a Marxist himself, is that Jameson defines the 
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first and the second worlds in terms of their production systems (i.e. capitalism and 
socialism), whereas the third-world is defined “purely in terms of an ‘experience’ of 
externally inserted phenomena [i.e. imperialism] . . . Ideologically, this classification divides 
the world between those who make history and those who are mere objects of it.”21  Thus, 
the primary ideological formation available to the left-wing third-world intellectual in 
Jameson’s framework, in Ahmad’s reading, is nationalism (and not socialism, which is a 
possibility Ahmad desires but has been denied by a fellow Marxist).  
Similarly, in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Gayatri Spivak criticizes the “us and 
them” binary oppositional logic of Jameson’s essay: “It is an unacknowledged version of 
what is most problematic in Jameson’s ‘Third World Literature.’  Psychoanalysis (such as it 
is), for us.  Anthropology (as, in Jameson, nationalism), for them.”22  Moreover, for her, 
there is another pitfall in Jameson’s argument.  Spivak suggests that in Jameson’s nostalgia 
for totalities, for the single, uninterrupted unconscious narrative, he reveals one of the most 
dangerous tendencies of allegorization—rewriting a narrative in terms of the master codes.  
Drawing out the differences between Jameson’s position and hers, she says, “If for us the 
assurance of transference gives way to the possibility of haunting, it is also true that for us 
the only figure of the unconscious is that of a radical series of discontinuous 
interruptions.”23  Spivak displaces Jameson’s uninterrupted unconscious narrative with a 
series of discontinuous interruptions.24  Jeremy Tambling suggests that Spivak displaces 
Jamesonian allegory through the framework of Paul de Man’s theory of allegory, whose 
postmodernist reading of the form did much to revive interest in this outmoded form: 
“Spivak agrees with Paul de Man in defining the unconscious in terms of parabasis.  For her, 
the repressed unconscious appears in allegorical forms, forms of ‘other’ speaking which 
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cannot be pre-known and therefore interpreted.”25  Tambling’s reading of Spivak’s response 
to Jameson suggests that she employs the revisionist, postmodern view of allegory in order 
to disrupt the traditional one.  Quoting Friedrich Schlegel’s definition of irony as 
“permanent parabasis,” de Man, in his essay “The Rhetoric of Temporality” states, 
“Parabasis is understood here as what is called in English criticism the ‘self-conscious 
narrator,’ the author’s intrusion that disrupts the fictional illusion.”26  Parabasis is a 
disruption of the continuum, an interruption of the continuous.  Postmodern fiction, more 
than any other style before it, employs parabasis through metafictional devices in order to 
break the illusion of reality and the authority of the speaking voice.  For de Man there is 
structural affinity between irony and allegory in terms of parabasis: “This definition points 
to a structure shared by irony and allegory . . . the relationship between sign and meaning is 
discontinuous. . . .  In both cases, the sign points to something that differs from its literal 
meaning and has for its function the thematization of this difference.”27  In opposition to the 
traditional unifying view of the form, for de Man the relationship between sign and meaning 
is discontinuous and untranslatable. 
De Man’s reconceptualization of allegory in his works, especially in his influential 
essay “The Rhetoric of Temporality,” and Benjamin’s recovery of the form in the 
Trauerspiel study have greatly influenced contemporary revisions of the form of allegory for 
postmodern sensibilities.  As stated above, for de Man allegory is understood in terms of 
“permanent parabasis,” of the discontinuity between the literal sign and its meaning, of the 
interruptions of the unifying text and the continuous authorial voice.  Benjamin’s study of 
the German baroque drama privileges allegory over the symbol, for the former points to the 
relentless unfolding and decay of life, while the latter refers to life in terms of a ahistorical 
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organic holism.  For Benjamin ruins are the material counterparts of allegory: “Allegories 
are, in the realm of thoughts, what ruins are in the realm of things.”28  Symbol embodies 
self-contained, concentrated meanings that capture totalities, and allegory consists of a series 
of discontinuous moments unfolding in time, resulting in failed attempts to capture 
meanings.  Craig Owens reads Benjamin through deconstruction, reminding us that for 
Benjamin the allegorist is a grave-digger, working in ruined fragments, and disinterring 
sedimented layers of meaning: “For Benjamin, interpretation is disinternment.”29  Thus, 
traditional allegory is understood in terms of continuities, metanarratives, and the 
transcendental truth; and postmodern allegory, Owen’s term, is understood in terms of 
discontinuities, fragmentary narratives, and immanental truths. 
Jameson is clearly aware of the contemporary reevaluations of the form of allegory 
after the Romantics had dismissed it in favor of the unifying and organic symbol.  He says, 
“If allegory has once again become somehow congenial for us today, as over against the 
massive and monumental unifications of an older modernist symbolism or even realism 
itself, it is because the allegorical spirit is profoundly discontinuous, a matter of breaks and 
heterogeneities, of the multiple poylsemia of the dream rather than the homogeneous 
representation of the symbol.”30  But, as Spivak shows in her response to the infamous 
essay, Jameson’s reading of all “third-world literature” as allegorical reveals a deep 
nostalgia for the disfavored and the devalued mode of allegorizing and for a recovery of its 
traditional form.  In this chapter I will show that several critical readers of Coetzee’s use of 
allegory reveal this nostalgia for the traditional mode, for totalities.  They interpret 
Coetzee’s allegories in terms of already existing master codes—of the national narrative or 
moral ones.  In Coetzee, I argue that the interpretative determinacy of such modes of 
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allegorization are deeply embedded in the knowledge-production of the Empire and its 
regimes of truth. 
Several of Coetzee’s novels are set at a distance from the time and place in which 
they were written, with exiguous plot peopled with mysterious characters (magistrate, 
barbarian girl, Michael K, Friday) who, if they speak at all, perform elaborate philosophical 
gymnastics: these elements have encouraged several readers of Coetzee to look “beyond” 
the literal into the moral or the political realms to seek out meanings which the novels might 
imply.  Even the two exceptions, Age of Iron and Disgrace, which specify South Africa as 
their setting, are generally read as allegories about South Africa: the former allegorizing the 
State of Emergency during the mid-1980s, and the latter allegorizing the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission Trials of 1995.  In echo of Jameson’s nostalgia for totalities, 
critics have often translated Coetzee’s allegorical fiction into the pre-existing master codes 
of morality or politics, conveying moral or national truths: those who read his allegories as 
“moral allegories” translate the timelessness and placelessness into transcendental truths; 
those who read them as “political allegories” translate apparently distant locales and periods 
into the South Africa of the time of writing.   
Bernard Levin, in his review of WFB published on 23 November 1980 in the London 
Sunday Times, states, “Mr. Coetzee sees the heart of darkness in all societies, and gradually 
it becomes clear that he is not dealing in politics at all, but inquiring into the nature of the 
beast that lurks within each of us.”31 (quoted in Barnett).  Levin treats Coetzee’s fiction as 
revealing to us the continuous universal unconscious of the human race.  Nadine Gordimer, 
who reads the form of allegory in a manner similar to Levin, criticizes Coetzee’s use of the 
apolitical form, more so in the politically charged context of South Africa: “Allegory . . . 
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clears the reader’s lungs of the transient and fill them with a deep breath of transcendence.  
Man becomes Everyman (that bore).”32  For Gordimer, who privileges the realist mode of 
witness writing for its direct access to the national truths, the allegorical form can only 
translate into revealing truths about that bore—the everyman.  Her frustration with the form 
of allegory arises from the fact that the particular truths of fiction cannot be interpreted in 
terms of the metanarrative of the nation, which is of course what she desires.  Only realist 
fiction can do so, that is, document historical and political truths.  Coetzee, according to 
Gordimer, uses allegory “out of a kind of opposing desire to hold himself clear of events and 
their daily, grubby, tragic consequences in which, like everybody else living in South Africa, 
he is up to the neck, and about which he had an inner compulsion to write.  So here was an 
allegory as a stately fastidiousness, or a state of shock.  He seemed able to deal with the 
horror he saw written on the sun only—if brilliantly—if this were to be projected into 
another time and place.”33  For Gordimer, moral allegory is politically and ethically evasive 
because it is deaf to the here and now of history.  Irving Howe reiterates Gordimer’s concern 
in his review of WFB, asserting that Coetzee’s use of allegorical narratives could suggest a 
form of ahistorical universalism:  
One possible loss is the bite and pain, the urgency that a specified historical place 
and time may provide.  To create a ‘universalized’ Empire is to court the risk—
especially among sophisticated readers for whom the credos of modernism have 
become dull axioms—that a narrative with strong political and social references will 
be ‘elevated’ into sterile ruminations about the human condition.34  
Levin, Gordimer, and Howe despite their different opinions about ahistorical universalism, 
read Coetzee’s fiction as concealing moral truths that can be revealed in the process of 
 42 
interpretation, of decoding the literal level of meanings.  In other words, they understand 
allegory in its traditional form of signification. 
Several critics (Head,35 Wenzel,36 Eckstein,37 Gallagher38), in order to “rescue” 
Coetzee’s fiction from readers like Levin, Gordimer, and Howe propose that they are 
“national allegories” about South Africa, that they are directly engaged with the unjust 
political reality of South Africa.  Dominic Head questions critics who read Coetzee’s 
allegories as revealing transcendental or moral truths, and asserts that they are rooted in the 
national reality of South Africa in particular, and imperialism in general:    
This novel [WFB] about the destructiveness (and self-destructiveness) of an imperial 
regime—obstructed by one man of conscience—has obvious ramifications for the 
white opponent of apartheid South Africa. . . .  At one level, this is an allegory of 
imperialism. . . .  Yet . . . the novel still be shown to have its compositional roots in a 
set of specific responses to contemporary South African concerns . . . through 
broadening and questioning of its one-to-one significance, the novel reinvigorates the 
allegorizing principle.”39 
Whether critics read Coetzee’s allegories as moral or national, both these readings 
understand allegory in its traditional form.  They treat Coetzee’s elusive novels as hiding a 
kernel of truth, either moral or political.  Thus, they rush to either redeem him by reading his 
allegories as being politically responsible or denounce him as being politically and ethically 
evasive and irresponsible.  Both these approaches show the dangers of allegorization, of 
interpreting the literal level in terms of the master codes, of constructing a unifying, 
continuous narrative—be it a national narrative or a moral one.  In their reading strategies, 
the particular is always already the general.  We have seen the pitfalls of such modes of 
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allegorization in Jameson’s reading of all third-world literature in terms of the metanarrative 
discourse of the nation.  In the following pages, I will show that Coetzee in WFB self-
consciously employs the form of allegory to deconstruct its interpretive determinacy.  What 
these critics fail to see is his critique of the form of allegory that most of his allegorical 
fables stage. 
Derek Attridge, in his chapter “Against Allegory: Waiting for Barbarians & Life and 
Times of Michael K,” speaks of this inclination to read Coetzee’s works as allegories, and 
more often than not, as national allegories.  In contrast to such readings he reads Coetzee’s 
novels against the allegorical impulse.  Moreover, he frustratingly alludes to a tendency in 
the West to read third-world writers exclusively in relation to their national backgrounds. 
Attridge of course has Jameson in mind here: 
Although the national backgrounds of Beckett and Kafka have played a part in some 
readings of their work, they are less subject to the preconception that their writing is 
‘really’ about Ireland or about the Austro-Hungarian Empire.  (Kazuo Ishiguro hits 
the nail on the head when, irritated by the frequent suggestion that The Remains of 
the Day is ‘really’ about Japan, he observes that if he had written The Trial he would 
have to put up with comments like ‘What strange judicial system the Japanese 
have.’40 
Ishiguro’s frustration, directed at Western readers of his text, voices the fate of several non-
Western writers whose works are often straitjacketed as “national allegories” (the irony of 
course is that postcolonial critics acting as native informants often read non-Western literary 
texts in such reductionist ways, although today the master code “global” replaces 
“national”).  Ishiguro’s irritation can also be read as an attack on Western high-handed tone 
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characteristic of the theories of development—because it is Japanese it is necessarily strange 
and backward.  In Jameson’s essay this tone is loudest in the following lines: “The third-
world novel will not offer the satisfactions of Proust or Joyce; what is more damaging than 
that . . . is its tendency to remind us of outmoded stages of our own first-world cultural 
development and to cause us to conclude that ‘they are still writing novels like Dreiser or 
Sherwood Anderson.’”41  While Attridge remains suspicious of all allegorical readings in his 
essay on Coetzee, he basically ignores Benjamin and de Man’s revisionist attempts, making 
one conclude that he only views the form in traditional ways.  With Jameson and the other 
critics of Coetzee I have expounded upon above, such a view of the form remains dominant.  
Coetzee I will show is only too aware of the dangers of such modes of allegorization.  The 
novel centers on the dangers of the interpretative determinacy of the form.   
WFB, published in 1980, brought Coetzee to world attention, and is considered one 
of his greatest works.  As the novel is set in an unspecified time and place, it has lead most 
critics to focus on its status as an allegory: Teresa Dovey declares that the novel is an 
“allegory of allegories.”42  Referring to the uncanny power of Coetzee’s allegorical novels 
for contemporary times, Rob Nixon states, “The prize may be awarded for a lifetime’s 
achievement, but this Nobel feels as if it has been awarded for Coetzee’s great allegorical 
novels from the early 1980s, Waiting for Barbarians and Life and Times of Michael K, 
which are uncannily in keeping with the temper of our War-on-Terror times.”43  Coetzee’s 
allegorical story is intertextual with several canonical writers; there are echoes of Franz 
Kafka’s “The Penal Colony,”44 Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter,45 and Samuel 
Beckett’s Waiting for Godot.46  As in Kafka’s elaborate torture machine that punishes by 
writing the law on the body of the condemned in a language incomprehensible to him, in 
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Coetzee’s novel, the Empire’s architectonic power is applied through systematic torture of 
the barbarian girl’s body, which the liberal magistrate reads as secret writing demanding to 
be interpreted; Hawthorne’s critique of prisons as the black flowers of civilization is echoed 
by the magistrate in the novel when the Empire orders construction of new prisons in 
preparation for the so-called external threat; and, Beckett’s staging of action in perpetual 
present which conveys a state of stasis is reenacted in Coetzee’s novel which not only 
echoes the play’s title but is also written entirely in the present tense.  The novel is more 
directly intertextual with the Italian novelist Dino Buzzati’s The Tartar Steppe, who was 
greatly influenced by Kafka.47  Coetzee rewrites Buzzati’s famous novel about a group of 
soldiers waiting for the arrival of the enemy— the Tartars.  Giovanni Drogo, a young 
lieutenant in a nameless country, is posted to Fort Bastiani located in a sleepy frontier 
beyond which lies the desert, the Tartar Steppe.  Isolated from the hustle and bustle of city 
life amidst mountains and a dreadful vast expanse, the soldiers, who live monotonous, 
boring lives, secretly hope that their military training will be rewarded with a confrontation 
with the Tartars over the northern horizon across the empty steppe.  Long ago there may 
have been Tartars but, as in Coetzee’s novel, none have appeared in recent memory.  
Nevertheless, the soldiers hone their weapons and build defenses against the alleged attack.  
Although not intending to stay, Drogo finds that several years have passed by, without his 
noticing, as he waits with his fellow soldiers for the foreign invasion that has not happened.  
Over time the fort is downgraded and Drogo’s ambitions fade after waiting thirty years for 
the enemy.  As he lies on his deathbed, the invading enemy is spotted crossing the desert by 
one of the soldiers.  To his chagrin, he is deemed unfit to fight at the very moment when 
glory beckons.  Unlike Coetzee’s novel, the enemy does eventually appear towards the end 
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of Buzzati’s novel and the militarization of the fort appears less futile.  Coetzee turns to the 
Egyptian poet Constantin Cavafy’s poem “Waiting for Barbarians” for his title and for a 
different ending to Buzzati’s story.  In the poem the Emperor, Praetors and Consuls have 
been waiting splendidly appareled for the arrival of the barbarians, who never appear.  
Disheartened they return to their homes like jilted lovers who have lost their reason to live.  
The concluding lines show their despair: 
 
Why this sudden restlessness, this confusion? 
(How serious people’s faces have become.) 
Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly, 
everyone going home so lost in thought? 
 
Because night has fallen and the barbarians have not come. 
And some who have just returned from the border say 
there are no barbarians any longer. 
 
And now, what’s going to happen to us without the barbarians? 
They were, those people, a kind of solution.48 
 
Coetzee’s novel repeats Cavafy’s ending.  The barbarians of course never appear. 
The novel is set in a lazy, frontier town of a nameless Empire.  The town’s 
Magistrate is the story’s protagonist and homodiegetic narrator.  He is also liberal-minded.  
His peaceful existence comes to an end with the arrival of Colonel Joll, a member of the 
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Third Bureau, who is visiting the frontiers of the Empire on emergency orders from the 
center.  There are rumors that the barbarians are preparing to invade the Empire.  Joll has 
come to verify “the truth” about the external threat, whose cruel interrogation methods force 
the liberal magistrate to distance himself from the Empire of pain.  The “idea” of the 
barbarians enables the Empire to array its forces, display its shiny swords and cannons, and 
even indulge in alleged conflict in the far desert with an invisible enemy, thus, producing 
new fears and desires among the people of the town.  Empire’s bogeyman tactics employed 
once every generation holds together a fractured polity.  The magistrate says: 
Of this [the barbarian] unrest I myself saw nothing.  In private I observed that once 
in every generation, without fail, there is an episode of hysteria about the barbarians.  
There is no woman living along the frontier who has not dreamed of a dark barbarian 
hand coming from under the bed to grip her ankle, no man who has not frightened 
himself with visions of the barbarians carousing in his home, breaking the plates, 
setting fire to the curtains, raping his daughters. These dreams are the consequence 
of too much ease. Show me a barbarian army and I will believe.49 
As in Cavafy’s poem, no barbarians ever appear in the novel, but only a few fisher folks and 
nomads, who are captured by Joll and tortured.  Meanwhile, the magistrate gets involved 
with a barbarian girl, one of the captured nomads bearing marks of Joll’s interrogation 
techniques.  Against the emergency orders, the magistrate undertakes a treacherous journey 
to return her to her people; after doing so, he is imprisoned, tortured, and declared enemy of 
the Empire.  The novel ends with the defeat of the Empire to the alleged barbarians (rumors 
are that they are nomads), while the magistrate, now wearing rags and feeding on leftovers, 
returns to his official post in an almost deserted town in ruins.  
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The novel is published at a time of significant political upheavals in South Africa.  
David Attwell notes that the South African government had aggressively elaborated its 
already existing security apparatus, “The central emphases of policy at this time were 
therefore managerial, technocratic, anticommunist, and military.  The umbrella concept 
linking all of these policies . . . was ‘total strategy.’”50  Moreover, the government banned 
several political organizations, more specifically those advocating Black Consciousness.  
Steve Biko, a founder of the Black Consciousness movement, was a noted anti-apartheid 
activist in South Africa during 1960s and 1970s.  He was brutally murdered in detention in 
1977 by the South African police.  Biko’s murder—and the subsequent cover up—was still a 
fresh memory for the nation as a whole.  For Attwell, Coetzee’s novel highlights the role of 
torture in Biko’s death.  In the novel, the magistrate has been denied direct access to Joll’s 
torture chamber, whose dark secrets exert great seductive power over him.   He is merely 
given two formal activity reports written in a judicious, bureaucratic language of “accidental 
deaths” of two of the detainees.  Coetzee, in his article “Into the Dark Chamber: The 
Novelist and South Africa,” states that torture has exerted a dark fascination on many liberal 
South African writers, most notably Alex La Guma.  During apartheid the South African 
government had banned visual representation of prisons, which increased exponentially over 
the face of the country.  Furthermore, the government banned photographs or sketches of 
Vorster Square, which was the security police headquarters in Johannesburg, where 
numerous political prisoners were taken for interrogation and not all returned alive.  As the 
torture chamber, a site of extreme human experience almost bordering on the pornographic, 
was inaccessible to the people, great many liberal writers of South Africa were drawn to this 
forbidden site: for Coetzee, in South Africa, “The dark forbidden chamber is the origin of 
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the novelistic fantasy per se; in creating an obscenity, in enveloping it in mystery, the state 
creates the preconditions for the novel to set about its work of representation.”51  Thus, the 
State makes its vile mysteries an occasion for novelistic fantasy.  This could partly explain 
the demand by liberal humanist writers of South Africa to act as witness to the injustices of 
apartheid.  The totalitarian state creates the preconditions for such a novel to emerge.  For a 
writer, the ethical challenge is to not fall into the choices produced by the State: to either 
ignore torture or to represent it.  Coetzee states, “The true challenge is how not to play the 
game by the rules of the state, how to establish one’s own authority, how to imagine torture 
and death on one’s own terms.”52  Coetzee, in this article, does not tell us how a writer 
should proceed on his or her own terms sans falling into the games produced by the state.  
What would such a writing look like?  Would such writing produce realist or allegorical 
narratives, the two modes of styles that have divided the liberal South African intelligentsia?  
He only hopes for a future society in which the above two will not be choices, when all 
human actions will be returned to the ambit of moral judgment: “When the choice is no 
longer limited to either looking on in horrified fascination as the blows fall or turning one’s 
eyes away, then the novel can once again take as its province the whole of life, and even the 
torture chamber can be accorded a place in the design.”53   
He slyly dances around the question of his own writing, which, in its own way, has 
been preoccupied with torture and largely produced under the censorship gaze of the 
security state.  I argue that we can find an answer to this question in Coetzee’s fiction, in 
which he confronts the horrors of history on his own terms.  In this essay, Coetzee is 
indirectly responding to his liberal humanist critics such as Gordimer who contend that the 
postmodernist form of allegory, in which his works are largely written, is politically and 
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ethically evasive, and assert that fiction should stand as “witness,” that is, be a 
“representation” of history—“the novel must hold a mirror to history.”  Attwell maintains, 
“The predominance of realism in South African literary culture has led Coetzee, when 
pressed, to adopt positions that waver between embattled defensiveness and incisive 
critique.”54  In numerous interviews and journalistic articles, Coetzee has voiced his 
complaint that in South Africa there is a tendency to “subsume the novel under history” as 
imaginative witnesses of “real” historical events, and a novelist who resists such formulas is 
deemed irresponsible.55  Challenging these notions, he asserts that to offer “Marxist or 
feminist interpretations” of novels is to have missed everything about it:  
No matter what it may appear to be doing, the story may not really be playing the 
game you call Class Conflict or the game called Male Domination or any of the other 
games in the games handbook.  While it may certainly be possible to read the book 
as playing one of those games, in reading it in that way you have missed something.  
You may have missed not just something, you may have missed everything.  
Because (I parody the position somewhat) a story is not a message with a covering, a 
rhetorical or aesthetic covering.56  
In the above quote, Coetzee is ironically attacking two aesthetic forms of writing—realism 
and allegory.  On the one hand, he is defending his use of allegory from criticisms from the 
realist camp that demands witness writing in order to represent the suffering of the victims 
of history.  But he is also attacking the allegorical mode of cognition exemplified in 
Jameson’s reading of “third-world literature,” for whom the literal is always already the 
general.   
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Coetzee’s allegorical fiction critiques the received wisdom that realist narrative is a 
transparent medium through which the light of historical truth passes unmediated by the 
writer-intellectual.  In Coetzee, representation is always an act of interpretation and 
translation.  Furthermore, Coetzee’s metafictional novels also stage the signifying function 
of language; sign as “representation” denies the productive nature of language as it assumes 
that there is one-to-one relationship between the signifier and signified: “The linguistic-
systemic orientation of his novels involves the recognition, rooted in all linguistic inquiry, 
that language is productive.”57  We have “real” world because we have language to signify 
it.  Liberal humanist intellectuals, in their desire to give voice-consciousness to the other of 
history, disguise their position as “representing” intellectuals who “speak for the other.”  To 
disguise this “interpretive” function of representation is ethically problematic, more so when 
the writer, camped outside the closed doors of the dark chamber as witness to history, is also 
a voyeur. 
Coetzee’s oeuvre perpetually stages the figure of the liberal humanist indulging in 
the business of “representing” the subaltern: in WFB the magistrate is one such figure who 
attempts to speak for the suffering of the silent barbarian girl.  Through the course of the 
narrative these “representing humanists” learn the painful lesson, which is echoed in 
Spivak’s famous essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?”, that “their privilege is their loss”:  
When we come to the concomitant question of the consciousness of the subaltern, 
the notion of what the [intellectual’s] work cannot say becomes important. . . .   With 
no possibility of nostalgia for that lost origin, the historian must suspend . . . the 
clamor of his or her own consciousness . . . so that the elaboration of the insurgency, 
packaged with an insurgent-consciousness does not freeze into an “object of 
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investigation,” or, worse yet, a model for imitation.  The postcolonial intellectuals 
learn that their privilege is their loss. In this they are a paradigm of the 
intellectuals.58 
Spivak is critical of liberal intellectuals of both the first and the third worlds who, in their 
desires to “speak for the other,” construct the subaltern either as a subject-of-revolt or 
object-of-oppression, in turn ironically rehearsing imperialist impulses.  Intellectuals should 
begin with an admission of failure, that is, a recognition of the limits of their position, rather 
than rendering themselves transparent through witness writing.  In Coetzee’s fiction, the 
figure of the liberal humanist comes to realize that to confront the subalterns is not to 
appropriate, assimilate or represent them but to learn to re-present him/herself.  The 
subalterns in Coetzee’s fiction remain silent; they resist the author’s (and the protagonist’s) 
attempts to “represent” them.  In WFB, the silence of the subaltern woman interrupts the 
magistrate’s dominant discourse.  Concomitantly, the liberal author belonging to the 
dominant group, stages the limits of his own discourse, which is deeply rooted in the history 
of imperialism.  In this regard, far from being an ethical black hole, Coetzee’s fiction is 
deeply ethical in the Levinasian sense.  As suggested in my introduction, for Levinas ethics 
occurs when the liberty and the spontaneity of the knowing subject is called into question by 
the radically other.  In Coetzee’s fiction, the radical other of Europe resists all attempts by 
the narrators and the author to appropriate and assimilate them.   
In WFB Coetzee interrupts the objective illusion of the realist mode of representation 
by deliberately writing the novel in the allegorical mode that helps him stage the act of 
interpretation—an act of establishing of meanings in terms of the master code.  This bare 
timeless, placeless narrative—an allegory of allegories—deliberately seduces interpretations 
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from the readers.  Allegory, in the novel, is employed not only at a structural level, but also 
at a thematic level.  Throughout the novel, the liberal magistrate is preoccupied with the 
attempt to decipher a hieroglyphic script, written on pieces of poplar wood which he has 
discovered among ancient desert ruins.  When Colonel Joll questions him about the pieces, 
he says, “They form an allegory.  They can be read in many orders.  Further, each single slip 
can be read in many ways,” expressing the idea that allegory requires an act of interpretation 
whereby its meanings can be decoded.59  The literal wood pieces stand for something else.  
Needless to say Colonel Joll interprets the wood pieces as embodying a secret code that the 
barbarians have shared with the traitorous magistrate.  Colonel Joll’s reading of the act of 
interpretation as translation of the literal into the symbolic realm finds its corollary in the 
magistrate’s attempts at decoding the marks and scars left by Joll’s interrogation techniques 
on the barbarian girl’s body.  But over the course of the narrative plot, the magistrate 
becomes painfully aware that his attempts at interpreting the marks on the subaltern’s body 
bring him increasingly closer to Joll’s interrogation methods applied to the body to reveal its 
dark secrets.  The act of interpretation inextricably links the State (Vorster Square), the 
author, the character, and the reader in a vicious hermeneutics circle.  Critics, who 
unselfconsciously engage in the dangerous games of allegorization, of translating the text 
into pre-exiting master codes of morality or politics, fail to see this trap laid out by the text.   
We do not have here a transparent intellectual mind transmitting the truth of history—fiction 
as witness is an impossibility in this hermeneutic circle.  Coetzee’s novelistic strategy 
radically differs from the realist narratives of liberal writers (such as Gordimer) as it self-
consciously presents itself “as an interpretation” (rather than disguising itself as 
representation), and thus as a necessarily problematic narrative.  Dovey rightly suggests that 
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the “liberal humanist discourse does not recognize its status as discourse; it fails to account 
for the way in which the meanings it constructs are contingent upon a specific interpretive 
framework.”60  This is evident in the demands for witness writing, in standing as witness to 
history.  In contrast, Coetzee stages his ambiguous position as a “postcolonizer” in the 
neocolonial context of South Africa.  He cannot simply choose to deny this (or worse still to 
render himself transparent); the history of his discourse is deeply rooted in the history of 
imperialism, which necessitates that he cannot unproblematically “speak for the other” of 
history.  In Coetzee’s fiction, we have an account of the complicity between writing, 
reading, and the structures of desire and power.  But the task of the intellectual-writer is not 
merely to repeat blindly the dominant modes in his writing, but to displace it.  WFB not only 
places under scrutiny its own interpretive practice but also, in this repetition of the act of 
interpretation, deconstructs itself by displacing the very terms of its own dominant narrative. 
Such a deconstructive practice helps Coetzee displace the dominant from within.   
The novel begins with the magistrate of a lazy outpost of the Empire declaring in the 
first-person (homodiegetic) singular, “I have never seen anything like it: two little discs of 
glass suspended in front of his eyes in loops of wire.”61  The glasses are dark and look 
opaque from the outside, which makes the magistrate initially conclude that they hide blind 
eyes; but he soon learns that Colonel Joll can see through them.  Joll, who is visiting the 
frontiers of the unnamed Empire on emergency orders from the center, proudly announces 
that his spectacles are a new invention protecting the eyes from the harsh light of the desert 
sun and the skin from getting wrinkled: the magistrate, conscious of his outdatedness, 
excitedly states, “He tells me they are a new invention.”62  The nervous magistrate (and the 
reader) is uncomfortably aware of being seen by Joll’s eyes, but unable to see them.  Joll is a 
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member of the Third Bureau, which has newly become the most important division of the 
Civil Guard whose members are “seekers of truth,” “doctors of interrogation.”  The Empire 
has sent its representative to the border post to find out truth about the alleged attack by the 
barbarians.  The dark glasses are meant to protect the eyes of the Empire from the sun 
(symbolically from the land and its people) and to keep it ageless: the magistrate observes 
the effects of the spectacles on the Colonel’s skin, “It is true. He has the skin of a younger 
man.”63  The sun shall never set on the Empire.  Here one is reminded of Coetzee’s analysis 
of white writing in the context of South Africa.  In his book White Writing, he speaks of the 
resistance of the white settler writer to fully embrace Africa, being quick to love the land but 
not its people.64  These new men of Empire, Joll and Mandel, are handsome (Mandel 
possesses “Aryan” beauty), neat, efficient, and machinic: “He [Mandel] is good-looking 
man, with regular white teeth and lovely blue eyes. . . .  The kind of man who drives his 
body like a machine, I imagine, ignorant that it has its own rhythms.  When he looks at me . 
. . he will look from behind that handsome immobile face and through those clear eyes as an 
actor looks from behind a mask.”65  The eyes hidden behind the mask can see without being 
seen; the voyeuristic nature of this uneven visibility is a motif that repeats throughout the 
novel.  Under the new emergency situation, the eyes of power are visible but unverifiable 
(even by its own members); in this new world, there is a dissociation of the see/being seen 
dyad. Empire’s panoptic gaze appears blind but can see; blindness and (in)sight, 
contradictions in the old world, are perfectly coherent in the new technology of power, 
contradictorily coherent.  
WFB is written in homodiegetic present-tense narration.  The structural use of 
unbroken present tense conveys a sense of immediacy, urgency and newness of the 
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emergency situation.  In this State of emergency, time is suspended in an eternal present.  
Empire consolidates its presence by imposing a timeless stasis and obliterating the past and 
the future; the emergency powers have created an “irruption of history into the static time of 
the oasis.”66  The community is caught in an ever-repeated present time of “waiting” for the 
putative enemy, which serves to reinforce the power structures by making knowledge of a 
different time and a different society inaccessible.  The present tense of Magistrate’s 
narrative time is at odds with his anachronistic desires, suggesting a split between the 
experiencing self and the narrating self.  Before Joll’s arrival on the scene he appears to be 
living a peaceful existence, carrying out his not too onerous duties, pursuing his hobbies that 
include hunting and archeological excavations, as well as enjoying multiple liaisons with the 
young women of the town.  But in these new times, his quiet existence has come to an end: 
“So now it seems my easy years are coming to an end, when I could sleep with a tranquil 
heart knowing that with a nudge here and a touch there the world would stay on its 
course.”67  A member of the old-style Empire, the magistrate increasingly desires to distance 
himself from the presentness of the Empire of pain by struggling on with the old story: “The 
new men of Empire are the ones who believe in fresh starts, new chapters, clean pages; I 
struggle on with the old story, hoping that before it is finished it will reveal to me why it was 
that I thought it worth the trouble.”68  One of his hobbies is to excavate ancient desert ruins 
hoping to hear spirits from the byways of history: “I pamper my melancholy and try to find 
in the vacuousness of the desert a special historical poignancy.”69  Significantly enough, this 
romantic nostalgia for a past time, uttered in the urgency of the present tense of narrative 
time, does not suggest a desire for destruction of Empire altogether but a destruction of the 
Empire of pain, of the new men of Empire, who have ruined his peaceful days: he wishes to 
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run an “Empire in which there would be no more injustice, no more pain.”70  When Joll 
returns to the center, after his first visit, the magistrate orders his soldiers to thoroughly 
clean up the torture chamber declaring “I want everything as it was before.”71  By holding 
on to an old story he wishes to distance himself from the “bad” men of the Empire.  
Confronted with the torture marks on the barbarian girl’s body the magistrate realizes that 
his attempt at temporally distancing himself from the torturers (the “bad” Empire) is futile.  
In the figure of the barbarian girl the past and the present collapse into an eternal presence of 
the Empire, marked on her body by Joll’s forks and pincers. 
Colonel Joll captures nomads and fisherfolk to supposedly investigate the truth about 
the alleged barbarian invasion.  The magistrate takes one of the tortured nomads, a barbarian 
girl, to live with him; her father is killed and she is blinded by the Colonel.  He undertakes 
nightly rituals of bathing and oiling her wounds, frequently interrupted by sleep: “But more 
often in the very act of caressing her I am overcome with sleep as if poleaxed, fall into 
oblivion. . . .  These dreamless spells are like death to me, or enchantment, bank, outside 
time.”72  He is drawn to the dark, elusive symbols that the new Empire has left on her body: 
“Between thumb and forefinger I part her eyelids. The caterpillar comes to an end, 
decapitated, at the pink inner rim of the eyelid.”73  This liberal servant of the Empire has a 
fascination for the dark chamber, where the doctors of interrogation work on their patients to 
“produce” truth, but has been denied access to it: “I sit in my rooms with the windows shut, 
in the stifling warmth of a windless evening, trying to read, straining my ears to hear or not 
hear sounds of violence.”74  He is the figure of the liberal humanist writer, who stands 
outside the torture chamber begging to be let it in so as to act as witness to the crimes of the 
State.  When denied access to document the crime, he begins to engage in hermeneutics, 
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interpreting the mysteries of the chamber.  The choice, to document or represent, to write a 
realistic novel or an allegorical one, is created by the preconditions of (the bad men of) the 
Empire.  Thus, daily ritualistic acts of healing function as acts of interpretation, of 
decipherment: “It has been growing more and more clear to me that until the marks on this 
girl’s body are deciphered and understood I cannot let go of her.”75  The magistrate’s 
healing activity is directed towards a goal of signification and is, therefore, teleological; she 
is the only “key to the labyrinth.”76  This allegorical activity seeks that symbolic level of 
meaning through decoding the literal torture marks left on the body.  He seeks to translate 
the literal into the pre-existing metanarrative of the Empire.  The impulse for interpretation 
goes hand in had with the desire to penetrate, to crack open the surface and reveal the truth.  
But the symbols invite a hermeneutic activity only to frustrate it.  Similarly Coetzee’s novel 
invites allegorical readings only to frustrate such attempts by the reader.  The magistrate, to 
his chagrin, fails to translate the surface of the barbarian girl’s body into the master codes of 
the Empire: 
But with this woman it is as if there is no interior, only a surface across which I hunt 
back and forth seeking entry.  For the first time I feel a dry pity for them [torturers]: 
how natural a mistake to believe that you can burn or tear or hack your way into the 
secret body of the other!  The girl lies in my bed, but there is no good reason why it 
should be a bed. I behave in some ways like a lover—I undress her, I bathe her, I 
stroke her, I sleep beside her—but I might equally well tie her to a chair and beat her, 
it would be no less intimate.”77 
The act of allegorization collapses the distance between Joll and him, between the “good” 
Empire of the past and the “bad” Empire of the present.  Joll’s torture and his healing rituals 
 59 
(described in the metaphor of hunting) are signifying activities that in their attempt at 
revealing the truth transform the Other of history into the dominant narrative of the Empire.  
To decipher/to torture is to obliterate/translate the singular alterity of the Other into 
Empire’s regimes of truth.  Foucault, in his influential book Discipline and Punish, states 
that the truth-power relation is central to torture: “If torture was so strongly embedded in 
legal practice, it was because it revealed truth and showed the operation of power. . . .  It 
also made the body of the condemned man the place where the vengeance of the sovereign 
is applied, the anchoring point for a manifestation of power, an opportunity of affirming the 
dissymmetry of forces.”78  Through torture the Empire does not reveal truth but asserts its 
“will to truth” by exerting its power over the body of the Other; it rewrites the body into its 
pre-existing master code.  It produces and circulates subjects and signs in accordance with a 
recognizable totality.  In the magistrate’s failure to decode Coetzee stages the dangers of 
allegorization, of the nostalgia for continuities and totalities.  Empire, both in its old and 
new avatars, brings about a dissociation of the see/being seen dyad, as symbolized by the 
uneven visibility of Joll’s dark glasses.  Significantly enough, the liberal magistrate’s 
voyeuristic gaze establishes a similar dissymmetry of forces between him and the blind 
barbarian girl: “I watch her as she undresses, hoping to capture in her movements a hint of 
an old free state. . . .  Her face has the look of something that knows itself watched.”79  Yet 
again, the distance between Joll and him is negligible; they are merely two sides of the same 
coin: “For I was not, as I liked to think, the indulgent pleasure-loving opposite of the cold 
rigid Colonel.  I was the lie that Empire tells itself when times are easy, he the truth that 
Empire tells when harsh winds blow.”80  Good imperialism (sometimes called the “civilizing 
mission”) is the lie, while bad imperialism is the truth.  The hegemony of liberal humanism 
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works in alliance with the domination of the imperial powers.  Dovey suggests in the 
magistrate’s crisis of interpretation we see the failure of liberal humanism to see itself as 
discourse: “One corollary to the failure of liberal humanism to see itself as discourse is its 
failure to see itself as located in history. . . .  A second corollary is the failure of liberal 
humanist discourse to see itself as a speech act . . . engaged in a process of subject 
constitution.”81 
If the voyeuristic desire for signification collapses the illusory ethical and temporal 
distance between him and Joll, his failure to penetrate the surface of the barbarian girl, to 
interpret her body marks, initiates his radical transformation from being a servant to 
becoming the enemy of the Empire.  The crisis of interpretation results in loss of the 
referential certainty of the Empire.  Realizing that she is “a prisoner now as ever before,” he 
decides to take her back to her people against the emergency orders.82  Outside the 
boundaries of the Empire, in a treacherous desert, he is able to consummate the relationship 
with the girl (who initiates the sexual act).  After the intercourse, still doubtful of his 
relationship to the gendered Other, he asks, “Is it then the case that it is the whole woman I 
want, that my pleasure in her is spoiled until these marks on her are erased . . . [or] that it is 
the marks on her which drew me to her but, which to my disappointment do not go deep 
enough . . . is it she I want or the traces of history her body bears?”83  Dovey reads the 
magistrate’s crisis of interpretation as the failure of the liberal humanist discourse to see 
itself located in history.  But, as this quote suggests, is this crisis not due to a sense of a lack 
rather than a failure?  The question doubts if his inability to penetrate earlier was merely due 
to personal or historical reasons.  Being an ordinary magistrate with no heroic desires of 
toppling the Empire but merely hoping to merit three lines of small print in the Imperial 
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Gazette, he doubts whether the marks were simply ugly and distasteful or they symbolized 
the brutal history of the Empire from which he cannot ethically distance himself.  Although 
he struggles to understand his position, the Empire has no such difficulty: as soon as he 
returns from his journey he is arrested on charges of treason.  He is now imprisoned in the 
same dark chamber, access to which he sought earlier.  Ironically, facts and metaphors are 
literalized here.  Either writing choices, based on documentation or interpretation, realism or 
allegory, would still have afforded him distance from that chamber.  After being imprisoned 
in the same dark chamber, he continues to doubt his heroic capabilities, but is certain about 
one thing, “my alliance with the guardians of the Empire is over, I have set myself in 
opposition, the bond is broken, I am a free man. . . .  And is there any principle behind my 
opposition?”84  The interpretive determinacy of allegory is disrupted; the hermeneutic seal is 
broken.  Consequently, justice no longer means good, painless imperialism—“to run an 
Empire in which there would be no more injustice, no more pain.”85  The passage from 
being a legal subject to becoming an outlaw reveals to him that such oxymoronic fantasies, 
painless Empire, can only be entertained within the fixed system of meanings produced by 
the Empire.  Joll, after his first expedition against the alleged barbarians, returns to the fort 
with a group of nomads, who walk in a file tied neck to neck with a loop of wire running 
through the flesh of each man’s hands and through holes pierced in his cheeks.  The 
magistrate, who sneaks out of prison to witness the public torture of the nomads along with 
other members of the town, appeals to Joll, in a high humanist tradition, to halt the torture: 
“We are the great miracle of creation! But from blows this miraculous body cannot repair 
itself!”86  Returning to his prison cell, after being beaten, he ponders, “Justice: once that 
word is uttered, where will it all end?. . . .  For where can that argument lead but to laying 
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down our arms and opening the gates of the town to the people whose land we have 
raped?”87  In the process of “othering,” of becoming the enemy of the State, the magistrate 
has learned some hard lessons.  Justice demands a total destruction of the Empire’s regimes 
of truth rather than desiring access to and selectively appropriating those codes for liberal 
humanist reasons.  
If earlier the magistrate fails to interpret the Other’s body, after becoming an outlaw, 
he plays with Joll the game of being a master interpreter.  The pieces of poplar wood that he 
has been collecting from his archaeological excavations in ancient desert ruins are painted 
with characters in a script he cannot read.  Joll believes the slips to be evidence of secret 
messages between the magistrate and the barbarians and demands that he translate them.  In 
a seminal passage central to the novel’s preoccupation with interpretation and signification, 
the magistrate pretends to decipher the hieroglyphic script, critiquing, in each process of 
translation, the interpretive determinacy of the Empire: 
Now let us see what the next one says.  See, there is only a single character.  It is the 
barbarian character war, but it has other senses too.  It can stand for vengeance, and 
if you turn it upside down like this, it can be made to read justice.  There is no 
knowing which sense is intended.  That is part of barbarian cunning. . . .  They form 
an allegory.  They can be read in many orders.  Further, each single slip can be read 
in many ways.  Together they can be read as a domestic journal, or they can be read 
as a plan of war, or they can be turned on their sides and read as a history of the last 
years of the Empire—the old Empire, I mean.  There is no agreement among 
scholars about how to interpret these relics of the ancient barbarians.  Allegorical 
sets like this one can be found buried all over the desert.  I found this one not three 
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miles from here in the ruins of a public building.  Graveyards are another good place 
to look.88 
The language games he plays highlight the indeterminacy and unreliability of signification.  
In his performance, the magistrate is aware that the script has already been translated by Joll 
into the pre-existing, fixed, totality of Empire’s master code.  Slemon points out that 
imperialism can be seen as an allegorical activity, in that colonial conquest rereads and 
translates the new upon the old: “Columbus’s ritual of naming is essentially an extension of 
allegorical consciousness in that it ‘reads’ the territory of the ‘other’ by reference to an 
anterior set of signs already situated in a cultural thematics, and by this process the ‘new’ 
world is made contingent upon the old.”89  Colonel Joll wants to hear from the magistrate 
what, he believes, is already true—“X means war,” “X stands for war,” “X is war.” Thus, he 
first pretends to play the game by the rules of the state by giving an allegorical reading—“It 
is the barbarian character war”—, repeating what Joll wants to hear, but soon displaces the 
teleological narrative by not offering a signified, a universal representation of the sign, but a 
chain of signifiers: it can mean war, vengeance or justice.  The direct, fixed relationship 
between signifier and signified is disrupted, and instead we have an infinite shift in meaning 
relayed from one signifier to another.  In an internal monologue he says, “I have no idea 
what they stand for.  Does each stand for a single thing, a circle for the sun, a triangle for a 
woman, a wave for a lake; or does a circle merely stand for “circle”, a triangle for “triangle”, 
a wave for “wave”?”90  There is no continuous, original, transcendental signified.  
Uncannily, the magistrate’s antiteleological reading strategy is mirrored later in the nomads’ 
war strategy employed against the Empire.  The nomads, due to their familiarity with the 
land, lure Joll’s army deeper and deeper into the harsh desert, where the soldiers nearly 
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freeze and starve to death, while they disappear.  The magistrate’s poignant, fictive story 
that similar allegorical sets are buried all over the desert becomes a reality as the soldiers’ 
dead bodies are strewn all over the harsh desert.  His reading consists a veiled warning that 
the inherent elusiveness of language, of the barbarians will bring about the destruction of the 
Empire.  Joll ignores the magistrate’s prediction by dismissing his language games as a sign 
of madness; he orders a second expedition against the barbarians but returns hungry and 
defeated.  In the last encounter between them, Joll’s dark glasses are missing and the 
magistrate whispers to him, “The crime that is latent in us we must inflict on ourselves. . . .  
Not on others.”91  At this moment, the novel powerfully performs the historical 
“decolonization” of the allegorical imperative.  The allegorical impulse of the Empire is 
necessarily a suicidal one; it entails its own destruction.  
Empire has created the time of chronos (a time of history) in opposition to the time 
of kairos (a time of the seasons): “Empire has created the time of history.  Empire has 
located its existence not in the smooth recurrent spinning time of the cycle of the seasons but 
in the jagged time of rise and fall, of beginning and end, of catastrophe.  Empire dooms 
itself to live in history and plot against history.”92  Empire imposes the time of history on its 
subjects, the catastrophic, jagged time of rise and fall.  In resistance to the linear time of 
Empire, the magistrate sits down on his desk to write, in an almost deserted fort, a pastoral 
story: “No one who paid a visit to this oasis . . . failed to be struck but the charm of life here.  
We lived in the time of the seasons, of harvests, of the migrations of the waterbirds.  We 
lived with nothing between us and the stars.  We would have made any concession, had we 
only known what, to go on living here.  This was a paradise on earth.”93  In his desire to 
leave a record of the last year of the settlement he takes recourse to the idyllic time of the 
 65 
kairos, which is not the oppressive, static present time of his own narrative, but the time of 
the seasons, of change.  Writing in and about a different temporal order demands a different 
form; thus, he writes not a testament but a literary work, not “History” but a story.  The 
literary displaces the oppressive hermeneutic circle of the Empire as it harkens to the 
movement of the emergent. 
In the figure of the magistrate, Coetzee’s novel stages the dangers of allegorization 
in order to deconstruct its referential certainty.  Consequently, Coetzee’s use of allegory 
undermines and dismisses the interpretive teleology of his own allegorical fable.  The novel 
seduces the reader to indulge in allegorical interpretations, which inevitably are subject to 
the same failures.  Coetzee deconstructs the form of allegory from within allegory.  He 
offers a critique of the discourse of imperialism from writing within that discourse and not 
as a transparent “witness” to history (whose hands are not bloodied).  His critique of 
imperialism shows awareness of the traces of the discourse of imperialism in his own 
critique.  Coetzee displaces the dominant from within. 
But then, does not the form of allegory work in both ways for him—to stage imperial 
totalities and to disrupt these totalities?  In other words, is Coetzee employing the form of 
postmodern allegory to interrupt traditional allegory?  In the scene with Joll he dramatizes a 
clash of the two forms of allegory: Colonel Joll reads the literal wood pieces as referring to a 
secret, symbolic code whose revelation will save the Empire; the magistrate, now 
transformed into the figure of the Benjaminian grave-digger, disinters the ruined 
hieroglyphic fragments and points to Joll that the meaning generated is uncertain and 
discontinuous—the sign could mean justice or vengeance, who knows?  Throughout this 
chapter, I have laid out the dangers of allegorization which Jameson, Coetzee’s critics, and 
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the magistrate fall into.  But so does Coetzee’s WFB.  The novel is preoccupied with what 
now is called “traditional allegory.”  The above scene between Joll and the magistrate is the 
only moment in the text where we see Coetzee reiterate the possibilities in the form that 
Benjamin and de Man see.  While the form of allegory has been central to his imaginative 
endeavors, and more so as a South African writer working under the injunctions of witness 
writing, I do not think Coetzee’s novels wish to recover, recuperate, revise, and redeem the 
form, and his practice, from the dangers of allegorization.  And, given the continued 
dominance of the “traditional” ways of reading his allegories, how could he?  In other 
words, Coetzee’s relationship to the form is agonistic; his allegorical novels simultaneously 
stage the dangers and the possibilities of the form, but are more cautious of its dangers. 
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2.0  WRITING A COUNTER-MEMORY OF EMPIRE: J. M. COETZEE’S FOE 
What matter who’s speaking, someone said what matter who’s speaking. 
—Samuel Beckett.1 
 
I would really like to have slipped imperceptibly into this lecture. . . .  I would have 
preferred to be enveloped in words, borne way beyond all possible beginnings.  At the 
moment of speaking, I would like to have perceived a nameless voice, long preceding me, 
leaving me merely to enmesh myself in it, taking up its cadence, and to lodge myself, when 
no one was looking, in its interstices as if it had paused an instant, in suspense, to beckon to 
me.  There would have been no beginnings: instead, speech would proceed from me, while I 
stood in its path—a slender path—the point of its possible disappearance.  
—Michel Foucault.2 
 
To write (active) is to carry out the action without reference to the self, perhaps, though not 
necessarily, on behalf of someone else.  To write (middle) is to carry out the action (or 
better, to do-writing) with reference to the self.  
—J. M. Coetzee.3 
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Coetzee’s Foe,4 first published in 1986, is intertextual with three texts of Daniel 
Defoe: Robinson Crusoe,5 Roxana,6 and “True Relation of the Apparition of One Mrs. 
Veal.”7 Although Foe constitutes a complex interplay between all three texts, it 
predominantly rewrites Robinson Crusoe.  In this chapter, I argue that if Daniel Defoe’s 
Robinson Crusoe is a story of origin (Ursprung), then Coetzee rewrites this original English 
novel, which is also a novel about Empire, as a story of beginnings (Herkunft).  Drawing 
from Michel Foucault’s idea of general history as a new kind of history that does not record 
the past but monumentalizes it, I argue that Coetzee’s parodic novel rewrites a general 
history of Empire, in order to interrupt the totalizing humanist project of universal history, 
by transforming the documents of the past into monuments, reality into parody, and memory 
into counter-memory.  Unlike Defoe’s novel, the story of the racialized subaltern Friday is 
not a story of centralizing through recollection.  It is a story of establishing distance, not for 
reflection, but to produce a gap of difference between the self and the other.  In the tradition 
of Levinasian ethics, it constitutes a face-to-face encounter with the radical alterity of the 
other, whose absolute otherness cannot be collapsed into the law of the liberal humanist 
Susan Barton.  Friday’s story does not lend itself to an anthropological reduction.  In 
Coetzee, to write is not to represent the other, but to wrench the self from itself through 
dehumanizing effects of counter-memory. 
Defoe is one of the first practitioners of the English realist novel; in conventional 
accounts, he is considered to be the “father” of the “novel” (the term “novel” began to be 
used in its modern sense during the late eighteenth century).  With the emergence of this 
new genre, there appears a new kind of writing, the realist novel: Ian Watt states, “realism . . 
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. [is] the defining characteristic which differentiates the work of the early eighteenth century 
novelists from previous fiction.”8  Novel form replaces myth with the truth of individual 
experience: “from the Renaissance onwards, there was a growing tendency for individual 
experience to replace collective tradition as the ultimate arbiter of reality.”9  In the social 
realm, democratizing tendency of industrial capital, combined with progressive division of 
labor, provides the best conditions for the arrival of the individualist independent of fellow 
human beings and of tradition.  The social field is now organized around the ordinary 
individual rather than the family, church or guild.  Memories, which provide the causal link 
between past and present, establish the continuous individual identity.  The novel form 
emerges as the expression of the experience of the unified individual through duration in 
time.  Defoe, a master of verisimilitude, stages the unified subject with a believable ruse: 
Watt argues, “Defoe initiated an important new tendency in fiction: his total subordination 
of the plot to the pattern of the autobiographical memoir is as defiant an assertion of the 
primacy of individual experience in the novel as Descartes’ cogito ergo sum was in 
philosophy.”10  The title page of RC announces itself as a confessional autobiography— The 
Life and Strange Surprising Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, Written By Himself.  
Confessional autobiography provides the ego absolute freedom of self-expression and self-
examination.  If the homogenizing forces of capitalism promise the individual absolute 
freedom in economic, social, and intellectual spheres based on division of labor, the 
egalitarian tendency of Puritanism promise all diligent souls a path to redemption based on 
dignity of labor and self-scrutiny.  According to Watt, along with capitalist individualism 
and economic specialization, Puritan ethic of the self was seminal factor in the rise of the 
novel: “It is . . . likely that the Puritan conception of the dignity of labor helped to bring into 
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being the novel’s general premise that the individual’s daily life is of sufficient importance 
and interest to be the proper subject of literature.”11  The emergence of the English novel is a 
product of divergent forces: the Western ego’s internal journey into the depths of its soul 
and external journey for surplus profits.  Novel lies in the interstices between the soul-
making and the profit-making interests of the English individualist.  RC is a pioneering text, 
which stages the play of these divergent forces in the figure of its protagonist.  
Robinson Crusoe has become a prototype of the economic individual: Watt asserts, 
“That Robinson Crusoe . . . is an embodiment of economic individualism hardly needs 
demonstration.”12  The economic individual, the homo economicus, forms basis of the 
political economy of Adam Smith whom he describes as a rational and self-interested human 
being.  While arguing that division of labor is based on the propensity in human nature to 
exchange, he states, “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, 
that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest.  We address ourselves, 
not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities but 
of their advantages.”13  For Smith, exchange, an activity not found in animals, is based on a 
rational, calculating principle of self-interest.  In Defoe’s novel, Crusoe’s actions are 
governed by the principle of economic self-interest.  Crusoe forgoes his middle state “or 
what might be called the upper Station of Low Life,” which his father deems to be the best 
state of life, to become a sailor.14  Despite feeling that “there seem’d to be something fatal in 
that Propension of Nature tending directly to the Life of Misery” he abandons his family, 
nation and God for sea and adventure.15  Affective ties function as impediments to his 
economic interests; hence, in his dealings as a sailor, slave trader, plantation owner, and a 
settler colonist, Crusoe only forms contractual relationships.  Echoing the utilitarian 
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individualism of Smith’s ideas, the autobiographical narrative dramatizes the rational choice 
theory: Crusoe, with meticulous rational scrutiny of his own economic interests, tries to 
maximize profits by extracting maximum labor-power for minimum wages (or zero wages 
as in Friday’s case).  One key example of this is his dealings in slave trade.  Although he has 
a few qualms about selling Xury, a Moorish boy, to the Portuguese Captain, he has little 
doubt about the great economic benefits of directly expropriating, rather than exchanging for 
wages, the labor power of his slaves.  With the arrival of Friday, a “faithful, loving, sincere 
Servant . . . without Passions, Sullenness or Designs, perfectly oblig’d and engag’ed,”16  
Crusoe muses, “life [on the island] began to be so easy, that I began to say to my self, that 
could I but have been safe from more Savages, I cared not, if I was never to remove from the 
place while I lived.”17  On the island, Crusoe experiences the absolute state of laissez-faire, 
where there is no taxman, no competitor, and complete harmony between labor and capital.  
Here, he is detached from all natural bonds and master of all he surveys: “I was lord of the 
whole Manor; or if I pleas’d, I might call my self King, or Emperor over the whole Country 
which I had Possession of.  There were no Rivals.  I had no Competitor, none to dispute 
Sovereignty or Command with me.”18 
In the eighteenth-century, for the first time, the social is confronted by the private 
individual.  The idea of an economic utopian state constituting of isolated autonomous 
individuals detached from natural bonds engaging in independent production outside of 
society, which Karl Marx mockingly calls “Robinsonades,” has held great sway since the 
first appearance of Defoe’s novel.  Karl Marx chides Ricardo and Smith for taking the 
naturally independent autonomous subject, which according to him belongs to “the 
unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades,”19 as the starting point of 
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their economic theories.  Critiquing the most enduring myth of capitalism, that of an isolated 
individual producing outside of society, he takes “material production,” individual 
production that is socially determined, as his point of departure.  Gayatri Spivak argues that 
most critics have misread Marx’s analysis of Robinson Crusoe, in Capital: Volume I, as an 
example of capitalist mode of production: “Everyone reads it as being about capitalism, but 
it is exactly not so.”20  Instead she asserts, “Marx chooses four examples, three precapitalist 
and one post-.  One of the three precapitalist examples, Robinson is the first and the most 
interesting because the other two are situations of exchange, although not of generalized 
commodity exchange.”21  Thus, Crusoe is an example of the production of, not exchange-
values, but use-values: Marx states, “All Robinson’s products were exclusively the result of 
his own personal labour and they were therefore directly objects of utility for him 
personally.”22  But for Marx, individual production is always already social, as a human 
being is necessarily a “political animal.”  For him, isolated individual production, a mere 
fancy of Ricardo and Smith, is as absurd as the development of language in isolation.  
Although in RC we see an instance of isolated individual production, according to Marx, 
Crusoe is “ a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present.”23  
Thus, even the private individual production contains the social processes; concrete labor is 
already abstract labor.  Spivak is right to point out that, in Marx’s reading, Crusoe is an 
instance of precapitalist mode of production.  But for Marx Crusoe’s story also shows the 
reigning myth of capitalism, its “aesthetic semblance,”24 of isolated Robinsons engaging in 
independent production outside society.  This aesthetic semblance is both anachronistic and 
ahistorical.  Political economists have placed their homo economicus in a primordial natural 
state outside history:  
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Smith and Ricardo still stand with both feet on the shoulders of the eighteenth-
century prophets, in whose imaginations this eighteenth-century individual—the 
product on the one side of the dissolution of feudal forms of society, on the other 
side of the new forces of production developed since the sixteenth-century—appears 
as an ideal, whose existence they project into the past.  Not as a historic result but as 
history’s point of departure.  As the Natural Individual appropriate to their notion of 
human nature, not arising historically, but posited by nature.25 
Thus, political economists treat the economic individual not as a product of history but its 
miraculous origin.  Paradoxically, the origin of the rational self-interested individualist lies 
outside history, already present in a pure natural state.  This society of “free” competition 
seems to be posited on naturalism as it considers isolated, autonomous individuals the most 
natural state of being.  According to Marx, this is not merely a reaction against civilization 
and a “return to nature,” but a necessary illusion, “the aesthetic semblance,” of capitalism.  
The concept of homo economicus is based on this chimera of pure origin.  Elaborating on the 
difference between Ursprung (origin) and Herkunft (descent) in Nietzsche’s thoughts, 
Michel Foucault asserts that as a genealogist Nietzsche critiques the search for origins 
because “it is an attempt to capture the exact essence of things, their purest possibilities, and 
their carefully protected identities, because this search assumes the existence of immobile 
forms that precede the external world of accident and succession.”26  Origin, that pure state 
outside history, is the condition of possibility of the homo economicus. 
In his treatise on natural education of citizens, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, who declares 
that he hates books because they have no utilitarian function, makes one exception to that 
rule: “Since we must have books, there is one book which, to my thinking, supplies the best 
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treatise on an education according to nature.  This is the first book Émile will read. . . .  Is it 
Aristotle?  Pliny?  Buffon?  No; it is Robinson Crusoe.”27  To produce ideal citizens who 
can participate in the collective will of contrat social, Rousseau, like Smith, proposes a 
return to an isolated, primordial, natural state not touched by the corruption of society and 
the accidents of history.  For Rousseau, moral education of citizens requires “recognizing” 
direct relationship between things without recourse to signs, and hence language: “The 
surest way to raise him above prejudice and to base his judgments on the true relations of 
things, is to put him in the place of solitary man, and to judge all things as they would be 
judged by such a man in relation to their own utility.”28  Rousseau’s homo solitarius can 
arrive at sound judgments only in isolation, a necessary condition to recognize the utility of 
things.  Upon reflection on his life on the island, Crusoe realizes that he can enjoy only those 
things that have use-value: “In a Word, The Nature and Experience of Things dictated to me 
upon just Reflection, That all the good Things of this World, are no farther good to us than 
they are for our Use.”29  Like Crusoe, Émile should be deprived of human companionship 
and mechanical tools, and even dress in coat of skins (and possibly carry an umbrella too).  
An ideal citizen can learn to respect others when s/he enjoys absolute freedom from social 
constraints.  According to Marx, ideas of eighteenth century thinkers such as Smith and 
Rousseau are not so much based on naturalism but on anticipation of formation of social 
relations based on capitalist mode of production: “This is the semblance, the merely 
aesthetic semblance, of the Robinsonades, great or small.  It is, rather, the anticipation of 
‘civil society,’ in preparation since the sixteenth century and making giant strides towards 
maturity in the eighteenth.”30  Rousseau’s treatise on natural education, rather than a 
reiteration of the concepts of metaphysical naturalism of the past, posits, like Smith, a 
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foundational myth of capitalism, that of the isolated, autonomous, rational, self-interested 
individualist engaging in independent production in an absolute state of laissez faire.  In 
other words, in capitalist mode of production, the myth of empty lands, terra nullius, is the 
necessary condition for the moral and economic well being of the ideal European citizen of 
the contrat social. 
With the rise of capitalism, eighteenth and nineteenth-century Britain experienced 
surplus production and surplus population leading to search for new markets.  J. A. Hobson, 
one of the first economists to emphasize the economic basis of imperialism, maintains that 
capitalism is the “taproot of imperialism.”  Hobson critiques the conventional wisdom that 
in capitalist system imperialism is a necessity, as surplus wealth that cannot be consumed at 
home is channeled into foreign markets.  Instead, he argues that monopoly of the rich class 
leads to under-consumption (over-saving) which fails to keep pace with the power of 
production resulting in imperialist expansion: “The struggle for markets, the greater 
eagerness of producers to sell than of consumers to buy, is the crowning proof of a false 
economy of distribution.  Imperialism is the fruit of this false economy.”31  Thus, excess 
savings of the bourgeoisie leads to annexation of foreign lands.  After examining the cost-
benefit analysis of imperialism, Hobson contends that it is bad business.  This false economy 
is based on the semblance of terra nullius, of the idea of “empty” lands available for transfer 
of Europe’s surplus.  The importance of this myth can hardly be underestimated in the 
history of colonialism, and more so in the settler colonial societies like North America, 
Australia, and South Africa.  One of the central justifications for colonialism was based on 
the doctrine of, what Henry Reynolds calls, terra nullius, which referred to “empty land” or 
“no man’s land”:  
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The doctrine underlying the traditional view of settlement was that before 1788 
Australia was terra nullius, a land belonging to no-one. . . .  Confusion has abounded 
because terra nullius has two different meanings, usually conflated.  It means both a 
country without a sovereign recognized by European authorities and a territory 
where nobody owns any land at all, where no tenure of any sort existed.  ‘In things 
properly no ones,’ Grotius observed, ‘two things are occupable, the lordship and the 
ownership.32 
Thus, “uninhabited” lands referred to lands occupied by “uncivilized” peoples without self-
determining sovereignty and without the rights to private property.  Lands belonging to 
indigenous peoples were considered “unsettled,” without any recognizable laws, and, what 
G. W. F. Hegel concludes in relation to Africa, outside history enveloped in the “natural 
spirit.”33  Reynolds asserts that, as competition for colonies intensified, terra nullius became 
an internationally recognized legal principle in the nineteenth-century, which considered 
land not belonging to members of the family of nations as available for occupation.  The 
myth of terra nullius is the necessary condition for the creation of the false economy and for 
the moral development of the European individualist.  Imperialist expansion, thus, 
constituted establishment of the autonomous, property-owning European subject’s self-
presence on territories without presence.  
Defoe’s story is a prophetic one wherein the European imperial self comes into 
presence on a terra nullius.  RC, the “origin” of the English novel, stages the formation of 
the homo economicus on an “uninhabited” land in an “uncivilized” natural state outside 
history.  In this pure state of laissez faire, without natural bonds, outside the accidents of 
history, Crusoe’s “true” self, the economic self, emerges.  Crusoe learns that the vast open 
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empty spaces, along with meticulous division of labor, help him tap into his latent capacity 
for innovation and progress.  Furthermore, he realizes the endogenous growth potential of 
mathematization of time (as one of his first tasks on the island is to divide a post into 
measured instants) and division of space (as he divides the land according to its production 
capacity).  Bookkeeping helps him track the annual growth rate of his production: “Defoe’s 
heroes . . . have no need to learn this [book-keeping] technique; whatever the circumstances 
of their birth and education, they have it in their blood, and keep us more fully informed of 
their present stocks of money and commodities than other characters in fiction.”34  Along 
with bookkeeping, Crusoe also keeps a journal, in which he tracks the day-to-day 
movements of his soul.  His misfortunes reveal to him the will of God in mundane affairs 
and instill in him a sense of fear and duty towards God (and his father): “I work’d my Mind 
up, not only to Resignation to the Will of God in the present Disposition of my 
circumstances; but even to a sincere Thankfulness for my Condition.”35  In the tradition of 
Puritanism and its emphasis on introspection, Crusoe engages in careful reflection on his 
daily tasks, which reveal to him, not a transcendental God, but an immanental one, present 
in the day-to-day activities of the individualist.  Thus, his use-value producing labor, rather 
than being alienating, is a spiritual quest, bringing him closer to recognition of the hand of 
God in the utility of things.  Crusoe establishes his presence on the terra nullius through 
both soul-making and profit-making endeavors.  
Defoe’s island story is a story of origin; it is a representation of the origin of the 
Puritanical imperialist bourgeois self.  It is one of the “purest” examples of the 
representation of terra nullius in narrative fiction.  It lies at the origin of the English novel, 
and tells the story of Ursprung rather than Herkunft.  Coetzee’s Foe rewrites this story of 
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origin as a story of Herkunft, of descent.  Foe does not lie at the origin of the novel but at its 
beginnings.  In the figure of Friday, it shows the gaps, dispersions, and accidents that are 
found at every beginning.  In this sense, Coetzee is a Nietzschean genealogist dispersing the 
chimera of origin with history.  Foucault argues that Nietzschean genealogy is not a search 
for origin but a diagnosis of the events of history in their dispersion: “A genealogy of values, 
morality, asceticism, and knowledge will never confuse itself with a quest for their ‘origins,’ 
will never neglect as inaccessible the vicissitudes of history.”36  Genealogy is not a 
revelation of the Ursprung but an examination of descent, of Herkunft.  Foucault points to 
two different uses of the word “origin” in Nietzsche’s writings (differences that become 
more prominent in On the Genealogy of Morals): origin as Ursprung and origin as Herkunft.  
This difference is key to Foucault’s thought; in The Archaeology of Knowledge, he 
proposes a new way of doing history, which he calls general history, based on Herkunft.  
Ursprung seeks to reveal the already there, the primordial truth and the essential, unitary 
identity outside history.  Smith and Rousseau’s concepts of the homo economicus and homo 
solitarius disclose the moment of their births as an origin.  Defoe’s RC fictionalizes the 
story of a homo economicus in its origin.  Crusoe’s island, a terra nullius, helps establish the 
continuous European identity uninterrupted by the other and history, the other of history.  
On the other hand, Herkunft, which Foucault understands to be the proper objective of 
genealogy, sets out to examine descent, where rather than an essential, continuous identity 
we find a dissociation of self: “What is found at the historical beginning of things is not the 
inviolable identity of their origin; it is the dissension of other things.  It is disparity.”37  An 
analysis of descent does not seek to construct inert structures, but to disrupt what was 
thought to be immobile and unified.  Furthermore, it tries to confront historical events in 
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their dispersions: “it is to identify the accidents, the minute deviations . . . the complete 
reversals.”38  Herkunft shows us that beginnings are contentious and lowly.  A true 
genealogist needs history to laugh at the grandness of origins.  Most importantly, Herkunft, 
as a practice of criticism, dispels faith: “This is undoubtedly why every origin of morality 
from the moment it stops being pious—and Herkunft can never be—has value as a 
critique.”39  In Foe, I will show that Coetzee’s staging of the Herkunft of Friday interrupts 
the origin of the inviolable unified European individualist.  The European bourgeois subject 
comes unmasked by the face of the other of history. 
If Defoe’s RC is a story of capital, Coetzee’s Foe rewrites it as a story of Empire.  
With an acute historical eye, he unmasks the faint traces on the terra nullius, which have 
been obscured and lost in RC.  In this regard, Coetzee is not merely rewriting the story of 
RC but also the story of the novel.  Watt’s pioneering analysis of the rise of the English 
novel tells us a story of “origin.”  Novel and literary realism emerge as an expression of the 
bourgeois individualist.  It is hardly surprising that the figure of Friday plays no function in 
his analysis of the emergence of the unified European subject.  Nor does his analysis 
seriously consider, what Marx calls, the “aesthetic semblance” of capitalism, its myth of the 
homo economicus at the origins of history (and the novel).  The intellectual world will have 
to wait for Edward Said’s Orientalism for an analysis of Empire as a discursive formation, 
and more important for our discussion, for Culture and Imperialism for an examination of 
the relationship between novel and imperialism.  In this regard, Coetzee’s rewriting of the 
story of the novel is closer to Said’s analysis; he shows us that the myth of the terra nullius 
is the condition of possibility of the English novel, which emerges as a realistic 
documentation of the soul-making and profit-making interests of the individualist on 
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“empty” lands.  According to Said, more than any other cultural form, the novel has played a 
crucial role in the history of imperialism: 
Novel . . . I believe [was] immensely important in the formation of imperial attitudes, 
references and experiences.  I do not believe that only the novel was important, but 
that I consider it the aesthetic object whose connection to the expanding societies of 
Britain and France is particularly interesting to study.  The prototypical modern 
realistic novel is Robinson Crusoe, and certainly not accidentally it is about a 
European who creates a fiefdom for himself on a distant, non-European island.40 
The facts of Empire constituted the general structure of feeling in eighteenth and nineteenth-
century European societies.  Narrative fiction formed part of a systematic discipline by 
which the West produced myths of terra nullius to define, subjugate, and exterminate 
“unsettled” peoples.  Imperialism is a battle for “empty” lands; this battle was concurrently 
fought on foreign territories and in narrative spaces.  Foe stages the link between novel and 
Empire.  Coetzee rewrites the story of the emergence of the novel, not as an expression of 
the European subject, but as part of a colonial discourse, which attempts to produce and 
manage the other of history.  Thus, the story of the novel is not a story of the formation of 
unities, but a story of the contentious struggle, in which the dominant European self attempts 
to appropriate the wholly other.  In so doing, he questions its “origin” as a document that 
expresses the sentiments of the unified individualist, a.k.a realism.  Instead, he transforms 
the story of the novel from a “memorizing” of documents to a rewriting of silent monuments.  
He presents the novel not in its origins but in its occurrence as a beginning, constituting 
silences, discontinuities, and dissensions.  In the figure of Friday, Coetzee challenges his 
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readers to confront the silent monuments of history.  Let us turn to Foe for a demonstration 
of this. 
RC is the story of the struggles of a white man on a terra nullius; Foe is the story of 
the struggles of a white woman, Susan Barton, already on the margins of patriarchal English 
society, to tell the story of the wholly other.  Susan, born of an English mother and a French 
father, is the narrator of the story, and not Crusoe.  Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe, the colonizer, 
is a marginal figure in Coetzee’s narrative; Cruso, who largely remains reticent, dies in the 
first part of the novel.  By dropping the “e” from Defoe’s Crusoe, Coetzee invokes a 
biographical reference to the historical author: the name Crusoe probably came from 
Defoe’s classmate and friend Timothy Cruso, an English Puritan who had written guide 
books.  Moreover, the title Foe, apart from invoking the common noun “enemy,” is a 
reference to the proper name of the historical author Daniel Defoe, who added the prefix to 
his patronymic “Foe” in 1695 so as to appear aristocratic.  Susan’s daughter, who shares her 
name, is believed to be in the “New World” after being abducted by an Englishman.  Susan 
travels to Bahia, Brazil in search of her.  As the trail goes cold, she takes a ship to Lisbon, 
but on the way the sailors mutiny.  They kill the captain and cast her adrift in a small boat.  
She lands on Cruso’s island, and after spending a year there is rescued by an English ship.  
Cruso dies on the ship without leaving much record of his life on the island.  Both Friday 
and Susan return to England; here, she meets with the writer Daniel Foe and persuades him 
to turn her account into a popular adventure book.  The third part of the novel stages a tussle 
between the character and the author over authorial control of the story.  Foe is not 
interested in her island story; he deems it boring as Cruso does not engage in any innovative 
activities nor fight with cannibals, who do not appear in Susan’s account of the story.  Foe, 
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who is hiding from the debtors and the bailiffs, is more interested in the mother-daughter 
story, which provides him with a unity of plot in the tradition of the classic Greek structure 
of beginning, middle and end: the loss of the daughter, the quest for the daughter in Brazil, 
abandonment of the quest and the adventure on Cruso’s island, and the final reunion.  For 
Foe, books are made this way: “It is thus that we make up a book: loss, then quest, then 
recovery; beginning, then middle, then end.”41  Susan is interested in the middle part of 
Foe’s version of the story, the island story.  In the second part of the novel, Susan attempts 
to write her story, “The Female Castaway,” but soon realizes that she lacks the imaginative 
power of an author, which is necessary to achieve fame and money.  Meantime, it is here 
that Foe is intertextual with Roxana, Susan’s daughter appears, or so she claims to be, 
looking for recognition and legitimacy from the mother.  The marginal female individualist 
Roxana, whose first name is Susan in Defoe’s story, seeks to centralize herself through 
marriage, while being pursued by her daughter she has abandoned. 
Foe is a pre-text to RC: it is preoccupied with “origins” as it rewrites the “original” 
Defoe text, which is yet to come in the narrative space of Coetzee’s novel.  Needless to say, 
Foe is meticulously attentive to the process of writing that “original.”  Unlike Defoe’s RC, 
Coetzee’s Foe constitutes a complex narrative structure.  Defoe’s autobiographical past-
tense narrative presents a first-person narrator reflecting from a distant position on his past 
experiences.  Recollection of memories establishes a singular, unified consciousness through 
linear narrative time.  On the other hand, Foe stages a complex frame narrative constituting 
multiple narrative voices and narrative times resulting in overlaps, dispersions and 
repetitions.  The first two sections of the novel are in quotation marks, whose intended 
addressee is not the reader but the author Foe.  The general reader in both these sections 
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merely stumbles upon Susan’s dialogues with Foe concerning her attempts to write/tell her 
story.  The first section constitutes Susan’s memoirs describing the shipwreck, her stay on 
the island, and eventual rescue.  Echoing the narrative structure of RC, she writes her 
autobiography in past tense using a first-person narrative voice.  The intended reader of this 
written draft is Foe, which we learn in a parenthetical aside early in the section: “I sat on the 
bare earth with my sore foot between my hands and rocked back and forth and sobbed like a 
child, while the stranger (who was of course the Cruso I told you of) gazed at me more as if 
I were a fish cast up by the waves than an unfortunate fellow-creature.”42  The general 
reader first learns the name of the stranger Susan encounters on the island in this 
parenthesis, which indicates that the first section is a private dialogue between Susan and 
Foe (who is introduced only in the next section).  The second section employs the epistolary 
form, constituting of letters written in simple present by Susan to Foe, whom she has 
commissioned to write her story.  Initially, the letters respond to questions asked by Foe 
about how best he can set down the story, but soon the letters lose their addressee, as Foe is 
in flight from the bailiffs and the debtors (this is the most direct reference to the biography 
of Defoe, who was haunted by debtors).  Due to uncertainty regarding the intended reader of 
her letters, not all of which have reached their destination and disappearance of the 
commissioned author of her story, Susan slips into the author-position (almost literally by 
occupying Foe’s deserted house) and begins to write her own story, “The Female Castaway.  
Being a True Account of a Year Spent on a Desert Island.  With Many Strange 
Circumstances Never Hitherto Related.”  Given that the author/reader of her story has 
become a fugitive, Susan abandons chronometry; the letters in the last half of the section are 
not temporally marked.  The third section of the novel utilizes traditional first-person 
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narration (without quotation marks) addressed to the general reader.  Susan, the narrator of 
this section, describes in simple past the intense tussle between her and her “intended” 
author over authorial control of the story (and the sexual act).  The physical and narrative 
distance between the author and the character collapses; for the first time in the novel, Susan 
and Foe inhabit the same narrative space and also have sexual intercourse (she addresses 
him as an “intended,” connoting, in clear reference to the female individualist Roxana, “free 
choice” in author and marital partner).  The final section, the outermost frame, is written in 
first-person narration addressed to the general reader.  The narrator, who remains 
unidentified, stumbles upon the bodies of all the main characters in this section.  In vivid 
present tense, the narrator repeats two versions of the end.  In the first version, after entering 
an unmarked house, the narrator encounters Susan and Foe lying together motionless on the 
bed, while Susan’s “daughter’s” body lies cold on the staircase.  The narrator lies on the 
floor with Friday, who still has a faint pulse, and soon hears the sounds of the island issuing 
from his mouth.  In the second version of the end, the narrator encounters the plaque marked 
“Daniel Defoe, Author” on the wall outside the house.  Defoe and Foe do not inhabit the 
same narrative space.  Inside, he stumbles upon the body of Susan’s “daughter” on the 
staircase and the embracing bodies of Foe and Susan in bed.  Friday, who is lying on the 
floor facing the wall, now has a scar left by a rope on this neck.  The narrator finds yellowed 
papers in a box next to the bed.  As it reads the first line, “Dear Mr. Foe, At last I could row 
no further,” which blends the opening line of section one with the salutations of section two, 
the unidentified “I” slips overboard and dives into the ocean wreck, the home of Friday, 
where the “I” is enveloped by the slow stream that issues from Friday’s mouth, which runs 
“northward and southward to the ends of the earth.”43  In this outermost frame, the narrative 
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commits itself to its dissipation: as the narrative abandons referential verisimilitude, the 
narrator’s unified identity, which still remains intact in the previous sections, gets enmeshed 
in the voiceless stream issuing from Friday’s mouth, which eventually disperses the narrator 
and Friday to the ends of earth. 
If RC is preoccupied with time, Foe is preoccupied with space, and hence Empire.  
Emphasizing the geographical element of imperialism, Said states, “Imperialism after all is 
an act of geographical violence through which virtually every space in the world is explored, 
charted, and finally brought under control.”44  Space is an important dimension in Coetzee’s 
story.  Defoe’s autobiographical narrative strictly follows a linear time of narration; 
Coetzee’s narrative chaotically shuttles between past and present tense.  One of Crusoe’s 
first inscriptions on the island is the representation of the infinite series of instants by 
measured notches on the post.  This mathematization of time helps him keep track of, in 
journal entries, the labor time necessary for various productive activities, along with his 
increasing resignation to the will of God, which intensifies with greater production.  
Coetzee’s Cruso has no need for time: he has neither kept a calendar nor a journal of his life 
on the island.  Susan, who is the narrator, expresses her dismay that Cruso has not inscribed 
the island space with time: “I searched the poles that supported the roof, and the legs of the 
bed, but found no carvings, not even notches to indicate that he counted the years of his 
banishment or the cycles of the moon.”45  Measured and finite time is also an important 
factor in redemption and salvation from captivity on the island and from the original sin.  
Crusoe diligently records the number of years he has spent on the island; Coetzee’s Cruso is 
not interested in being rescued, nor does he remember the number of years he has spent on 
the island.  Susan notes, “the desire to escape had dwindled within him.”46  On the other 
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hand, Susan meticulously marks time in her numerous narrative adventures.  Like Crusoe’s 
temporally marked journal entries, she gives specific dates to all the letters she writes to the 
author Foe in the second section of the novel and also resides for some time in Clock Lane.  
Throughout the year on the island, Susan keeps alive her desire to be rescued.  Thus, 
mathematization of time is not totally absent in Foe; it rather occurs in the numerous actions 
of the bourgeois individualist white woman, Susan Barton, in whom the spirit of Defoe’s 
homo economicus lives.  Coetzee’s reticent Cruso is preoccupied with space.  Although 
Susan desires that he keep a temporal record of his stay on the island, Cruso is more 
interested in marking his presence spatially on the island for posterity.  Unlike Crusoe’s 
preoccupation with the precise labor time necessary for the production of use-value, 
Coetzee’s Cruso engages in labor that has no use-value or exchange-value.  He and Friday 
diligently work on clearing ground for terraces, even though they have no seeds to plant.  
Susan, the rational and self-interested individualist, mocks this non-utilitarian activity as 
“stupid labour,” to which Cruso replies, “‘The planting is not for us,’ said he. ‘We have 
nothing to plant –that is our misfortune.’. . .  ‘The planting is reserved for those who come 
after us and have the foresight to bring seed.  I only clear the ground for them.’”47  In case of 
Cruso, we have an instance of labor without value, which marks his spatial presence on the 
island.  But in Crusoe’s use-value producing labor (not produced for exchange), Spivak 
states, “Time, not money, is then the general equivalent.”48  In Marx’s labor theory of value, 
time is a necessary component in determining value, both in the production of use-value and 
exchange-value.  Value is measured by the amount of labor time actively and necessarily 
spent in its creation: Marx states, “What exclusively determines the magnitude of the value 
of any article is therefore the amount of labour socially necessary, or the labour-time 
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socially necessary for its production.”49  Value cannot be determined by the indefinite future 
of Cruso’s non-utilitarian labor.  One could argue that Defoe’s Crusoe is producing goods 
for personal consumption, which have no value, as his labor is not “socially necessary.” But 
in Marx only few things, such as “air, virgin soil, natural meadows, unplanted forests,” have 
use-value without value.50  Crusoe’s goods, although not immediately socially necessary, 
have great personal utility for him.  Thus, “nothing can be a value without being an object of 
utility.”51  Furthermore, Spivak argues that in Marx the binary opposition between use-value 
and exchange-value is often deconstructed, as the private is always already social: “This 
may be the cornerstone of the subterranean text of socialist ethics in Marx which is still to be 
theorized.”52  In case of Coetzee’s Cruso, we have an example of labor which has no 
utilitarian value for the individual or the community, either in the present or the future.  
Although Cruso believes that it might be of use in an indefinite future, Susan is aware of the 
sheer absurdity of such a proposition:  
When I passed the terraces and saw this man, no longer young, labouring in the heat 
of the day to lift a great stone out of the earth or patiently chopping at the grass, 
while he waited year after year for some saviour castaway to arrive in a boat with a 
sack of corn at his feet, I found it a foolish kind of agriculture.  It seemed to me he 
might occupy his time as well in digging for gold, or digging graves first for himself 
and Friday and then if he wished for all the castaways of the future history of the 
island, and for me too.53 
Cruso’s specific labor is non-utilitarian, hence easily replaceable with any other activity.  
Instead of utilizing time, he is killing time.  On Cruso’s island, we have suspended time, 
rather than measured time.  It is the spatial mark of his labor, and not the production of value 
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through necessary labor-time, that establishes Cruso’s presence on the island.  Cruso’s labor 
has no determinable origin or goal; it is caught in an interminable repetitive loop; the 
terraces display a neat, repetitive, spatial pattern.  When asked by Susan what specific 
memories is he leaving behind for posterity, Cruso responds, “I will be leaving behind my 
terraces and walls.”54  What do we make of this shift in Coetzee’s rewriting of Defoe’s RC?  
Spivak thinks, “The theme of the transition from land to landed capital is, after all, only one 
important strand of the mission of imperialism.”55  Conversion of terra nullius from “no 
man’s land” to landed property through the production of value is only one story of Empire.  
Coetzee’s text shifts focus from time to space, from production of value to the production of 
docile bodies through application of uninterrupted power.  The tortured body of Friday, 
rather than being memorized through time, is monumentalized through space. 
Time is an important dimension of the novel form; Watt notes that the realist novel, 
instead of depicting “life by values,” depicts “life by time”: “The novel’s plot is also 
distinguished from most previous fiction by its use of past experience as the cause of present 
action.”56  The realist novel vividly realizes past events in the present; the novel, rather than 
universalizing characters in mythic time, individualizes characters in measured time.  
Continuous individual identity depends on memory or anamnesis (recollection), which 
establishes the causal link between past and present.  Watt asserts that John Locke’s theory 
of unified identity based on a recollecting consciousness greatly influences representative 
realism: “Locke had defined personal identity as an identity of consciousness through 
duration in time; the individual was in touch with his own continuing identity through 
memory of his past thoughts and actions.”57  The realist novel is a recollection of “already-
said.”  In RC, Crusoe’s impeccable episodic memory functions to narrate the progressive 
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evolution of the unified subject in linear time.  Crusoe has not forgotten any details of his 
past life, nor has isolation affected his memory.  On the other hand, Coetzee’s Cruso has 
forgotten much; Susan notes, “But the stories he told me were so various, and so hard to 
reconcile one with another, that I was more and more driven to conclude age and isolation 
had taken their toll on his memory, and he no longer knew for sure what was truth, what 
fancy.”58  Cruso, to Susan’s chagrin, gives multiple accounts of his family background, the 
shipwreck, the number of years spent on the island, and Friday’s history.  Coetzee’s island 
space has no time and no memories; Cruso has no clear memory of his past life before his 
arrival on the island and Friday has no tongue to narrate his story.  Time on the island is in 
perpetual suspension, where human labor, rather than being directed towards production of 
value, is caught in a repetitive loop.  Unlike the rich abundance of Defoe’s island which 
reveals to Crusoe the immanence of God, Coetzee’s island is barren, where the brutal wind 
blows away everything in its way.  The merciless wind makes production of value difficult 
and preservation of memories impossible.  With no store of memories, language plays little 
function on the island: Cruso merely has use for a few command words for his servant 
Friday, who is mute.  Cruso reminds Susan, “This is not England, we have no need of a 
great stock of words.”59  The loquacious Susan schools Cruso that language not only has an 
instrumental function but a symbolic (civilizing) one too: “you might have brought home to 
him [Friday] some of the blessings of civilization and made him a better man. What benefit 
is there in a life of silence?”60  On the other hand, Susan’s episodic memory is akin to 
Crusoe; she has forgotten little.  As soon as she lands on the island, she gives a detailed 
account of her past, even though Cruso does not ask her for an introduction: “He [Cruso] did 
not care how I came to be in Bahia or what I did there.”61  In her memoirs, which constitute 
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the first section of the novel, she describes the island and its two inhabitants with great 
precision.  For Susan stories are a storing-place of memories; she urges Cruso to write his 
memoirs.  Civilization has no use for castaways without memories: “Cruso rescued will be a 
deep disappointment to the world; the idea of a Cruso on his island is a better thing than the 
true Cruso tight-lipped and sullen in an alien England.”62  England, an island too but without 
the brutal wind, is a storehouse of memories.  It demands stories from its subjects; collective 
anamnesis weaves together a continuous national identity and destiny.  Susan notes, “They 
say Britain is an island too, a great island.  But that is a mere geographer’s notion.  The earth 
under our feet is firm in Britain, as it never was on Cruso’s island.”63  Memories are 
sanctified foundations of the great nation Britain that establish its durability and fixed 
identity (even though geographer’s claim it is an island).  
Susan’s identity is indelibly tied to her memories of the island.  Like her namesake in 
Roxana, she seeks to centralize herself in a patriarchal society through the island story.  She 
has faith that her impeccable memory of her sensational past as a female castaway will bring 
her substance in the present.  She knows that the authority of print will grant her fortune and 
immortality.  In early eighteenth-century England, a female individualist could only have 
proxy access to print.  If Roxana centralizes herself through traditional marriages, Susan 
attempts to centralize herself through memorization of her past in print by a male author 
Foe, who is also her “intended.”  Susan pleads Foe, known to be a very secret man who is in 
the business of listening to confessions:  
Return to me the substance I have lost, Mr. Foe: that is my entreaty.  For though my 
story gives the truth, it does not give the substance of the truth. . . .  To tell the truth 
in all its substance you must have quiet, and a comfortable chair away from all 
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distraction, and a window to stare through; and then the knack of seeing waves when 
there are fields before your eyes, and of feeling the tropic sun when it is cold; and at 
your fingertips the words with which to capture the vision before it fades.  I have 
none of these, while you have all.64 
While truth depends on memory, substance of truth can only be materialized through 
writing, which, as Virginia Woolf once famously said, requires a room of one’s own and 
five hundred pounds a year.  Susan exchanges for wages her body and her memories as labor 
power; Foe gives her a small allowance for her confessions and also has sexual intercourse 
with her.  Only the male author Foe can be the begetter of the story and infuse it with 
substance through his imagination in the privacy of his room (and the comfort of his chair 
placed near a window).  Stories are father-born; their parentage is exclusively patrilineal.  
Defoe is the “father” of the novel form; both Foe and its original, RC, are father-born.  
Origins have no place for women; in RC, the economic man lies at the origins of history as 
its agent.  Crusoe describes the goods he has transported to his colony, “From thence I 
touch’d at the Brasils, from whence I sent a Bark, which I bought there, with more People to 
the Island, and in it, besides other Supplies, I sent seven Women, being such as I found 
proper for Service, or for Wives to such as would take them.”65  Sexual division of labor lies 
at the “origins of man.”  Crusoe expropriates women’s bodies for reproduction of particular 
forms of labor power to populate his colony, which in turn will produce generalized 
commodity.  Coetzee’s revisionist account rearranges Defoe’s oeuvre to interrogate the 
gendered construction of origins; the mother-daughter subplot, derived from Roxana, 
interrupts Foe.  Susan believes that she can gain inviolable substance by “fathering” her 
story into history through Foe’s imaginative powers.  But when Foe becomes a fugitive in 
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the second section of the novel, the female individualist, who claims to possess “free 
choice,” slips into the father-position.  She takes up residence in Foe’s house, sits in his 
comfortable chair beside the window and hopes that the “man-Muse,” who helps authoresses 
beget their stories in the night, will pay her a visit: “I was intended not to be the mother of 
my story, but to beget it.”66  Stories have no mothers; Susan wants to be the father of her 
story.  Although Susan slips into Foe’s chair, it is truly Defoe’s chair that she occupies, the 
true father figure of Coetzee’s novel.  In the tussle over authorial control that follows upon 
meeting Foe, Susan urges him to only report the truth in writing her confessional story, thus 
alluding to Defoe’s “documentation” of Crusoe’s story: “Once you [Cruso] proposed to 
supply a middle by inventing cannibals and pirates.  These I would not accept because they 
were not the truth.  Now you propose to reduce the island to an episode in the history of a 
woman in search of a lost daughter.  This too I reject.”67  Defoe, the master of 
verisimilitude, announces in his preface to RC, “The Editor believes the thing to be a just 
History of Fact; neither is there any Appearance of Fiction in it.”68  For Defoe and Susan, 
stories faithfully document the factual truths of past events.  The marginal Susan is 
convinced that substance can be derived, not from the affective value of mothering, but from 
memorizing “facts” of the island story.  For Foe, the island story is repetitive, hence lacks 
the teleological direction of the beginning-middle-end structure.  It can only be an episode in 
a larger mother-daughter story: “The island story is not a story in itself. . . .  The island lacks 
light and shade.  It is too much the same throughout . . . who will prefer it when there are 
tastier confections and pastries to be had?”69  On the other hand, Susan wants her story to 
begin and end with the island story.  Like Defoe, she believes that there is no room for the 
mother-daughter story on the island.  By selectively memorizing her past, she erases the 
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story of search for the daughter in Bahia before her shipwreck; after all, it is the father’s 
prerogative to choose his history.  The affective value of mothering distracts from the truth 
of the island story; it is an embellishment with no value.  Spivak suggests that Susan’s 
rejection of motherhood gestures “toward the impossibility of restoring the history of empire 
and recovering the lost text of mothering in the same register of language.”70  Consequently 
one can say, motherhood in the novel, echoing Roxana, functions as an impediment in the 
path of female individualism: the text of mothering cannot inhabit the same narrative space 
as the story of individualism.  When a young woman appears claiming to be her daughter, 
Susan chides her for looking for recognition and legitimacy from the mother, “I repeat: what 
you know of your parentage comes to you in the form of stories, and the stories have but a 
single source. . . .  You are father born.  You have no mother.  The pain you feel is the pain 
of lack, not a pain of loss.”71  Within the limits of a patriarchal mode of cognition, the 
female story is defined, not by a loss, but a lack—Freud’s “penis envy.”  Susan tries to 
convince the girl that she is a story fabricated by Foe, who is her real father.  All stories have 
single origin; fathers are begetters of origins.  The island story is not haunted by 
fictionalized daughters, but produced by substantive fathers, the guardians of primordial 
truth.  Susan, the only witness to the island story (Friday being mute), wishes to recreate the 
chimeras of origins.  The version she wishes to materialize in print is closest to Defoe’s RC, 
the original text of Foe, which is yet to be written.  In Coetzee’s text, the spirit of the 
historical author Defoe survives in the character Susan; the true author-character struggle 
over authorial control of the island story is not between Foe and Susan, but between 
Defoe/Susan and Coetzee.  While Susan (and Defoe) attempts to write a story of origin, 
Coetzee’s text is simultaneously rewriting it as a story of descent.  Coetzee is writing with 
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and against Defoe/Susan.  Foe emerges as a product of the clash between Ursprung and 
Herkunft. 
In the third section of the novel, the female individualist succeeds in reversing the 
relations of power; she usurps the father-position from Foe in a coup d’état : “It is not I who 
am the intended, but you.  But why need I argue my case?  When is it ever asked of a man 
who comes courting that he plead in syllogisms?”72  Fathers are begetters of origins; from 
the father-position, Susan attempts to restore the magic of lost origins.  In her pursuit of 
substance, she attempts to memorize the exact facts of things, their essential identities, not 
distracted by the affective value of mothering.  In the novel, the coup d’état occurs 
immediately before the second appearance of the imaginary daughter, whom Susan has 
abandoned earlier in the darkest part of the Epping Forest, after convincing her that she is 
father-born.  Having expelled the girl, Susan wakes up in London hoping the bad dream is 
over and the momentary loss of authority is restored.  As the girl, who is also called Susan 
Barton, appears again, this time with her nurse Amy, Susan starts to lose grip over the newly 
usurped father-position, as she begins to question her memory and her authority (in Roxana, 
Susan, Roxana’s namesake and daughter, symbolizes a past self, whom Roxana, with the 
help of her maid Amy, tries to abandon in the forest).  Convinced that Foe has conjured up a 
ghost claiming to be her daughter, at first she protests that she is not a receptacle passively 
accepting Foe’s authority, “if I were like a bottle bobbing on the waves with a scrap of 
writing inside, that could as well be a message from an idle child fishing in the canal as from 
a mariner adrift on the high seas—if I were a mere receptacle ready to accommodate 
whatever story is stuffed in me . . . you would say to yourself, ‘This is no woman but a 
house of words, hollow, without substance’?”73  Having occupied the father-position, she 
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claims to possess both choice and substance.  As an expression of her voice-consciousness, 
she has expelled the ghosts created by Foe’s imaginative powers.  But with the second 
appearance of the daughter, Susan feels that her real self is slipping into a fictional self, her 
history transforming into a story: “In the beginning I thought I would tell you the story of 
the island and, being done with that, return to my former life.  But now all my life grows to 
be story and there is nothing of my own left to me.  I thought I was myself and this girl a 
creature from another order speaking words you made up for her.  But now I am full of 
doubt.”74  Dreams and reality inhabit the same narrative order.  The promise of 
demarginalization of the self through selective recollection of the island story is interrupted 
by the apparition of the daughter, which dissolves the boundaries between reality and 
fiction.  The presence of the girl marks a blind spot in Susan’s documentation of her past, 
which limits her visibility.  In her attempts to form a continuous identity based on facts of 
the island, she is now confronted with a story rather than her memory, with a bad dream 
rather than reality, that unmasks the farce of the unified self.  The narrative structure 
corresponds to the narrator’s dissociation of self.  In the first two sections of the novel, 
which are in quotations, Susan documents reality, carefully reporting her past experiences in 
memoir and epistolary form.  Both these forms have played a seminal function in the 
development of representative realism: Daniel Defoe being the master of the memoir form 
and Samuel Richardson being the master of the epistolary form.  If the memoir form weaves 
together a continuous narrative self in chronological time, the epistolary form is a direct 
quotation of the stream of consciousness of the narrative subject in instantaneous time.  
Susan’s memoir, constituting the first section of the novel, avoids all temptations of 
fictionality to document the events as they occurred on the island.  The memoir functions as 
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source material for Foe’s writing of the island story.  Susan is aware that her memoir is dull 
because it is too much like the island: “‘It is not a dull story, though it is too much the 
same,’ said Foe.”  To which Susan replies, “It is not dull so long as we remind ourselves it is 
true.  But as an adventure it is very dull indeed.”75  The dullness of the story tempts her to 
make up lies, to infuse desire in the activity of labor without value: “There was too little 
desire in Cruso and Friday. . . .  Without desire how is it possible to make a story?. . . .  I ask 
myself what past historians of the castaway state have done—whether in despair they have 
not begun to make up lies.”76  Yet, she perseveres to report only the truth of her past 
experiences, on which depends her substance.  The private letters directed to Foe, which 
constitute the second section of the novel, give a minute-by-minute account of Susan’s new 
life in England and also contain her responses to Foe’s questions about her memoir.  Initially 
the letters are precisely dated, but with the loss of their addressee they also lose their dates.  
With the disappearance of the author, Susan occupies Foe’s empty house to gain authority 
over the telling of her true story.  But the first appearance, in this section, of the strange girl 
claiming to be her daughter, challenges the accuracy of her memories.  As her past begins to 
resemble a bad dream, she quickly lures the girl into the deep forest and abandons her, thus 
reestablishing control over the truth of the past.  Although confronted with challenges, 
Susan’s identity remains intact in the first two sections of the novel.  It is only in the third 
section, at the moment of her greatest triumph when she has imposed a coup d’état, Susan’s 
narrative self begins to dissipate.  With the reappearance of the girl, she is forced to confront 
that to write one’s past is not to recognize it the way it really was but to conjure it: Foe 
notes, “You and I know, in our different ways, how rambling an occupation writing is; and 
conjuring is surely much the same.”77  To conjure is to construct the past for the present; it is 
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to converse with the ghosts of the past as they flash in the present.  In an intertextual 
reference to Defoe’s short story, “True Relation of the Apparition of One Mrs. Veal,” Susan 
in Foe recalls a story Foe has written of one Mrs. Barfield who spends an afternoon 
conversing with a friend, only to realize later that the friend had died the day before the 
meeting.   Although this section, written in traditional first-person narration, is still 
organized around the continuous narrative identity of Susan, the narrative structure has 
abandoned the quotation marks of the memoir and the epistolary sections.   Confronted with 
ghosts, rather than factual truths of the past, the narrator’s episodic memory faces 
impediments, enmeshing her in a maze of doubt.   The quotation marks establish proximity 
with the past, revealing the carefully preserved narrative self within its boundaries; thus, 
with the loss of quotation marks in the third section, the text establishes greater distance 
between the narrator and her memories.   Susan, when schooling Cruso about the value of 
memorizing one’s past, fears the effects distance can have on memory: “I do not wish to 
dispute, but you have forgotten much, and with every day that passes you forget more!. . . .  
But seen from a vantage, life begins to lose its particularity.   All shipwrecks become the 
same shipwreck.”78   The reappearance of the apparition of the daughter in the narrative 
space outside quotation marks establishes distance and uncertainties concerning the past, 
resulting in dissolution of Susan’s narrative self.  This is the last time we will encounter her 
as the narrator, as the fourth section of the novel abandons the proper name Susan and 
introduces an unidentified narrator.  As the bad dream becomes substantial in the figure of 
the girl, the narrator’s persona slides into insubstantiality.  In the last section, Susan, having 
now lost the narrator-position, is discovered dead alongside of Foe by the unidentified 
narrator.  In the fourth section of the novel, which is most dreamlike, fiction has triumphed 
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over reality; the narrative abandons attempts at establishing a causal link between past and 
present, characteristic of the memoir form.  The events of the past appear as constellation 
dotting the here and now of the narrative space.  If the novel begins with a representational 
image of thought depended on recollection and recognition, it ends with a non-
representational image of thought, depended on fluidity and exteriority, where the “bodies 
are their own signs.”79  The dissociation of self is complete: having abandoned the proper 
name Susan, the text only momentarily replaces her with an unidentified narrator, who is 
eventually dispersed into a general textuality, extending to the ends of earth.  Foe opens in 
media res within the secured limits of the quotation marks, with the emphatic “I” of Susan 
narrating the singular experience of the shipwreck, “At last I could row no further,” and 
describing her attempt to land on the shore.  Revealing the frame narrative, it ends outside 
the limits of the quotation marks, with the drowning of the unidentified “I” in the voiceless 
stream issuing from Friday’s mouth.  This technique of the cinematic zoom-out induces 
forgetfulness, as with distance the particular memories blend into a general textuality, and 
facticity morphs into fictionality. 
The apparition of Susan’s daughter interrupts the facticity of her episodic memory, 
resulting in disruption of authority and narrative identity.  The mother-daughter subplot is a 
story of recognition and legitimacy, and its eventual failure: the daughter’s desire to 
centralize herself through recognition from the mother remains unrealized.  The subplot also 
succeeds in disrupting Susan’s desire for recognition in print through fathering her text into 
existence by accurately documenting her past.  By denying her access to the text of 
mothering, Foe also denies Susan access to the text of fathering; she and the girl end up dead 
in the end, still in the margins without recognition.  Spivak states, “We could fault Coetzee 
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for not letting a woman have access to both authorship and motherhood.  We could praise 
him for not presuming to speak a completed text on motherhood.  I would rather . . . call it 
the mark of aporia.”  In rewriting RC, Foe struggles with the absence of the figure of the 
mother in the original text by staging its construction as father-born.  But at the same time, 
Foe resists against tactical reversal of relations of power that merely reinstate the status quo; 
the mother-daughter story interrupts precisely when Susan has imposed a coup d’état 
reversing the existing order.  Foe guards against restoring the lost text of mothering in the 
original, or worst still, reconstructing it as mother-born.  Coetzee refuses to reconcile 
motherhood with its essential identity, regain contact with its origin, and establish a full 
positive relationship with itself.  Susan’s failure to “memorize” her past and “recognize” her 
daughter is a failure to lend speech to the traces of the past, articulating it in continuous, 
linear time.  The mother-daughter subplot, although introduces the key element of 
fictionality in the text, is after all a story of demarginalization, of infusing the margins with 
voice-consciousness.  Against this story of demarginalization depended on establishing facts 
through recollection, Coetzee presents us with a counter-factual—the story of Friday.  The 
figure of Friday is aporetic that does not lend itself to an anthropological reduction.  The 
story of Friday is not a story of centralizing through anamnesis; it is a story of establishing 
distance, not for reflection, but to produce a gap of difference between the same and the 
other.  It constitutes a face-to-face encounter with the radical alterity of the other of history, 
whose absolute otherness cannot be collapsed into the law of the same.  Friday is a non-
allegorical figure, whose story doggedly keeps its silence.  Speaking of the difference 
between the story of the mother-daughter relationship and of Friday, Spivak maintains that 
feminism and anticolonialism cannot inhabit the same narrative space; if feminism is 
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concerned with issues within the “same cultural inscription,” anticolonialism is concerned 
with an absolute racial other.  According to Spivak, Western feminism tends to overlook a 
problem, “that a concern with women, and men, who have not been written in the same 
cultural inscription, cannot be mobilized in the same way as the investigation of gendering in 
our own.  It is not impossible, but new ways have to be learned and taught, and attention to 
the wholly other must be constantly renewed.”80  Chandra Talpade Mohanty has famously 
made a similar charge against liberal white Western feminist humanists who take their own 
benevolence for granted and produce monolithic and universalizing constructions of women, 
collapsing all cultural difference.81  In contrast to the relationship between Cruso and Friday 
based on absolute colonial domination, the relationship between Susan and Friday is based 
on neocolonial hegemony.  If in the original text the relationship between Crusoe and Friday 
is that of a colonizer and colonized, Coetzee rewrites that original relationship as an 
encounter between the figure of liberal humanist and a subaltern.  Susan is the figure of the 
white, liberal feminist humanist who takes her own benevolence for granted and attempts to 
recuperate Friday’s voice-consciousness and history.  Her demarginalization is depended 
upon representation of the racially other.  But the figure of Friday is impassable; he has no 
tongue and cannot be captured in a representational image of thought.  Friday’s history is 
inaccessible to Susan.  The mother-daughter subplot and the story of Friday present two 
different uses of the past.  If Susan and the girl, each in their own way, “memorize” their 
past, Coetzee’s text “monumentalizes” the past of Friday; in this regard, Coetzee’s Foe 
dramatizes a struggle between two different kinds of history: total history and general 
history.  As Susan writes a total history of the island, the text simultaneously rewrites it in 
terms of a general history of the island. 
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In AK, Foucault differentiates total history from general history: 
To be brief, then, let us say that history, in its traditional form, undertook to 
‘memorize’ the monuments of the past, transform them into documents, and lend 
speech to those traces which, in themselves, are often not verbal, or which say in 
silence something other than what they actually say; in our time, history is that which 
transforms documents into monuments.  In that area where, in the past, history 
deciphered the traces left by men, it now deploys a mass of elements that have to be 
grouped, made relevant, placed in relation to one another to form totalities.  There 
was a time when archaeology, as a discipline devoted to silent monuments . . . 
aspired to the condition of history . . . in our time history aspires to the condition of 
archaeology, to the intrinsic description of monument.82 
Total history, the traditional form of history, engages in recuperating Ursprung.  It attempts 
to memorize or document the past, reconstituting the teleological, evolutionary progress of 
events through chronological time.  Such a history treats the documents of the past “as a 
language of a past since reduced to silence…but possible decipherable trace.”83  The past is 
viewed as constituting not only the “already-said,” corporeal discourses already spoken or 
written, but also constituting the “never-said,” incorporeal discourses buried in silence that 
precede the voiced presence of the corporeal discourses.  Thus, the task of a historian is to 
allegorize the past, to interpret the voiced presence so as to unearth the repressive presence 
of discourses: traditional history is “an interpretation of ‘hearing’ of an ‘already-said’ that is 
at the same time a ‘not-said.’”84  Total history attempts to unmask the hidden traces of the 
past, infuse them with speech, and consequently reveal the eternal truths preserved in them 
through time.  In her memoirs and letters, Susan meticulously documents her past on the 
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island.  The ghastly presence of the girl claiming to be her daughter, whom she tries to 
abandon, challenges the facticity of her episodic memory.  Like a traditional historian, Susan 
allegorizes the story of Friday, attempting to unearth the “never-said” of the history of mute 
Friday before his arrival on the island.  This process is also a humanizing process, granting 
voice to the voiceless of history.  Her survival and her substance depends on accessing the 
realm of the “never-said.”  In contrast to total history, Foucault proposes general history, 
which transforms the documents of the past into monuments.  Rather than interpret the 
documents to unravel the hidden eternal truths or reveal their expressive value, general 
history questions the sanctified unity of the document by examining the mass of 
discontinuities.  If total history organizes the past around a single center—a principle or a 
spirit of the age—, general history deploys “a space of dispersion.”85  That is, the latter 
organizes the document by dividing it up, arranging it in levels, establishing series and 
describing relations between them: Foucault notes, “The document is not the fortunate tool 
of history that is primarily and fundamentally memory; history is one way in which a society 
recognizes and develops a mass of documentation with which it is inextricably linked.”86  
For Foucault, history is not recollecting the past the way it was, but an active 
monumentalizing of the documents of the past by establishing relations between series, 
series of series.  General history does not recuperate the origin but examines an event in its 
occurrence, its Herkunft.  If total history is based on continuity and totalities, general history 
is based on series and events.  In Foucault, historical documents, as Said notes, are 
“intended.”87  Every society is indelibly linked to the construction of mass of documents, 
which constitute a certain order that is limited and historically specific.  Foucault calls this 
order discourse: “The analysis of the discursive field . . . grasp[s] the statement in the exact 
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specificity of its occurrence; determines its conditions of existence, fix at least its limits, 
establish its correlations with other statements that may be connected with it, and show what 
other forms of statement it excludes.”88  Discourse is made up of limited number of 
statements that constitute a historically specific order.  In a discursive field everything 
cannot be said because every order constitutes limited statements that are formed on the 
basis of exclusion of other possible statements.  The internal continuity of discourse is 
established on the basis of discontinuity, on exclusion of other statements and discourses.  
Exclusion, in Foucault, is not understood as repression.  The past does not constitute the 
“never-said” that is hidden beneath and precedes the corporeal discourse, patiently waiting 
to be discovered by the recollecting consciousness.  There is “no subtext. . . .  Each 
statement occupies in it a place that belongs to it alone.”89  In fact, discourse is “a 
distribution of gaps, voids, absences, limits, divisions.”90  These gaps, absences and 
discontinuities do not hide a silent text waiting to be unraveled.  They cannot be reduced to a 
lack or interiority, but constitute exteriority, the external conditions of existence.  Gaps are 
opened up by dispersion, which indicate that the continuity of discourse is based, not a 
single principle, but on appropriation of difference.  In short, every discourse entails a power 
struggle: Discourse “has its own rules of appearance, but also its conditions of appropriation 
and operation [that] . . . from the moment of its existence . . . poses the question of power.”91  
Total history, in seeking uninterrupted continuities, has difficulty conceiving of gaps, 
discontinuities, and differences, which in Foucault, is the mark of the Other; it is afraid “to 
conceive of the Other in the time of our own thought.”92  On the other hand, general history, 
which he also calls archaeology, is not a recollection of memory but a making of difference.  
It is “making differentiations, it is a diagnosis.”93  To make difference is to monumentalize 
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the past.  Archaeology is a discipline “devoted to silent monuments.”94  In Foe, the figure of 
Friday appears as a mute monument of the past, whose story cannot be documented by total 
history.  Against Susan’s anthropological documentation of Friday, Coetzee’s text stages 
Friday as a silent monument of the past, who can only be described archaeologically. 
General history constitutes monuments of thought; it transforms documents into 
monuments.  Although Foucault does not describe the monument in AK, the concept 
generally appears to mean discursively constructed raw materials of history.  Unlike 
documents, monuments do not exist causally for the recollecting consciousness of the 
historian to establish a continuous identity.  If document is first and foremost memory, the 
monument is counter-memory that disrupts the formation of a unified identity.  Monuments 
do not possess interiority that requires interpretation; rather, they exist in the dimension of 
exteriority, the external conditions of possibility.  Monuments do not subsist as the “already-
said” of discourse, which is also the realm of the “never-said,” that secret voice waiting to 
be heard.  They do not conceal silent voices of the dead or the law of the father.  They are 
not sources of information and are not empirically visible or verifiable.  They document 
nothing.  Said notes, “a document’s monumentality can only emerge when discourse is not 
elided with reality. . . .  Monumentality is the general mode of presence of discourse.”95  
Discourses exist monumentally.  Monuments do not emanate from a single origin, or 
organized around a single principle.  They exist in series and are repeatable occurrences.  In 
Foucault, repetition produces difference, an idea similar to Gilles Deleuze’s concept of 
repetition.  Deleuze clarifies that Nietzsche’s concept of eternal return is not a recurrence of 
the same but of difference: “Returning is the becoming-identical of becoming itself. . . .  
Such an identity, produced by difference, is determined as ‘repetition.’  Repetition in the 
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eternal return, therefore, consists in conceiving the same on the basis of the different.”96  
Difference opens the space to the Other in the time of our thought.  To differentiate is to 
monumentalize by establishing distance.  Mark Poster calls Foucault’s monuments a 
strategy of dehumanization that makes the familiar strange.97  Monuments exist 
impersonally, without a voice or an author.  Let us turn to the figuration of the unvoiced 
Friday, the impassable monument of the history of Empire. 
Coetzee reinscribes the figure of Friday in markedly different ways from Defoe.  To 
begin with, his Friday is racially different from Defoe’s character.  Crusoe observes that his 
new manservant, a rather handsome fellow, “had all the Sweetness and Softness of an 
European. . . .  His hair was long and black, not curl’d like Wool. . . .  The Colour of his 
Skin was not quite black, but very tawny.”98  Crusoe portrays his Friday by negation, as not 
black.  He goes on to describe, at great length, his facial features, as being not that of a 
“negro.”  Susan encounters Friday immediately after reaching the shore, whom she 
describes as, “He was black: a Negro with a head of fuzzy wool, naked save for a pair of 
rough drawers.  I lifted myself and studied the flat face, the small dull eyes, the broad nose, 
the thick lips, the skin not black but a dark grey, dry as if coated with dust.”99  Coetzee’s text 
self-consciously repeats Crusoe’s description of Friday, without the negation, as his Friday 
is black.  The signs of Friday’s blackness pervade the text, as Susan is not only obsessed 
with his hair, but also stereotypically addresses him largely through animal metaphors.  The 
next crucial difference between the two Fridays is their relation to language.  After Friday 
promises to abandon his cannibal ways, Crusoe proceeds to teach him to speak: “I began to 
speak to him, and teach him to speak to me; and first I made him know his Name should be 
Friday, which was the Day I sav’d his Life . . . so for the Memory of the Time.”100  Needless 
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to say, as Crusoe cannot hear the barbarian speech, he concludes that Friday has no 
language.  Spivak reminds us, “It is a longstanding topos that barbarians by definition do not 
speak language.”101  Crusoe’s speech-act, “I name thee Friday,” carries an illocutionary 
force beyond its content; it temporally and linguistically marks the beginning of Friday’s 
transformation from a soulless heathen to a souled being.  Cruso’s christening the 
manservant Friday marks the time of his redemption: Friday is saved from being 
cannibalized and from his own cannibalism, and more importantly, rescued from life of 
speechlessness.  In RC, cannibalism and speech do not inhabit the same narrative space-
time.  To speak is to be civilized (and memorized), and to be civilized is to be human.  
Speech itself occurs in the master’s tongue and utters the law of the father.  The cannibal 
past of Friday is exorcised through the tongue of the master/father.  In contrast, Coetzee’s 
Friday is mute; his tongue has been cut off by the slavers.  Due to absence of the tongue, his 
cannibalism cannot be accessed, contained, and transformed by the speech and law of the 
master/father.  Friday’s soulless being cannot be marked by the language or time of Europe.  
In other words, he cannot be humanized by Europe.  Direct signs of cannibalism, which are 
clearly present in Defoe’s story, are absent in Coetzee’s text.  In a reference to the most 
famous line of RC, “It happen’d one Day about Noon going towards my Boat, I was 
exceedingly surpriz’d with the Print of a Man’s naked Foot on the Shore, which was very 
plain to be seen in the Sand,”102  Susan notes, “I saw no cannibals; and if they came after 
nightfall and fled before the dawn, they left no footprint behind.”103  Although there are no 
verifiable signs, cannibalism has a ghastly presence in the novel.  It lives in the realm of the 
“never-said,” of that silence beneath the island story that Susan attempts to memorize.  
Throughout the text, the fear of Friday’s cannibal past haunts Susan, which she verbalizes 
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only once in the text: “Did human flesh once pass those lips?. . . .  For surely human flesh is 
like falling into sin: having fallen once you discover in yourself a taste for it, and fall all the 
more readily thereafter.  I shiver as I watch Friday . . . on the time before, when he was a 
savage among savages.”104  In Foe, if the time before the contact with Europe was marked 
by cannibalism, the time after is marked by speechlessness, a condition imposed by the law-
preserving violence of the civilizing mission.  In the novel, the letter h indicates the 
condition of speechlessness.  When Susan questions Cruso’s claim that Friday is incapable 
of speech, he demonstrates to her the sound of muteness: “‘La-la-la,’ said Cruso, and 
motioned to Friday to repeat.  ‘Ha-ha-ha,’ said Friday from the back of his throat.  ‘He has 
no tongue,’ said Cruso.  Gripping Friday by the hair, he brought his face close to mine.  ‘Do 
you see?’ he said.  ‘It is too dark,’ said I.”105  If Crusoe grants speech to Friday, Susan 
wishes to grant voice to the speechless Friday: Spivak makes a seminal point, “the contrast 
here is also between the colonialist—who gives the native speech—and the metropolitan 
anti-imperialist—who wants to give the native voice.”106  Coetzee complicates the simple 
equation of the original.  To be civilized and humanized is to be voiced by the master 
discourse.  Not by granting speech, but by voicing silence that Susan attempts to access the 
traces of Friday’s past.  His speechlessness emanates from a dark, unverifiable place, where 
hidden traces of his past, and possibly present, cannibalism exit.  The marks of 
speechlessness and cannibalism are inscribed on the tongue, where signs of violence before 
and after the encounter with Europe exist simultaneously.  In his essay “On Cannibals,” 
Michel de Montaigne, discussing the habits of barbarians who eat their enemies out of 
vengeance and not nourishment,” says, “I am not so anxious that we should note the horrible 
savagery of these acts [cannibalism] as concerned that, whilst judging their faults so 
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correctly, we should be so blind to our own.  I consider it more barbarous to eat a man alive 
than to eat him dead; to tear by rack and torture a body still full of feeling.”107  A barbarian 
is defined by negation, the other that is not the same, the other that is inhuman, non-human.  
For Montaigne, the acts of violence disrupt this definition.  To torture a living body is worse 
than to eat a dead one.  Friday’s tongue holds memory of Africa, that place without speech 
and outside history, where one devours one’s enemies.  As there are no verifiable footprints 
on Cruso’s island, Susan’s voicing, through anamnesis, the truth of the island story is 
haunted by the “never-said” of Friday’s cannibal past that is already articulated in that 
silence and stubbornly runs beneath the surface.  To voice that silence is to access and 
humanize Friday’s cannibal past so as to not be eaten as the enemy.  Like Scheherazade, 
Susan, the storyteller, attempts to voice Friday’s silence to forestall death.  But, the event of 
torture of the Empire disrupts her access to Friday’s Ursprung.  The Herkunft of Friday 
attaches itself to the body, with its gaps, faults and fissures, disrupting the continuity of 
origins. 
Throughout the novel, Susan diligently engages in the rather arduous task of soul-
making through voicing Friday’s past.  Her writing the truth of the island story is also an act 
of undoing that story.  Crusoe, the savior, rules with hegemony, passing on the torch of 
European Enlightenment to Friday.  Coetzee’s Cruso rules with pure domination. He is the 
figure of the colonizer.  Coetzee’s novels often depict the figure of the colonizer in terms of 
absolute violence.  Eugene Dawn and Jacobus Coetzee in Dusklands are examples of such 
colonizers.108  On a barren terrain where he expends labor without value, he has imposed 
near total silence, interrupted only by functional speech.  The symbolic function of language 
granting access to the thoughts of Europe has no value for him.  He communicates with 
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Friday exclusively in command words, who, like a dog, responds only to the words taught, 
having no knowledge of the complexity of human language.  His vocabulary is painfully 
limited, understanding the word “firewood” but not “wood.”  On the other hand, Susan sees 
no benefit in the life of silence; and lectures Cruso about the advantages of English 
language, that can bring pleasure and blessings of civilization: Susan notes, “Yet would it 
not have lightened your solitude had Friday been master of English?. . . .  You might have 
brought home to him some of the blessings of civilization.”109  To speak is to memorize and 
civilize Friday’s past.  In her memoir and letters, the benevolent white liberal feminist 
humanist fathers the island story by granting voice to Friday’s past, thus undoing the silence 
imposed by Cruso’s pure domination.  For the marginal female individualist, to voice the 
other’s story is also a process of centralizing the self.  In short, Susan wishes to become 
Defoe, to occupy the father-position, from which she can write RC, that story of coming into 
presence of the imperial European self on a terra nullius.  But Susan, as Spivak reminds us, 
is not a classic colonialist like Crusoe granting speech to the other of Europe.  After all, 
Coetzee’s Friday has no tongue.  Coetzee shifts focus from the colonizer-colonized 
relationship of RC.  For Susan, the body of Friday exists as a terra nullius, an empty space 
without self-determining sovereignty, waiting to be spoken of/written in the master 
discourse.  She is a benevolent metropolitan anti-imperialist, whose self-definition is 
depended upon granting voice-consciousness to the other of history.  Coetzee is not only 
rewriting RC into apartheid South Africa, with the figure of the white liberal feminist 
humanist representing the voice of the segregated black, but also into the larger neocolonial 
world, characterized by the dominant economic, political, and cultural restructurings 
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emerging in the post-colonial world, with the figure of the liberal metropolitan scholar, 
whose self-definition depends upon representing the marginal subaltern.  
In her memoir and letters to Foe, Susan attempts to recuperate the Ursprung, the true 
story of the origin of the loss of the tongue.  By making “the air around him [Friday] thick 
with words,” she hopes “memories will be reborn in him which died under Cruso’s rule.”110  
Through sketches, she tries to stir Friday’s memories, wishing to know if Cruso or some 
other slaver cut his tongue.  Susan wants to “build a bridge of words over which, when one 
day it is grown sturdy enough, he [Friday] may cross to the time before Cruso, the time 
before he lost his tongue, when he lived immersed in the prattle of words as unthinkable as a 
fish in water.”111  To evoke memories of the loss of the tongue is a strategy of return to a 
past before the encounter with Empire, when his body was unmutilated and whole, and 
words were abundant. Cruso has no memories of the loss; he does not remember who cut the 
tongue and for what reasons.  Although there are no verifiable signs of cannibalism, Susan is 
convinced that the marks of mutilation exist allegorically, hiding a deeper, darker truth.  In 
order to establish the facticity of Friday’s cannibalism, Susan attempts to articulate the loss, 
which she has not verified but regards with intense revulsion: “I have not looked into your 
mouth.  When your master asked me to look, I would not.  An aversion came over me that 
we feel for all the mutilated.”112  For the benevolent feminist to give voice to the allegorical 
signs is a strategy for survival, for fear that the cannibal past lives unarticulated and 
unchanneled in the present.  The line between benevolence and despotism is ever so thin: 
Susan confesses, “I tell myself I talk to Friday to educate him out of darkness and silence.  
But is that the truth?  There are times when benevolence deserts me and I use words only as 
the shortest way to subject him to my will.”113  To unmask the truth of the origin of the loss 
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is to impose her will to truth.  For Susan, like RC, stories are about cannibalism and its 
expulsion through the tongue and the law of the master/father.  But as Cruso’s barren island 
has no visible footprints of cannibalism, she fears she might have to invent them: “How long 
before I am driven to invent new and stranger circumstances . . . a landing by cannibals on 
the island, followed by a skirmish and many bloody deaths.”114  To succumb to temptations 
of fictionality in narrating her past is to lose her substance, which depends on the truth.  
Susan is at her wit’s end, for “only tongue that can tell Friday’s secret is the tongue he has 
lost!”115  She concludes that her story “seems stupid, that is only because it so doggedly 
holds its silence.  The shadow whose lack you feel is there: it is the loss of Friday’s 
tongue.”116 
In Foe, the silent figure of Friday exists monumentally; he has no voice and no 
origin.  Origins lie at the locus of inevitable loss, where essential identities remain buried. 
Susan fails to unmask the story of the loss of the tongue, the Ursprung of Friday, thus failing 
to access, what she believes to be the truth of his nature, his cannibalism.  Only the lost 
tongue can narrate the story of its loss.  The mutilated body of Friday carries marks of its 
descent, its Herkunft, maintaining the traces of the events of history in their proper 
dispersion.  In RC, the traces of the Friday’s past are appropriated and transformed into the 
tongue of the master/father.  For Susan the marks of mutilation hide an interiority (the truth 
about Friday’s cannibalism), but the effects of torture make access to that interiority 
impossible.  For Foucault Herkunft identifies “the accidents, the minute deviations . . . the 
errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty calculations that gave birth to those things that 
continue to exist.”117  The body of Friday exists, not as an allegorical sign awaiting 
interpretation, but as an exteriority of accidents, gaps, and errors of history: the home of 
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Friday is a place where “bodies are their own signs.”118  The body of Friday is a parchment 
upon which Empire writes itself and displays its effects—the dominations, desires, and 
diseases.  In Foe, unlike RC, Friday’s body bears marks of the insurmountable conflicts of 
Empire, which cannot be memorized by the narrator’s consciousness.  The cinematic zoom-
out of Coetzee’s text, revealing the outermost frame outside the quotation marks, establishes 
greater distance between the liberal consciousness and the marginal other.  If the first two 
sections of the novel, written in memoir and epistolary form, attempt to document the past 
and to decipher the traces on the island to uncover their essential truth, the last two sections, 
staging the dissolution of the narrative self outside the quotation marks, transform these 
documents into monuments, memory into counter-memory.  
Foucault’s concept of counter-memory is greatly influenced by Nietzsche’s idea of 
active forgetting, a necessary condition for living.119  The formation of a unified subject 
through temporal recollection is suspended through active forgetfulness, which is a 
condition of freedom.  Forgetting disrupts essences, continuities and unities.  General history 
severs its connection to memory, its anthropological model, and constructs a counter-
memory, which is a process of forgetting.  For Foucault, counter-memory constitutes three 
uses of the past, all of which are staged in Foe.  The first use is parodic, directed against 
reality: Foucault states, “Genealogy is history in the form of a concerted carnival.”120  Foe is 
a perverse repetition, and not a recollection, of the original text, unmasking, through the 
figure of Friday, the gaps, discontinuities, and differences, which it attempts to collapse into 
the law of the same.  The second use is dissociative, directed against identity: Foucault 
asserts, “Genealogy is not to discover the roots of our identity but to commit itself to its 
dissipation.”121  The narrator’s desire to form a unified self through anamnesis of the loss of 
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the tongue is disrupted by the event of torture.  The marks of torture fail to be translated into 
a representational image of thought.  The third use is sacrificial, directed against truth: 
Foucault maintains, “Where religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge 
now calls for experimentation on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of 
knowledge.”122  Coetzee’s text stages the malicious nature of the metropolitan liberal 
subject’s will to knowledge, and the eventual destruction of the subject who seeks to 
know/subject the other of history.  The silent stream issuing from Friday’s mouth drowns the 
narrator, the characters and the author into a general textuality.  RC, the original text of Foe, 
fails to be materialized in Coetzee’s novel. 
If Susan tries to forestall death through memorizing the past, Coetzee’s text murders 
the author through monumentalizing the past.  In the final section, outside the house where 
Foe lies dead, the plaque announces “Daniel Defoe, Author.”  Foe and Defoe cannot inhabit 
the same narrative space.  The death of the author releases the author-function in its 
discursive realm.  In Coetzee, writing is an act of forgetting, of sacrifice of the author.  
Foucault describes the nature of writing in our times, “Writing is now linked to sacrifice and 
to the sacrifice of life itself. . .  .  Where a work had the duty of creating immortality, it now 
attains a right to kill, to become the murderer of the author.”123  To write is to write the self, 
to transform the self into the victim of one’s own writing.  Coetzee, following Ronald 
Barthes, asserts that writing occurs in the middle voice, with reference to the self: “To write 
(active) is to carry out the action without reference to the self, perhaps, though not 
necessarily, on behalf of someone else.  To write (middle) is to carry out the action (or 
better, to do-writing) with reference to the self.”124  To write is not to represent the other, but 
to wrench the self from itself through dehumanizing effects of counter-memory.  Counter-
 120 
memory has value as critique; it is an act of dislodging the self from itself, opening a gap of 
difference.  Paul A. Bové explains its value as critique: “It [criticism] can exploit the 
possibilities of that discourse to produce what Foucault calls a ‘counter-memory,’ but it 
needs to be careful not to assume the right of speaking for others in forming that 
memory.”125  As a true genealogist, Coetzee writes in the middle voice, laughing at the 
grandness of origins through monumentalized history. 
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3.0  JUSTICE, ETHICS, AND PRACTICES OF FREEDOM: J. M. COETZEE’S 
DISGRACE 
Our cries 
are drums heralding desire 
in the tumultuous voices, music of nations, 
our cries are hymns of love that hearts 
might flourish on the earth like seeds in the sun 
the cries of Africa 
cries of mornings when the dead grew from the seas 
chained 
the blood and the seed. 
—Agostinho Neto1 
 
We, the people of South Africa, feel fulfilled that humanity has taken us back into its bosom, 
that we, who were outlaws not so long ago, have today been given the rare privilege to be 
host to the nations of the world on our own soil. . . .  We trust that you will continue to stand 
by us as we tackle the challenges of building peace, prosperity, nonsexism, nonracialism and 
democracy. . . .  Let there be justice for all.  Let there be peace for all.  Let there be work, 
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bread, water and salt for all. . . .  Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful 
land will again experience the oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being 
the skunk of the world.  Let freedom reign. 
—Nelson Mandela2 
 
I am not a herald of community or anything else . . . I am someone who has intimations of 
freedom (as every chained prisoner has) and constructs representations—which are shadows 
themselves—of people slipping their chains and turning their faces to the light.  
—J. M. Coetzee3 
 
Perhaps more than any other of his novels, J. M. Coetzee’s Disgrace4 has garnered 
intense domestic controversy and worldwide commentary, largely centered on the depiction 
of black-on-white rape in post-apartheid South Africa.  The African National Congress 
(hereafter ANC) submitted a report to the South African Human Rights Commission on 5th 
April 2000 using Disgrace as an example of racism in the media due to the representation of 
black-on-white crime.5  I will address this charge of racism in the following pages.  While 
the narrative event of interracial rape has gained much attention in critical readings of the 
novel, there are almost no readings on the question of justice, which the novel intensely 
grapples with, given its publication in 1999 just after the event of national catharsis—The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission trials (hereafter TRC).  The question that haunts the 
text is this—in face of such unspeakable horrors of the past, is justice possible in the 
present?  If so, what is its form and nature?  Moreover, can fiction speak to the possibility of 
justice?  In this chapter, I will argue that Coetzee’s Disgrace proposes the possibility of 
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justice, not as law, but as ethics.  Recasting justice in post-apartheid and postcolonial South 
Africa, the novel stages the “idea” of justice as being heterogeneous to law.  It exceeds the 
law of retributive, restorative, and distributive justice.  In this regard, I will show that the 
novel allegorizes the TRC model of restorative justice through the mode of the confessional 
narrative only to interrupt it.  Borrowing from Jacques Derrida’s reconceptualization of the 
idea of justice in relation to deconstruction, elaborated in numerous works, I will 
demonstrate that Disgrace, while staging the limits of the interpretative violence of justice as 
law (“force of law”), presents the irreducible idea of justice that addresses itself to the 
absolute singularity of the other, to the human-other and the animal-other.  This idea of 
justice, as an ethical relation to the other, is a gift without exchange, without circulation and 
without debt.  In the novel, the state of dis-grace (apart from the Law of the Father) is the 
condition of possibility of justice outside and beyond law.  It exceeds the universalist 
discourses of law and rights, and also escapes the gaze of the witness and the allegorist. 
Furthermore, I will argue that writing itself, in Coetzee, is an act of justice beyond law; it is 
an ethical gesture towards the radical alterity of the wholly other. 
Disgrace, published in 1999, almost five years after Nelson Mandela was elected 
president in a fully representative democratic election, brought Coetzee a record-breaking 
second Booker Prize that same year.  The narrative events of Disgrace unfold in post-
apartheid South Africa, just after the fall of the apartheid regime and the end of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission hearings.6  Gerald Kaufman, a Member of Parliament and 
the chairman of the Booker judge’s panel noted that the book is “an allegory about what is 
happening to the human race in the post-colonial era.”7  He also declared it “a millennial 
book because it takes us through the 20th century into a new century in which the source of 
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power is shifting away from Western Europe.”8  Kaufman notably reads this novel, which 
several critics suggest is one of the rear instances of the use of the realist style by the author, 
as a global allegory (not a universal, transcendental one), symbolizing the occasion of the 
emergence of a new phase in geopolitics, when not only South Africa but the globe is 
experiencing the deterritorialization of the old (colonialism and apartheid) and 
reterritorialization of the new (the “rise” of the postcolonial nations, or the “Asian century”).  
After its publication the novel soon captured the world’s imagination, with, however 
skeptical one is of such “lists,” a 2006 poll of 150 literary luminaries conducted by the 
British newspaper The Observer of the best novels of the last 25 years electing Disgrace as 
the winner.9  In 2008 a motion picture adaptation directed by Steve Jacobs starring John 
Malkovich as the protagonist David Lurie was premiered at the Toronto Film Festival and 
won the International Critics’ Award.  
Disgrace is among the few novels of Coetzee that identifies the time and place of the 
action; it is often read as a realist novel: Gareth Cornwell asserts, “Thus, although there is 
little trace in Coetzee’s novel of ‘smelly underwear’ or ‘people picking their noses,’ it is safe 
to say that Disgrace has every appearance of being a realist text.”10  While Disgrace is a 
realist novel, perhaps his most realist novel, I will demonstrate that it is a multi-generic 
novel.  Along with apparently realist representation of places and events, it is also part 
allegory.  The novel is written in third-person narration in free indirect discourse with David 
as the focalizer.  Coetzee employs free indirect discourse through much of the novel, thus 
cautioning his readers that although the third-person narrator adheres as closely as possible 
to the thoughts of the character-focalizer, David, the narrative voice does not fully yield 
ground to David’s consciousness.  In other words, the free indirect style of the novel 
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produces crucial distance between the two.  But in many passages, we will see the distance 
between the two voices blurs, or appears to.  Similar to other novels of Coetzee, it is also 
entirely written in the present tense.  It narrates the story of David, a divorced middle-aged 
white liberal university professor specializing in British Romanticism, who solves the 
problem of sex in a programmatic fashion, meeting with Soraya, a Muslim sex-worker 
whom he has chosen from the “Exotic” section of the catalogue, every Thursday afternoons.  
When these liaisons come to an end, after he stalks her, Lurie seduces his student Melanie, 
who is coloured (the Greek root melas meaning dark), and is charged with sexual 
harassment by the university committee.  At the meeting, he offers no defense and no 
apologies, rejecting the confessional mode of contrition that the committee members desire 
in order to “access and reform his soul.”  The university committee hearing is often read as 
allegorizing the TRC hearings, which were framed within the Christian confessional mode.  
He leaves the university and Cape Town to live with his daughter Lucy who lives on a farm 
some miles away from Salem in Eastern Cape.  Lucy, a young independent settler woman, 
who briefly shares the house with Helen before David’s arrival and is “possibly” a lesbian, 
has appointed Petrus as a new assistant and co-proprietor of the farm.  One day she is raped 
and beaten by three black men, and David himself is beaten and burnt.  Lucy refuses to file 
charges with the police despite David’s objection. When interrogated by David about her 
silence, Lucy explains, “The reason is that, as far as I am concerned, what happened to me is 
a purely private matter.  In another time, in another place it might be held to be a public 
matter.  But in this place, at this time, it is not.”11  In response to Lurie’s question to clarify 
this place, she states, “This place being South Africa.”12  One of the rapists appears at 
Petrus’ party and is apparently his relative.  Lucy, who now is pregnant, decides to carry the 
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child to term.  Petrus, who is already married, proposes to marry her in exchange for his 
protection, suggesting that without him she is “fair game.”  Lucy agrees to the concubinage-
style marriage.  When Lurie objects to this humiliating arrangement, she responds, “Yes, I 
agree, it is humiliating.  But perhaps that is a good point to start from again.  Perhaps that is 
what I must learn to accept.  To start at ground level.  With nothing.  Not with nothing but.  
With nothing.  No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity. . . .  Yes, like a 
dog.”13  Meantime, David has been working for the not so attractive Bev Shaw who runs the 
clinic, Animal Welfare League, that puts unwanted dogs to sleep, and also has intercourse 
with her.  David, who learns to love dogs and to let go of them, writes a sad operetta in his 
spare time. 
In his reading of tense and aspect in Franz Kafka’s story “The Burrow,” Coetzee 
suggests that the story unfolds in the shifting now of the present: “[In Kafka’s story] now 
that the construct of narrative time has collapsed there is only the time of narration left, the 
shifting now within which the narrative takes place. . . .”14  Perhaps more than any other 
writer, Kafka’s influence on Coetzee’s fiction is the greatest.  Disgrace is intertextual with 
numerous works of Kafka, and more specifically the novel, The Trial.  In Coetzee’s style 
and themes there are several echoes of Kafka.  Alluding to Kafka’s style, the novel, like 
several other novels of Coetzee, is written entirely in the present tense.  The shifting aspect 
of the perpetual present tense heightens the sense that every moment is a moment of crisis.  
The beginning itself throws the characters and the readers into one such moment of crisis.  
The novel begins with David concluding, falsely, that he has solved the “problem of sex”: 
“For a man of his age, fifty-two, divorced, he has, to his mind, solved the problem of sex 
rather well.”15  The narrator’s aside “to his mind” distances itself from the focalizer and puts 
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in doubt David’s interpretation of his situation, foreshadowing the future events of the 
plot—the events of the two rapes that will precipitate his fall from a state of grace to that of 
dis-grace.  The opening line of the novel mirrors the iconic beginning of Kafka’s The Trial: 
“Some one must have slandered Josef K., for one morning, without having done anything 
truly wrong, he was arrested.”16  Both the opening lines begin at the moment of crisis.  In 
Coetzee’s novel there is no teleological end point to this crisis as the shifting present tense 
of the narration is relentless.  In the very first chapter we learn that David has been 
unsuccessful in solving the problem of sex as he shifts from one woman to another.  We also 
learn that this sense of crisis is felt not merely at a personal level but also at the collective 
level.  When David takes Dawn, the new secretary with whom he is having an affair, out for 
lunch she discusses her plans to emigrate to New Zealand saying: “‘You people had it 
easier.  I mean, whatever the rights and wrongs of the situation, at least you knew where you 
were . . . I mean your generation.  Now people just pick and choose which laws they want to 
obey.  It’s anarchy.  How can you bring up children where there’s anarchy all around.”17  
The perpetual now of the present-tense narration renders every moment as a time of crisis 
for individuals and collectivities.  The tropes of space recur throughout the novel.  Although 
the word apartheid is never uttered, as in Dawn’s nostalgic discourse, it is referred to subtly 
in spatial metaphors—“you knew where you were.”  Each knew his or her place in the 
system.  Moreover, we realize that the shifting tectonic plates of the now are not only 
rapidly moving but also doing so in the opposite directions.  The novel is set in a South 
Africa that is undergoing seismic changes.  The novelistic beginning stages, along with 
David’s personal problem, the deterritorialization of the old structures (Dawn’s sense of 
anarchy all around her) and the subsequent reterritorialization of the liberal democratic 
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structures in post-apartheid South Africa.  These terms, borrowed from Gilles Deleuze and 
Felix Guattari’s works, are useful to describe Disgrace’s beginning and the narration as they 
draw our attention to the geological movements and shifts.  In Deleuze and Guattari, the 
movement of deterritorialization interrupts traditional structures, while reterritorialization 
restructures the place or territory that has experienced deterritorialization producing new 
regimes of power: “Derritorialization is the movement by which ‘one’ leaves the territory.  It 
is the operation of the line of flight. . . .  Derritorialization may be overlaid by a 
compensatory reterritorialization obstructing the line of flight.”18  Dawn’s flight precipitated 
by the dismantling of the apartheid structure is of course due to a sense of loss, of nostalgia 
for the certainties of “the color line.”  But the young students at David’s liberal university 
appear to embrace “the operation of the line of flight,” the “flight of the old” and the arrival 
of the “new” South Africa.  Slyly sitting in the dark auditorium where his student Melanie is 
rehearsing for the play:  
“Sunset at the Globe Salon,” David drily notes, “a comedy of new South Africa set 
in a hairdressing salon in Hillbrow, Johannesburg.  On stage a hairdresser, 
flamboyantly gay, attends to two clients, one black, one white.  Patter passes among 
the three of them: jokes, insults.  Catharsis seems to be the presiding principle: all the 
coarse old prejudices brought into the light of day and washed away in gales of 
laughter.19   
As lines are being crossed and borders dismantled, there is a new sense of racial and sexual 
liberties, where the past is conjured at a comedic distance from the present only to be 
purged.  The “new” South Africa experiences catharsis, purgation of the feelings of pity and 
fear, not as a result of the tragic suffering of the interracial lovers, but as a result of the gay 
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and joyful crossings of the old lines.  The popular aesthetic form under the old regime, 
tragedy, is replaced by the new form, comedy.  If the play within the novel perceives the 
present time as a moment of flight from the old, the novel’s staging of the shifting now of 
the present-tense narration perceives every moment as a time of crisis.  Although the novel 
opens with the disruption of the old, there is a deep sense of doubt that such a process is 
only relative and negative:  Deleuze and Guattari state, deterritorialization, when relative, is 
always followed by reterritorialization: “Deterritorialization is negative or relative . . . when 
it . . . operates . . . by principle reterritorializations that obstruct the lines of flight.”20  The 
uncertainties and the gaps produced by deterritorialization of the old are being replaced by 
the certainties and structures of the new regimes of power and knowledge. 
Describing David’s job, the narrator says, “Once a professor of modern languages, 
he has been, since Classics and Modern Languages were closed down as part of the great 
rationalization, adjunct professor of communications.  Like all rationalized personnel, he is 
allowed to offer one special-field course a year . . . because that is good for morale.”21  A 
new wave of great rationalization is sweeping across the liberal democratic South Africa; 
David, a professor of British Romanticism, now has to teach courses in professional 
communications.  A few paragraphs later, the narrator describes David’s disinterest in 
teaching the Communications classes: “He has never been much of a teacher; in this 
transformed and, to his mind, emasculated institution of learning he is more out of place 
than ever.  But then, so are other of his colleagues from the old days, burdened with 
upbringings inappropriate to the tasks they are set to perform; clerks in a post-religious 
age.”22  The sedimented banalities of professionalized knowledges have replaced the old 
discourses of good and evil.  In the university-as-global corporation, professionalized and 
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rationalized knowledges emerge victorious in the “marketplace of ideas.”  The old processes 
of racialization of the population are being rapidly replaced by the new processes of 
rationalization of the population, through which the citizens are being transformed into 
homogenous, continuous subjects.   If the regime of apartheid confiscated differences and 
assigned each to his/her place, the structures of neo-liberal democracy appropriate gaps, 
differences, and discontinuities into the plane of sameness.  Kaufman’s reading of the novel 
as a global allegory can find strong support in these beginning pages when the narrator 
bemoans the commercialization of the universities in the era of globalization; the new 
reterritorialized geography of the neo-liberal democratic South Africa, like most nations 
around the globe, dances to the global flows of capital.23  Although David bemoans the new 
commercialized terrain, I intend to argue in the following pages that his rape of his student, 
Melanie, who he is spying on in the auditorium scene mentioned above, parallels the 
instrumentalization and violent appropriation of the difference of the other.  In Disgrace the 
tectonic shifts experienced at the personal level parallel those experiences at the collective 
plane.   
Disgrace proceeds in parallels.  Parallelism is the dominant rhetorical figure in the 
novel, both at the structural and the thematic levels.  The text centers around two rapes: 
David’s rape of Melanie, his student and the three male intruders’ rape of Lucy, although 
only the latter case has generated much of the controversy and charges of racism against the 
author.  Melanie’s rape has not generated much critical debate partly because it is not read as 
rape.  Given that force and lack of consent are verifiable in Lucy’s case, as the men are total 
strangers, it is indubitably read as rape.  Moreover, David is beaten and burnt by the 
intruders.  In the case of Melanie, as there are no visible signs of force by David, despite the 
 138 
sexual act being nonconsensual, most readings of the novel, especially those that accuse 
Coetzee of racism, exclusively analyze the black-on-white rape as the dominant metaphor 
for post-apartheid South Africa.  Aggrey Klaaste, a South African journalist who was editor 
of Sowetan, finds David’s sexual acts convincing, rather than posing problems of power and 
desire: 
I read J. M. Coetzee’s book Disgrace, some time ago and while its artistry is good 
enough to win the Booker prize, its substance is that of a typically disgruntled 
Afrikaner.  The story of the fading grey university lecturer sleeping with his student 
and satisfying an unusual—for his age—sexual appetite is thoroughly convincing.  It 
is the end of Disgrace that gives me serious problems.  In sum the story of black men 
raping a white woman, who accepts this serious abuse as something like a badge of 
courage, is in my view quite offensive.  At the political level it depicts a white male 
fear about black male sexual potency and the black males’ inability to deal with 
power.24 
In this much-quoted passage, Klaaste correctly emphasizes the history of “black peril,” 
white male fear concerning black male sexuality that justified racial discrimination.  Sol 
Plaatje, a prominent political and literary figure who was one of the founders of the African 
National Congress, wrote in 1922, while living in United States, the history of this fear: “By 
‘Black Peril’ the South African whites mean ‘assaults by black men upon white women.’”25  
Plaatje goes on to say, “When Lord Harcourt, in the opinion of the South African Natives 
the weakest Colonial Secretary that ever succeeded Joseph Chamberlain at Downing Street, 
was questioned about the Natives’ Land Act, he justified it as a means of stopping ‘black 
peril’ cases.”26  Natives’ Land Act, enacted in 1913 by the British legislative body, aimed at 
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regulating the land acquisition by the “natives.”  While Klaaste reads Lucy’s rape in light of 
the history of “black peril,” he ignores the history of, what Plaatje calls, the “white peril” 
that Coetzee’s Disgrace stages in the beginning as a structural parallel to the latter half of the 
novel.27  Plaatje notes that although black and white unions in Transvaal were banned, white 
men could cohabit with black or coloured women as long as they did not marry them, which 
made it more difficult to prosecute white-on-black rape.28  Klaaste reads Lurie’s sexual 
encounters with Melanie, not in terms of rape, but merely in terms of the natural expression 
of male desire, thus ignoring issues of power endemic to a student-teacher relationship and 
the history of “white peril.” (In the South African nomenclature, Melanie is coloured.  
Although the narrator does not specify this, it is suggested by her name—the Greek root 
melas meaning dark.)   
The ANC’s submission to the Human Rights Commission’s Inquiry into Racism in 
the Media (April 2000) accusing Coetzee of racism repeats Klaaste’s omission.  Public 
Enterprises Minister Jeff Radebe, who presented the ANC report, states, “In this novel J. M. 
Coetzee represents as brutally as he can the white people’s perception of the post-apartheid 
black man” (as quoted in Attwell).29  Klaaste’s and ANC’s understanding of only Lucy’s 
sexual encounter as rape reiterate flaws of legal definitions of rape in numerous judicial 
systems that require the victim to establish both force and lack of consent.  Feminists have 
long argued that such dual requirements of force and lack of consent are not only redundant, 
but provide legal protection to such acts as marital rape.  While Klaaste and ANC are 
certain, prima facie, that Melanie has not been raped, the internal focalizer David is not so 
sure.  One afternoon he barges into Melanie’s apartment and despite her performative 
utterance “no,” establishing nonconsent, he proceeds to rape her.  The narrator notes, “Not 
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rape, not quite that, but undesired nevertheless, undesired to the core.”30  In this passage, the 
distance between the external narrator and the internal focalizer collapses—the narrative 
voice mirrors Lurie’s consciousness of his unreciprocated sexual desire.  Moreover, Klaaste 
and ANC read Disgrace predominantly through the all-encompassing oppositional relations 
between blacks and whites, but Coetzee’s text rejects such duality to show that manifold 
relationships of force, constituting of race, gender, class, and sexuality, run through the 
South African social body.  The rapes of Melanie and Lucy do not function to reverse the 
hierarchically ordered binary oppositional relations of race in South Africa, with the white 
as a victim in the new South Africa, but function to destabilize the all-consuming 
oppositional structure as the rapes of the women are situated in the vicious nexus between 
racism, sexism, and heteronormative sexuality.31  Lucy reminds him of the gender divide 
between the two of them: when discussing her rape she states, “Maybe, for men, hating the 
woman makes sex more exciting.”32  To which David wonders if Lucy and he share familial 
and racial ties, “Are she and he on the same side?”33  As the new lines of forces are being 
drawn, David is uncertain of his place.  He echoes Dawn here.  Moreover, Lucy is a lesbian, 
who before David’s arrival was living with her partner Helen.  After her rape, the narrator 
declares, “Rape, god of chaos and mixture, violator of seclusions.  Raping a lesbian worse 
than raping a virgin: more of a blow.”34  Rape of Lucy has not only violated a racially 
gendered body but also a lesbian “utopian space,” and hence should be considered a graver 
crime.  One reason, among many, why this novel has posed such problems for reading is that 
the terrain staged in the story is filled with landmines, with multiple lines of forces (gender, 
race, sexuality, and class) crisscrossing the landscape in a maddening fashion.  Thus, the act 
 141 
of reading this novel involves hopping, stopping, calculating, and hesitating at every point 
that one lands on before taking another flight, and despite this one might not survive. 
In the redrawn terrain of South Africa, the parallel structure of the narrative plot puts 
David squarely on the side of the three intruders than with Lucy.  The two rapes in the text 
blur the “color line” between them, as the gender gap widens.  He and Lucy are no more on 
“the same side.”  Lucy draws the link between her father and her rapists: “When it comes to 
men and sex, David, nothing surprises me any more. . . .  You are a man, you ought to know. 
When you have sex with someone strange—when you trap her, hold her down, get her under 
you, put all your weight on her—isn’t it a bit like killing?”35  David resists Lucy’s 
understanding of all (or at least his) male sexuality, a la Catherine MacKinnon, as an 
expression of power.  In another instance of the blurring of distances between his voice and 
the narrative voice, he ponders, “You are a man, you ought to know: does one speak to one’s 
father like that? ‘Perhaps,’ he says. ‘Sometimes. For some men.’”36  But earlier in the text 
when David traps Melanie and forces himself on her, while deeming his actions “not quite 
rape,” he echoes Lucy’s words: “As though she had decided to go slack, die within herself 
for the duration, like a rabbit when the jaws of the fox close on its neck.  So that everything 
done to her might be done, as it were, far away.”37  Although, eventually, Lucy’s rape forces 
him to abandon his defense of his past actions on the basis of a liberal humanist discourse of 
“rights of desire,”38 at this point in the text he continues to resist being labeled a rapist.  A 
few paragraphs after defending himself against Lucy’s accusations, David, who is 
composing an opera on Byron’s liaison with Teresa Guiccioli, reflects on Byron’s 
relationship with his women: “Among the legions of countesses and kitchenmaids Byron 
pushed himself into there were no doubt those who called it rape.  But none surely had cause 
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to fear that the session would end with her throat being slit.  From where he stands, from 
where Lucy stands, Byron looks very old-fashioned indeed.”39  Although Byron appears 
old-fashioned, so does David, who finds more affinities with the British Romantics than 
with Lucy’s reading.  Still doubtful if Byron “pushing” himself into countesses and 
kitchenmaids could clearly be considered rape, David repeats flaws of legal definitions of 
rape (as do Klaaste and ANC) demanding that the victim show visible marks of force (throat 
being slit) inflicted by a stranger, which are lacking in Melanie’s case.  Thus, instead of 
being the victimizer, he speaks of Lucy and himself, echoing escalating “white paranoia,” as 
being the victims of the “new South Africa.”  But as the faculty of the imagination fails this 
professor of the Romantics in reconstructing Lucy’s perspective during her rape (failing to 
sympathize with her), he begins to realize that the only way he can understand her rape is by 
losing himself into the position of the rapist: “Lucy’s intuition is right after all: he does 
understand; he can, if he concentrates, if he loses himself, be there, be the men, inhabit 
them, fill them with the ghost of himself.  The question is, does he have it in him to be the 
woman?”40  Recognition and identification with men across the racial lines is a simpler 
proposition than crossing the fraught lines of gender.  Although he can inhabit the position 
of the male rapist, imagination fails in inhabiting the body of the woman.  Thus, the ethical 
challenge David faces is: can he inhabit the place of a woman; but more challengingly, can 
he inhabit the place of the coloured woman, Melanie?   In other words, can he put himself in 
the margins of history?  
The novelistic structure sets up another parallel in order to heighten the trope of 
irony.  While David defends his rape of Melanie in terms of “rights of desire,” he denies a 
woman the right to own her body.  The ironic and unsympathetic dramatization of David’s 
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discourse of rights offers a trenchant criticism of the liberal humanist discourse of rights and 
private ownership.  At the university hearing, composed of a diverse committee, David 
refuses to offer defense of his actions, but when visiting Lucy he defends his actions in 
terms of rights, rather than duties (as a professor), of the individual: “‘My case rests on the 
rights of desire,’ he says. ‘On the god who makes even the small birds quiver.’ . . . I was a 
servant of Eros: that is what he wants to say, but does he have the effrontery?  It was a god 
who acted through me.”41  At earlier moments in the novel, David engages in close reading 
of Romantic poetry to offer passionate defense of his philandering ways.  Like his favorite 
Romantic poets Wordsworth and Byron, governed by the pleasure, rather than the reality, 
principle, he wishes to cling till the end to his place in the banquet of the senses.  While 
doing a close reading of Book 6 of Wordsworth’s The Prelude, to a largely unresponsive 
class, he elaborates on the limits of sense-perception: “As the sense-organs reach the limit of 
their powers, their light begins to go out.  Yet at the moment of expiry that light leaps up one 
last time like a candle-flame, giving us a glimpse of the invisible.”42  In a later class, when 
discussing Byron’s “Lara,” David reminds his students that although Lucifer in the poem is 
driven by a mad heart, who does not act on principle but impulse, he is not judged by the 
poet: “Note that we are not asked to condemn this being with the mad heart, this being with 
whom there is something constitutionally wrong.  On the contrary, we are invited to 
understand and sympathize.”43  But in David’s reading there is limit to sympathy, not 
because judgments are necessary, but because Lucifer is a thing, a monster, given his 
otherworldliness.  David, like Byron’s Lucifer, resists moral judgment, while demanding no 
limits to sympathy towards him.  After all, he is a creature of this world and not a thing.  But 
Rosalind, his ex-wife, explicitly denies him sympathy, reminding him that in the “new” 
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South Africa he will be judged not in terms of individual transgression but in terms of a 
history of collective transgressions that demand atonement: “Don’t expect sympathy from 
me, David, and don’t expect sympathy from anyone else either.  No sympathy, no mercy, 
not in this day and age.”44  The new South Africa has no sympathy for this classical figure 
of the Romantic hero conjuring up the discourses of rights and individualism.  Furthermore, 
the ironic parallelism that the novel stages between his defense of his rights and his denial of 
those rights to women deliberately blocks sympathy for him from its readers.  In one of the 
scenes with Melanie, he convinces her to stay for the night “because a woman’s beauty does 
not belong to her alone.  It is part of the bounty she brings into the world.  She has a duty to 
share it.”45  The non-autonomous gendered subaltern’s body provides the necessary 
condition for establishing the self-presence of the autonomous liberal white male self.  
While in class, he offers a lyrical defense of his actions, at the committee hearing he 
exhibits a cold, indifferent exterior, rejecting the language of confession and moral 
judgment.  Mocking the panopticon-like structure of the committee hearing, he declares, “‘I 
have no fear of the committee.  I have no fear of the observer.”46  Although he immediately 
pleads guilty and desires a quick sentence, the committee is not satisfied with his admission 
of guilt.  They wish to witness a confession of the crime and then to reform him: Farodia 
Rassool, one of the committee members recommends, “‘You say you have not sought legal 
advice.  Have you consulted anyone—a priest, for instance, or a counsellor?  Would you be 
prepared to undergo counselling?’”47  Finding him evasive, with no expression of contrition, 
the members demand a public confession, rather than a plea.  David refuses to write a 
heartfelt confessional statement reiterating formulas the committee wishes to hear, insisting 
that what happens in his heart is beyond the scope of the law.  He expresses guilt in 
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clinically legal terms, while the committee wishes to witness a quasi-religious confession of 
remorse and contrition.  The committee hearing scene is an allegory of the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission hearings and critically engages with that historical event of 
national catharsis.48  TRC was based on the religious principle that revelation of truth about 
the past crimes shall lead to national unity and reconciliation.  The members of the TRC 
stood witness to the confessions of the crime and the process of reconciliation between the 
victims and the perpetrators.  In this scene, Disgrace stages the cathartic, confessional ritual 
enacted by the TRC model of production of truth based on public acts of witnessing the 
truth, confessing the crime, and reconciling with the past.  Lucy reminds David that his 
refusal to confess has turned him into a scapegoat, which he disagrees with by describing the 
difference between scapegoating and surveillance, in a quasi-Foucauldian passage: 
‘I don’t think scapegoating is the best description,’ he says cautiously. ‘Scapegoating 
worked in practice while it still had religious power behind it.  You loaded the sins of 
the city on to the goat’s back and drove it out, and the city was cleansed.  It worked 
because everyone knew how to read the ritual, including the gods.  Then the gods 
died, and all of a sudden you had to cleanse the city without divine help.  Real 
actions were demanded instead of symbolism. The censor was born, in the Roman 
sense.  Watchfulness became the watchword: the watchfulness of all over all.  
Purgation was replaced by the purge.’49 
David is right that the university committee, instead of scapegoating him as in the olden 
days, desired to observe, control, and reform him through the witnessing, confessional, and 
correctional methods.  In an earlier dialogue with Lucy, he pronounces that counseling 
reminds him “‘too much of Mao’s China. Recantation, self-criticism, public apology.  I’m 
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old-fashioned, I would prefer simply to be put against a wall and shot.  Have done with 
it.’”50  David, who is rather old-fashioned, prefers, similar to the practice of scapegoating, an 
older form of punishment.51  Justice here is achieved in purely legalistic terms: an explicit 
law has been breached and the punishment would address only the penal qualification of the 
act itself.  David wants to be punished for what he has done and not for what he might do—
the behavioral potentialities of the individual.  The university committee, dissatisfied with 
his plea, demand that he not only admit that he is wrong but prove the sincerity of the 
statement.  To this David replies, “That is preposterous.  That is beyond the scope of the 
law. . . .  Let us go back to playing it by the book.  I plead guilty.”52  
In essence, what David is denying the committee is the performance of the public 
roles of the witness and the interpreter.  They desire to witness him publically confess to the 
crimes; and to further go beyond the literal level of the utterance of the crime into the depths 
of his soul.  The novel disrupts the TRC model of restorative justice achieved through the 
normalizing gaze of the interpreter and the witness.53  In this scene with the court-like body, 
Coetzee dramatizes the figures of the realist writer and the allegorist.  The realist writer 
stands witness to the injustices of history; and the allegorist interprets the literal level into 
the pre-existing master codes—in our scene those codes are quasi-religious and quasi-legal.  
Ironically, the committee body wishes to perform both the roles of the realist and the 
allegorist, of witnessing and of interpreting the crimes of the past.  In this dissertation, I have 
tried to show that throughout his writing career Coetzee has strongly rejected the aesthetic 
mode of witness writing.  His novels are largely written in the anti-confessional mode.  
Furthermore, his relationship to the form of allegory is agonistic, as I have tried to show in 
my first chapter.  How then do we understand his choice of the realist aesthetic mode for 
 147 
Disgrace, which as this scene shows is also partly allegorical?  This surely has puzzled 
critics of his works.  In Disgrace, Coetzee I argue interrupts the acts of witnessing and 
interpreting both as a modality of justice and as a modality of writing. 
If at the committee hearing David exhibits a cold, impenetrable exterior, after the 
rape of his daughter, in still another instance of the use of the parallelistic structure to 
heighten irony, he desperately desires to perform the function of the realist and the 
allegorist.  The text and Lucy deny him both.  Although he was present in the house at the 
time of the rape, he was locked in the bathroom and did not actually witness the crime.  To 
add to his difficulties, Lucy mostly distances herself from him denying him sight and access 
to the scars.  After her rape, she refuses to file a formal police report against the rapists, 
insisting that her rape is purely a “private matter. In another time, in another place it might 
be held to be a public matter.  But in this place, at this time, it is not.”54  David, who desires 
justice for Lucy, insists on filing a report in order to pursue criminal prosecution.  He mocks 
Lucy’s attempt at private salvation for crimes of the past: “Do you think what happened here 
was an exam: if you come through, you get a diploma and safe conduct into the future. . . .  
That is not how vengeance works, Lucy.  Vengeance is like fire. The more it devours, the 
hungrier it gets.”55  To which, Lucy angrily responds, “Guilt and salvation are abstractions.  
I don’t act in terms of abstractions.”56  In an ironic reversal, David, who rejects the 
supervising gaze of the university committee desiring to reform him, passionately demands 
criminal prosecution of the rapists—trial, confession of the crime, and imprisonment.  David 
understands Lucy’s silence and refusal to file a formal report in terms of guilt and salvation 
for the wrongs of history, while Lucy reads it as a purely private matter beyond such 
abstractions.  In this regard, there is another ironic reversal with the inquiry scene earlier in 
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the novel, where David insists that his desires are purely private, beyond law, while Farodia 
Rassool reads David’s actions as having historical piquancy: “‘Yes, he says, he is guilty; but 
when we try to get specificity, all of a sudden it is not abuse of a young woman he is 
confessing to, just an impulse he could not resist, with no mention of the pain he has caused, 
no mention of the long history of exploitation of which this is part.’”57  In a later scene, 
when Lucy first discusses her rape with her father, she understands her rape in terms of debt 
and not guilt, in contrast to David: “What if . . . what if that is the price one has to pay for 
staying on?. . . .  They see me as owing something.  They see themselves as debt collectors, 
tax collectors.  Why should I be allowed to live here without paying?”58  Lucy, who does not 
work with the abstractions of guilt, reads the assailants as cold and indifferent debt-
collectors to whom she meant nothing.  If in the inquiry scene David resists the prying gaze 
in terms of the discourse of rights, Lucy resists David’s gaze in terms of the discourse of 
economics.  David, failing to read the trade metaphor, insists that their aim is to enslave her, 
to which she responds, “Not slavery.  Subjection.  Subjugation.”59  Slavery is based on 
direct expropriation, rather than exchanging for wages, the labor-power of the slaves.  Lucy 
feels that the rapists reminded her that she is, not enslaved, but indebted to them.  As 
creditors, the rapists subject her to their will in exchange for the debt. 
In his second essay, Friedrich Nietzsche reminds us that the beginnings of justice lie 
in the pre-historical contractual relationship between creditor and debtor.  Thus every injury 
“has its equivalent and can actually be paid back, even if only through the pain of the 
culprit.”60  In case the debtor failed to repay, the creditor could torture the body of the debtor 
as there were exact legal evaluations for every part of the human body.  In this way, the 
creditors could seek pleasure in participating in the right of the masters to subject and torture 
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the powerless.  The pleasure is greater the lower the creditor is in the social order.  This 
“economic” bargain, and not morality, formed the basis for the classical codes of law.  
Nietzsche also points out that the German word Schuld implying guilt has its origins in the 
material concept Schulden which means debt.61  The feeling of guilt, of personal obligation, 
has its origin in the debtor/creditor relationship.  In its prehistoric non-moral form, guilt did 
not imply fear of punishment but a feeling of indebtedness.  But over time, with the 
formation of society, humans develop a “bad conscience,” that is, the human all too human 
desire for cruelty becomes a perpetual source of guilt, a fear of transgressing the norms of 
society, thus making oneself a liability to oneself.  With bad conscience we get 
“internalization of man: it was that man first developed what was later called his ‘soul,’” 
which results in moralization of guilt and duty.62  Thus, humans are left with an 
irredeemable debt, their soul, that “gives rise to the conception of irredeemable penance, the 
idea that it cannot be discharged (‘eternal punishment’).”63  David interprets Lucy’s refusal 
to take legal recourse in terms of bad conscience, the moral form of guilt, as her private 
penance for the wrongs of history.  Lucy, vehemently resists David’s interpretations of the 
event, reminding him numerous times that he did not witness the crime, and suggests that 
the rape has marked her as being in debt.  The rapists subject her to their will to punish her 
for her debt.  What David fails to understand is the law-making function of Lucy’s rape, 
which is outside and above the law.  Walter Benjamin distinguishes between two functions 
of violence: the law-making and the law-preserving function: “All violence as a means is 
either lawmaking or law-preserving. If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits 
all validity.”64  Law-making violence is the foundational violence that establishes and posits 
a new law; law-preserving violence conserves, maintains and enforces the law, relying for 
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its preservation on the representation of the foundational violence.  In this sense, law, as it 
engages in constant re-legitimation, can never abandon the originary violence.  For 
Benjamin, juridical violence is inherent to both natural and positive law.  In the novel, the 
violence of Lucy’s rape entails a law-making character; it lies at the origin of “new” South 
Africa.  As originary violence, it constitutes a paradox: it is above and beyond law and is 
simultaneously the foundational violence of a new law, a new constitution.  It is a 
performative violence of an emergence ex nihilo of a legal and a political system, of a new 
society.  Echoing Cordelia in William Shakespeare’s King Lear, Lucy shields herself against 
the interpretative gestures of her father with the word “nothing,”  “Perhaps that is what I 
must learn to accept.  To start at ground level.  With nothing.  Not with nothing but.  With 
nothing.  No cards, no weapons, no property, no rights, no dignity. . . .  Yes, like a dog.”65  
After the rape, Lucy will formalize a contractual relationship, based on the prehistoric 
creditor/debtor model, with Petrus: she will marry him for his protection.  Nietzsche states 
that the creditor/debtor relationship is analogous to the relationship between the state and the 
citizen.  The state promises to protect the citizen from injuries in return for obedience.  
When the citizen transgresses, the state, as a disappointed creditor, can throw the citizen out 
of the community into the savage state.66  In Nietzsche, the origins of law, justice and 
society lie, not in the moral form of guilt, but in the economic relationship of indebtedness.  
As for Benjamin, Nietzsche maintains that if violence is uncontained before the contract, 
after the contract, within the sphere of the law, it is calculable and measured: “[The 
creditor’s] anger is held in check and modified by the idea that every injury has its 
equivalent and can actually be paid back, even if only through the pain of the culprit.”67  In 
the terms of the contract, Lucy will surrender her land and her body for protection.  Rape, 
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constituting the uncontained, originary, male violence, precipitates the concubinage-style 
marriage contract, in which she will “voluntarily” give herself up to the law of the 
master/father.  In law, Lucy submits herself to reproductive heteronormativity. 
Gayatri Spivak reads Lucy’s nothing as a refusal to be raped: “It is . . . casting aside 
of the affective value-system attached to reproductive heteronormativity as it is accepted as 
the currency to measure human dignity.  I do not think this is an acceptance of rape, but a 
refusal to be raped, by instrumentalizing reproduction.”68  Although Lucy casts aside the 
affective value of mothering entailed in reproductive heteronormativity, after all she enters 
into a concubinage-style marriage with Petrus, her status is still that of a debtor in a 
heteronormative relationship.  Lucy, the white lesbian, surrenders ownership of her body 
and land for protection in the “new” South Africa.  Spivak’s reading is based on the false 
assumption of choice—Lucy chooses to instrumentalize heteronormative reproduction and 
hence refuses to be raped.  In an interview with Nermeen Shaikh, when asked to explain the 
term reproductive heteronormativity, Spivak states, “[It] simply means that it is normal to be 
heterosexual and to reproduce, and it is in terms of that norm that society is made. . . .  It 
will never go away because that is what writes (and rights) being human . . . you 
acknowledge the norm, acknowledge that it is an instrument, it is a means, it has its limits, 
and it should not think of itself as an end.”69  It is only after rape that Lucy becomes a debtor 
and a citizen of the new state (she does not abandon South Africa although David begs her 
to return to Holland to live with her mother).  Lucy’s choice—of instrumentalizing 
reproduction (she decides to bear the child of rape to term)—is contained within the sphere 
of the law of the master/father.  It is based on a fundamental paradox—a choice produced 
within law.  After rape, she enters the realm of law and justice, of justice as law, of 
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distributive justice—a property owner becoming a property who will be shared within the 
calculable terms of the marriage contract (Petrus and one of her rapists are part of the same 
household).  In postcolonial South Africa, private property, viciously guarded by white 
privilege under apartheid, enters a circulatory system of community property, where women 
and cars circulate hands: David ponders, “Too many people, too few things.  What there is 
must go into circulation, so that everyone can have a chance to be happy for a day. . . .  Cars, 
shoes; women too.  There must be some niche in the system for women and what happens to 
them.”70  What is hard to take for several critics of the novel, some of them discussed above, 
in this bleak image of the new South Africa, is the novel’s depiction of a society drifting 
away from the promise of a full democracy, based on the principles of nonracialism, 
nonsexism, and distributive justice (that is, suum cuique, to each his or her own due).71  In 
Disgrace the model of distributive justice reiterates and legitimizes the law-making gendered 
violence—women and cars are equally distributed.  The novel stages the continuation in 
postcolonial societies of the gendered violence of colonial penetration.  Amina Mama argues 
that colonialism in Africa, as in several other nations, exploited preexisting patriarchal 
structures, only to make African women more vulnerable to various forms of violence, that 
only continues today with a vengeance in postcolonial Africa, more so in nations where the 
project of nation building has failed.72  
Lucy’s father has a contentious relationship with her independence (from the law of 
the father) symbolized by her solitary life as a settler woman in the country, her lesbianism, 
and her ownership of property.  When imagining Lucy sexually with a woman, David 
admits, “The truth is, he does not like to think of his daughter in the throes of passion with 
another woman.”73  When first meeting Lucy, he ponders, “Attractive, he is thinking, yet 
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lost to men.”74  Later, he notices Lucy’s systematic separation from him (and men): “As a 
child Lucy had been quiet and self-effacing. . . .  Now . . . she has begun to separate.  The 
dogs, the gardening, the astrology books, the asexual clothes: in each he recognizes a 
statement of independence, considered purposeful.”75  David believes women, like sheep, do 
not own themselves.  In the beginning of the novel, he attempts to seduce his student 
Melanie within the terms of distributive justice, “a woman’s beauty does not belong to her 
alone.  It is part of the bounty she brings into the world.  She has a duty to share it.”76  After 
her rape, her rejection of David’s desire to perform the function of the witness and the 
allegorist to the crime further establishes her independence from him.  Ironically, although 
David objects to Lucy’s surrender of property rights to her land to Petrus, her rape manifests 
David’s desire to contain his daughter within the sphere of fatherly influence.  David’s 
lament that she is lost to men, existing at the level of desire, materializes after her rape as 
she enters into the grand circulatory system of commodity exchange, although not of 
generalized commodity exchange.  As Petrus’ debtor, Lucy, in her state of nothingness, has 
no exchange-value but only use-value.  In the concubinage-style marital contract, she is 
directly the object of utility, shared among the members of the Petrus’ household, one of 
whom raped her. In the system of distributive justice staged in the novel, women and cars 
are shared enacting the foundational violence of law, of justice as law. 
In Disgrace I propose justice exceeds the law of the father; it is heterogeneous to the 
Law.  Derrida, in response to the question, “Does deconstruction insure the possibility of 
justice?,” differentiates between justice as law and justice (in itself): 
It is the force essentially implied in the very concept of justice as law (droit), of 
justice as it becomes droit, of the law as “droit” (for I want to insist right away on 
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reserving the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law that not only exceeds or 
contradicts “law” (droit) but also, perhaps, has no relation to law, or maintains such a 
strange relation to it that it may just as well command the “droit” that excludes it).77 
In Derrida, justice as law implies both the law-making and law-preserving function of 
violence.  The necessity of force is implied in justice as law.  For Derrida, if the witnessing 
gaze of the law calculates, interprets, and appropriates, justice outside the gaze of the law is 
without calculation, interpretation, and appropriation.  Disgrace stages the necessary force 
implied in justice as law, that is, in the laws of restorative, retributive and distributive 
justice.  As discussed earlier, the TRC model of restorative justice, invoked in the university 
committee inquiry scene, couched in the quasi-legal confessional mode, seeks to witness and 
to reform the crime through the calculated (and continuous) application of violence—
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination.  The strict legalism of 
David’s desire to be shot dead (rather than reformed), based on the model of retributive 
justice, establishes a finite and calculated relationship between the law and punishment.  In 
Lucy’s rape as retribution for the crimes of the past, Coetzee stages a paradox: it is outside 
and beyond law and the foundational violence of a new law, a new society.  As originary 
violence, it sets forth the force and calculations of retributive and distributive justice.  
Justice as revenge and justice as redistribution of land enact the originary gendered violence 
in the novel—Lucy in circulation.  Similarly, David’s justification for Melanie’s rape, 
operate within the terms of distributive justice outside the discourse of rights—women’s 
beauty should be shared.  All these forms of justice as law reduce justice to what can simply 
be calculated, appropriated, and normalized.  In Disgrace, justice exceeds law, the gaze, 
force, and calculations of law.  It cannot be reduced to circulation, calculation, revenge, and 
 155 
debt.  Derrida insists that justice does not stand for “calculable equality, therefore, not for 
the symmetrizing and synchronic accountability or imputability of subjects or objects . . . but 
for justice as incalculability of the gift and singularity of the an-economic ex-position to 
others. ‘The relation to others—that is to say, justice,’ writes Levinas.”78  In the novel, 
justice is incalculable; it is an experience of the impossible, of the absolute singularity of the 
other.  
After Lucy’s rape David visits Melanie’s family to narrate his side of the story.  He 
again defends his actions, to Melanie’s father, in terms of the liberal humanist discourse of 
rights: “Yet in olden days people worshipped fire.  They thought twice before letting a flame 
die, a flame-god.  It was that kind of flame your daughter kindled in me.”79  Despite his 
shock, Melanie’s father invites him to break bread with the family.  After the dinner, David, 
who mocks the university committee’s demand for remorse and contrition, apologizes to the 
father and seeks his pardon.  After which he goes to the bedroom, where Melanie’s mother 
and sister are sitting, and “with careful ceremony he gets to his knees and touches his 
forehead to the floor.”80  In this non-allegorical face-to-face encounter with the other of 
history, outside the gaze of the witness, in this (ex)position as a prostrator at the door of 
Melanie’s family, David, who at the inquiry refuses to apologize, surrenders himself to the 
absolute singularity of the racially gendered other.  In this event, justice as ethics, and not 
law, is staged; Derridean “idea” of justice, a la Levinas, implies a heteronomic relation to 
the other, an infinite right of the other over the self.  This relation to the other is the realm of 
ethics, outside and beyond law.  This relation cannot be collapsed into the law of the same, 
into the law of the master/father. 
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Towards the end of the novel Disgrace stages, what in Levinasian ethics is 
understood as, an ethical event.  Emmanuel Levinas, within whose conception of ethics 
Derrida works with, defines ethics, “A calling into question of the same—which cannot 
occur within the egoist spontaneity of the same—is brought about by the other.  We name 
this calling into question of my spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics.”81  Ethics 
occurs as the putting into question of the knowing subject, the ego, self-consciousness, or 
what Levinas calls, the same by the other.  The domain of the same maintains a relation with 
otherness, but it is a relation in which the ego struggles to reduce the distance between the 
same and the other and absorb all otherness into itself.  Rapes of Melanie and Lucy function 
as the ego’s violent interpretation and appropriation of the racially gendered other into the 
law of the master/father.  Ethics occurs when the liberty and spontaneity of the ego is called 
into question by the radical alterity of the other.  The ethical, therefore, is the location of a 
point of alterity, or as Levinas calls “exteriority,” “an access to exterior being.”  Levinas’ 
notion of ethics is markedly different from the traditional conception of ethics as a branch of 
moral philosophy; for him, ethics is an event, the relation between same and the radically 
other, that cannot be reduced to the same.  Justice is an ethical relation to the other; it 
addresses itself to the absolute singularity of the other, despite its claims to universality.  
Justice as law is a relation of debt, of calculation, of exchange, of economic circularity.  In 
the figure of the prostrating David, Coetzee dramatizes an ethical relation to racially 
gendered others, who have been wronged.  An act of justice outside law, which through 
much racist history of South Africa sanctioned, what Plaatje calls, “white peril”—white 
male rape of black, coloured and Asian women.  Justice in this instance is irreducible to law, 
“irreducible because owed to the other, owed to the other, before any contract, because it has 
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come, the other’s coming as the singularity that is always other.”82  Justice as ethics, which 
is outside law, does not revert to the originary law-making violence, which, as described 
earlier, is both outside law and foundational violence of a new law.  In other words, Lucy’s 
rape and David’s prostration, both occurring outside law, play different functions.  In the 
rape, the distance between the self and the other is violently collapsed, in which the other 
enters into a state of indebtedness, into a realm of law; in David’s prostration, the distance 
between the self and the other is established, where the absolute singularity of the other 
cannot be collapsed into the same, thus forcing the other into a state of indebtedness, into the 
law of the master/father. 
In Disgrace, justice is ethics, and ethics is absolute hospitality, unconditional 
hospitality.  For Derrida, conditional hospitality is related to law, debt, and duty.  Absolute 
hospitality occurs when the host opens his/her home (and self) to the interruptions of the 
guest:  
To put it in different terms, absolute hospitality requires that I open up my home and 
that I give not only to the foreigner . . . but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous 
other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and 
take place in the place I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity . . . or 
even their names.  The law of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality 
by right, with law or justice as rights.83  
In the novel, Issacs welcomes his enemy, David to break bread with the family, sans 
conditions, without demands for an apology, outside the sphere of law, of justice as law.  
This staging of absolute hospitality towards the end of the novel is in direct contrast to the 
conditional hospitality of the university committee that demands contrition from David in 
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order to let him stay at the university.  Absolute hospitality is the condition of possibility 
(and impossibility) of justice, of justice as ethics, of justice outside and beyond the gaze of 
the law and its hermeneutic circle.  
In this singular relation to the racially gendered other, removed from the horizon of 
presence, David, the white man, moves from the center to the margins of history.  Melanie’s 
father Issacs does not fail to notice this transformation: “‘So,’ says Issacs softly, and the 
word leaves his lips like a sign: ‘how are the mighty fallen!’”84  To which, David ponders, 
“Fallen? Yes, there has been a fall, no doubt about that.  But mighty?  Does mighty describe 
him?  He thinks of himself as obscure and growing obscurer.  A figure from the margins of 
history.”85  Through his eventful journey in this bildungsroman, David moves from within 
the sphere of law to a realm outside and beyond law, from a state of grace to that of dis-
grace (apart from grace).  The state of disgrace, of apartness from Cape Town and law, is 
akin to a dog-like state.  In the novel, the idiomatic expression “like a dog” suggests a state 
of shame: to be a victim of rape and a victim of apartheid (David notes, after the rapists kill 
the dogs, “Contemptible, yet exhilarating, probably, in a country where dogs are bred to 
snarl at the mere smell of a black man.”86).  In Coetzee, there is another sense of the phrase 
“like a dog,” borrowed from Kafka’s The Trial; it is to be outside law, to be outside the 
human form, that is, to become animal.  When accepting Petrus’ offer for marriage, Lucy 
echoes Kafka’s Josef K, “Yes, I agree, it is humiliating. . . .  Yes, like a dog.”87  In the last 
lines of Kafka’s The Trial, the narrator says, “But the hands of one man were right at K.’s 
throat, while the other thrust the knife into his heart and turned it there twice.  With failing 
sight K. saw how the men drew near his face, leaning cheek-to-cheek to observe the verdict.  
‘Like a dog!’ he said; it seemed as though the shame was to outlive him.”88  In The Trial, 
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and other works of Kafka, dog is a figure of servitude, of the shame of voluntary submission 
to the powers that be.  Josef K, who throughout the novel mocks at the dog-like behavior of 
the clerks, assistants, and lawyers in the judicial hierarchy, resigns to his fate and submits to 
his executioners, after a brief moment of resistance.  The shame of submission to the law is 
to outlive Josef K.  But in becoming “like a dog” he also symbolizes a sacrificial animal, a 
scapegoat of the corruption of human law.  In his reflections on Kafka, Benjamin states in 
parenthesis, possibly in relation to the above passage in The Trial, “Being an animal 
presumably meant to him only to have given up human form and human wisdom from a 
kind of shame.”89  In Kafka, becoming animal is to cast aside the corruption of human laws 
and the shame of being human.  Animals in Kafka are far away from the “continent of a 
man”: “It is possible to read Kafka’s animal stories for quite a while without realizing that 
they are not about human beings at all.  When one encounters the name of the creature—
monkey, dog, mole—one looks up in fright and realizes that one is already far away from 
the continent of man.”90  To be like a dog is to enter the realm of animality, a realm outside 
human law.  Rejecting the anthropomorphic readings of animals in Kafka, Benjamin 
understands the animals in Kafka not in terms of becoming-human of the animal, but in 
terms of becoming-animal of the human.  Extending on Benjamin’s reading of the animal in 
Kafka, Deleuze and Guattari assert that becoming-animal is the object par excellence of 
Kafka’s stories: “What Kafka does in his room is to become animal and this is the essential 
object of the stories. . . .  We would say that for Kafka, the animal essence is the way out, 
the line of escape, even if it takes place in place, or in a cage.”91  Becoming-animal, for 
Deleuze and Guattari, also constitutes the absolute deterritorialization of the human, with no 
possibility of reterritorialization by new regimes of power. 
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In Disgrace David’s fall from grace precipitates his transformation from being 
human to becoming-animal.  It is also a movement from within law to outside and beyond 
law.  If in Lucy’s rape a new regime of law is reterritorialized, then in David’s fall into a 
state of disgrace, outside law, there is the absolute deterritorialization of the human.  The 
novel ends with no possibility of reterritorialization.  Towards the end of the novel, David 
becomes a pariah, no more the figure of the father or the Romantic hero, living on the 
margins of society: he has lost his job, his home, and is forced to move out of Lucy’s farm 
house (after he attacks Pollux, one of the rapists).  At the beginning of the novel, he 
reluctantly agrees to help Bev Shaw at the Animal Welfare Clinic, but later, he completely 
surrenders himself to attending to the unwanted dogs that are put to sleep by her.  David has 
become a dog man; he is “prepared to take care of them once they are unable, utterly unable, 
to take care of themselves, once even Bev Shaw has washed her hands of them.  A dog-man, 
Petrus once called himself.  Well, now he has become a dog-man: a dog undertaker; a dog 
psychopomp; a harijan.”92  Harijan (Sanskrit harijanah, children of God), a term 
popularized by M. K. Gandhi for Dalits who were referred to as “untouchables,” are at the 
bottom of the Hindu caste hierarchy, traditionally assigned such occupations as sweeping, 
washing, and killing animals.  After Lucy’s rape, David becomes a harijan.  Ostracized by 
Lucy and society, he spends his last days killing dogs and giving them last rites with honor.  
David, who is indifferent to animals, undergoes a marked transformation.  After putting 
them to sleep on Sundays, instead of dumping the carcass along with other waste, every 
Monday he carefully loads the bodies of the dogs into the feeder trolley of the incinerator, 
watching them as they turn to ashes.  Curious about his transformation, David wonders if “a 
man as selfish as he should be offering himself to the service of dead dogs.  There must be 
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other, more productive ways of giving oneself to the world, or to an idea of the world.”93  
This offering the self to the animals, this becoming-animal, cannot be understood in terms of 
identification or resemblance, in short, sympathy with the other of human.  Deleuze and 
Guattari maintain that becoming-animal, “is a question of composing a body with the 
animal, a body without organs defined by zones of intensity and proximity.”94  For them, to 
become another is to enter an objective zone of indeterminacy, a shared proximity, that 
makes it impossible to discern the boundaries between the self and the other.  In one of the 
sessions with Bev at the clinic, when asked if he likes animals, David responds mockingly, 
“‘Do I like animals?  I eat them, so I suppose I must like them, some parts of them.”95  In 
this perversion of Bev’s question, the selfish David collapses the boundary between himself 
and the animal; the animal is violently appropriated into him.  After his fall from grace, he 
offers himself to the service of the animals, whose murder he cannot stomach: “The more 
killings he assists in, the more jittery he gets.  One Sunday evening, driving home in Lucy’s 
kombi, he actually has to stop at the roadside to recover himself.  Tears flow down his face 
that he cannot stop; his hands shake.”96  A realization of the proximity of the human with 
the animal, they both share the same fate, death.  The human, like a dog (not metaphorical 
but an approximate relation), will face his/her death. 
Critical of Levinas for foreclosing the question of the l’animot in his idea of justice 
as an ethical relation to the other, who remains necessarily human, Derrida asserts, “the 
animal, the animal-other, the other as animal, occupies the place of the third person and thus 
of the first appeal to justice, in between humans and the faces of those who look upon each 
other as brothers or neighbors.”97  The look of the naked l’animot, a Derridean neologism 
criticizing the homogeneity of the term “animal, ” implying irreducible heterogeneity of 
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animality, makes the first appeal to justice.  As argued earlier, Disgrace stages the idea of 
justice as ethics, as an ethical relation to the other.  The other in the novel is not merely a 
human-other (the racially gendered other) but also an animal-other.  The transformation of 
David, the becoming-animal of the human, occurs in the ethical relation to the animal-other, 
the other as animal.  In this relation lies the possibility of justice, above all else, before and 
beyond law. In a state of dis-grace, away from the gaze of the Law of the Father, l’animot 
makes the first appeal to justice.  Concomitantly, an ethical relation to the other is beyond 
the affective value-system.  The novel invokes King Lear’s demand for love in the value-
form—let us calculate thy love—in Lucy’s “nothing,” but rejects such calculations in the 
end.  David learns to love and let go of the dogs.  The last lines of the novel are as follows: 
“Bearing him in his arms like a lamb, he re-enters the surgery.  ‘I thought you would save 
him for another week,’ says Bev Shaw.  ‘Are you giving him up?’  ‘Yes, I am giving him 
up.’”98  David learns to let go of the dogs, his daughter and the past.  In the ethical relation 
to the human-other and the animal-other, he learns to unlearn privilege.  Justice occurs in the 
act of giving up others, and in giving up others giving up the self, the self-forgetting of the 
ego.  Justice is an act of freeing oneself from oneself, an act, not of liberation, but of 
practices of freedom.  
In his last words about writing as an act of self-forgetting, Kafka writes to Max Brod 
in July 1922, two years before his death, “It will be a strange burial, the writer insubstantial 
as he is, consigning the old corpse, the longtime corpse, to the grave.  I am enough of a 
writer to appreciate the scene with all my senses, or—and it is the same thing—to want to 
describe it with total self-forgetfulness—not alertness, but self-forgetfulness is the writer’s 
first prerequisite”99  In Coetzee, writing is self-forgetfulness of the author, the death of the 
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author, an act of finally consigning the longtime corpse of the author to the grave.  The 
author does not stand in relation of witness or in relation of interpreter to others (and 
history).  In Coetzee, echoing Kafka, writing is the process of the disruption of the gaze of 
the law of the father/author, of the process of becoming-other, and of the process of 
forgetfulness of the ego.  Writing is justice; justice is writing. To write is to write oneself 
into oblivion; it is an act of justice par excellence. 
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4.0  ESSAYING AGAINST EMPIRE: J. M. COETZEE’S DIARY OF A BAD 
YEAR 
Que sais-je?  
—Michel de Montaigne1 
 
“There is a certain tone,” Joll says. “A certain tone enters the voice of a man who is telling 
the truth.  Training and experience teach us to recognize the truth.” 
“The tone of truth! Can you pick up this tone in everyday speech?  Can you hear whether I 
am telling the truth?” 
—J. M. Coetzee2 
 
I believe in democracy.  I accept it.  I will faithfully serve and defend it.  I believe in it 
because it appears to me the inevitable consequence of what has gone before it.  Democracy 
asserts the fact that the masses are now raised to a higher intelligence than formerly.  All our 
civilization aims at this mark.  We want to do what we can to help it.  I myself want to see 
the result.  I grant it is an experiment, but it is the only direction society can take that is 
worth its taking; the only conception of its duty large enough to satisfy its instincts; the only 
result that is worth an effort or a risk.  Every other possible step is backward, and I do not 
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care to repeat the past.  I am glad to see society grapple with issues in which no one can 
afford to be neutral. 
—Henry Adams3 
 
Since the tragic events of 11 September 2001 the specter of torturing democracy 
haunts the globe.  Like Hamlet in the chill of the midnight hour, through the voice of his 
character-author J. C., Coetzee confronts this specter in the pages of his latest postmodern 
novel, Diary of a Bad Year, which constitutes fifty-five essays on politics, mathematics, 
literature, and writing.4   With the onset of the imperialist “war on terror,” the globe has 
witnessed the horror and the anomie of torture that has undermined the constituent and 
constituted power of a democracy.  The terrifying images of the attack have been co-opted 
by democracies around the world to instill fear among their citizen-subjects of the radical 
Other.  Coetzee’s novel meditates on the supra-political Machiavellian principle of necessity 
of self-preservation that justifies the practice of torture within a democracy today.  If the 
mantra of monarchy is necessity trumps morality, then the mantra of democracy today is 
security trumps liberty.  In this chapter, I argue that Coetzee employs the ironic, ambulatory, 
and the marginal form of the essay to interrupt the Machiavellian principle of necessity.  It is 
in this marginal form that J. C., the aging liberal humanist, confronts the absent presence of 
the tortured bodies of the victims of the so-called war on terror.  Examining the history of 
the form of the essay, which in the Western tradition has been considered a parergon to the 
arts, I show that in DOBY Coetzee grants prominent place to the essay form and its primary 
function of criticism.  Working within the Montaignian tradition of the essay form, similar 
to György Lukács and Edward Said, Coetzee, I argue, reinscribes the work of the essayist 
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within political and historical human formation.  Analyzing several essays in the novel on 
torture, terrorism, imperialism, and democracy, I demonstrate that through the essay form 
Coetzee attempts to disrupt the terror of torturing democracy.  With the phenomenal rise of 
what Noam Chomsky calls “military humanism” in the past decade, Coetzee shows us that 
today the ethical function of criticism in general, and postcolonial criticism in particular, is 
to democratize democracy itself.5 
J. M. Coetzee’s DOBY, published in 2007, is his most experimental novel so far.  
Formally innovative in the tradition of postmodernism, each page of the novel is divided 
initially into two and then three sections, echoing the split-screen technique used in cinema.  
The top section of the page, consisting exclusively of essays, written in the first person, is in 
the voice of the character-author J. C., who along with other distinguished writers, has been 
asked to express “Strong Opinions” on his times by a German publisher; the middle section, 
also narrated in the first person, is in the voice of the aging person J. C., who is suffering 
from Parkinson’s disease and also from a “metaphysical ache” for his Filipina neighbor and 
secretary; and the last section, again narrated in the first person, is in the voice of his 
secretary Anya, who comments on the aging distinguished author J. C.’s quirky nature, his 
lust for her and his boring political essays.  In Anya’s monologue, we also run into her 
boyfriend Alan, who is a financier and a millionaire plotting to siphon off J. C.’s wealth.  
Alan also ridicules J. C.’s lust for Anya and his ideas on probability theory, the free market, 
and Australian politics.  
Several reviewers read the character-author J. C. as a mirror of the writer J. M. 
Coetzee: writing for the New York Times Book Review, Kathryn Harrison declares, “Diary 
of a Bad Year [unlike Coetzee’s Elizabeth Costello] forgoes the conceit of a perfunctorily 
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named and differentiated alter ego by following the late career of Señor C, who, like 
Coetzee, is a South African writer transplanted to Australia and the author of a novel titled 
Waiting for the Barbarians.”6  It is true that Señor C shares several biographical details with 
Coetzee.  His initials are J. C., which is only mentioned twice in the novel when he writes 
two letters to Anya—the first time to request her to return to her secretarial duties after a 
misunderstanding between them and the second time when he invites her and Alan to dinner. 
It is Anya who refers to him as Señor C mistaking him to be from Colombia in South 
America.  J. C., like Coetzee, has recently emigrated from South Africa to Australia 
(Coetzee moved to Australia in 2002 after retirement) and is the author of the great novel, 
Waiting for the Barbarians.  It is also suggested in the novel that J. C. might have won the 
Nobel Prize (Coetzee won the Nobel in 2003): in Anya’s voice we are told that instead of 
having family photos on the wall, J. C. has “a framed scroll in some foreign language 
(Latin?) with his name in fancy lettering with lots of curlicues and a big red wax seal in the 
corner. His credentials?”7  While there are parallels between the fictional author J. C. and 
the writer Coetzee, the metafictional layerings of the text, in keeping with the style of 
postmodern narratives, disrupts the relationship of likeness between them.  While in several 
of his novels including Dusklands (1974), Foe (1986), and Elizabeth Costello (2003), 
Coetzee’s postmodern narratives self-consciously blur the lines between fiction and reality, 
it is not the life of the writer Coetzee that we encounter in the pages of DOBY but the fluid 
author-function.  The tripartite division gives voice to varieties of egos and subject positions.  
Speaking of the use of the first person narrative in fiction, Michel Foucault, in “What is an 
author?” states that the pronoun “I” refers not to the writer but to the “second self”; hence “it 
would be false to seek the author in relation to the actual writer as to the fictional narrator.”8  
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For Foucault, one of the characteristics of the author-function is that it arises in the chasm 
between these multiple egos.  In the split-screen Coetzee self-consciously stages, in first 
person narration, the chasm between the character-author J. C., the writer J. C., and the 
aging individual J. C. lusting for Anya.  Moreover, we also hear the voice of Anya, the 
object of desire of J. C. and Alan.  When each section of the novel is read horizontally the 
narrative skillfully maintains the illusion of reality and the promise of coherent 
communication, invoking the tradition of realist narration.  Only when the three sections 
arranged on the same page are read vertically, the narrative plunges into postmodern world 
frustrating any attempt at arriving at continuous and coherent signification.  Harrison warns 
the readers that, in the clever staging of the clash of authors, writers, narrators, and 
characters, they are being “deliberately manipulated by a form that is coy as well as playful, 
and it’s hard not to conclude Coetzee is more invested in his relationship with his readers 
than in his characters’ credibility and interactions with one another.”9  Harrison, by reading 
the form as manipulative, fails to see the aesthetic-ethical impulse of the style, which, in 
dramatizing the multiple subject positions, decenters and interrupts the authorial authority.  
The text stylistically denies readers the stability of a single, original, voice-consciousness of 
the imperial God-like author safely guiding them into a pen.  From his first novel Dusklands 
to this latest novel DOBY, this is a key feature of Coetzee’s writing strategies, which is also 
suggestive of the deep ethical impulse of his writing.  The tripartite division of the page 
functions to deconstruct the moral authority of the author.  It is from this unstable and 
marginal subject position that character-author J. C. pontificates, in mordant tone, about 
political, cultural and social issues, some of them highly controversial, such as torture, neo-
imperialism, terrorism, Guantanamo, state of democracy, suicide bombing, American 
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exceptionalism, George Bush, Tony Blair, Al-Qaeda, probability theory, J. S. Bach, 
Dostoevsky among others.  These essays may very well contain Coetzee’s own political 
opinions about the current state of the world, which is in fact what the Wikipedia entry on 
Coetzee’s biography suggests quoting from reviewers and journalists.  Under the sub-
heading of “Politics,” the Wikipedia entry states that Coetzee, like his character J. C., sees 
similarities in American and Australian anti-terrorism laws and the apartheid state.10  But 
Coetzee’s text anticipates such parallels between the writer and the character by deliberately 
writing in the varied forms of the essay and the diary, the former suggesting that the views 
are personal opinions and the latter that the book is a memoir.  The novel also ends with 
imitations of academic writing: the last two pages are “Notes” listing works cited in the 
essays, along with page numbers and acknowledgments to the publishers and to various real 
individuals, who are academics, writers, obscure linguists, and mathematicians.  The last 
line of the acknowledgment reads thus: “For their generously given advice, my thanks to 
Danielle Allen [American classicist and political scientist], Reinhild Boehnke [obscure 
linguist who published a bilingual German-English dictionary], Piergiorgio Odifreddi 
[Italian mathematician], and Rose Zwi [South African writer].  For what I have made of 
their advice I alone am responsible.”11  The acknowledgments page is also signed JMC.  
Sardonically, these two entries are placed towards the end, when the struggle between 
fiction (the second and third sections) and nonfiction (the first section) ends without a 
resolution.  These are not writings, like the essays, that J. C. asks Anya to type for him.  
Thus, the stylistic juxtaposition of egos and genres—diaries, fiction, nonfiction, and 
academic writing—thwarts any simple parallelism between J. C. and Coetzee. 
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Moreover, although the subjects covered in the essays have great importance for our 
times, Coetzee strips the character-author J. C. and himself of any moral authority of a wise 
sage.  Additionally, J. C.’s controversial personal opinions are not only uttered from an 
unstable subject position but also in the modest, marginal form of the essay, which are 
embedded within the prose narrative.  As stated earlier, the essays cover a range of topics 
but those related to the contemporary politics that has emerged since 9/11 dominate the 
pages of DOBY.  In this chapter I will examine the essays that discuss torture, function of 
art and criticism, and the futures of democracy.  But first, let us turn to the brief history of 
the essay form. 
Michel de Montaigne’s book, with a disarmingly simple title Essais, written during 
the French War of Religions (1562-98), declares its revolutionary aim in the preface to the 
reader to be a study of the self, not for the purpose of reputation among posterity, but for 
denuding oneself in front of family and friends: “You have here, Reader . . . a book which 
warns you from the start that I have set myself no other end but a private family one.  I have 
not been concerned to serve you nor my reputation. . . .  I have dedicated this book to the 
private benefit of my friends and kinsmen.”12  Although György Lukács’ essay on the essay, 
“On the Nature and Form of the Essay,” emphasizes the modest nature of the essay, the 
beginning of the form of the essay is couched in an immodestly modest desire of stripping 
down for a private show in print.13  Montaigne, who was neither a professional scholar nor a 
statesman or a general, retires to his citadel, Tower of Château, to pen down the “subject” he 
knew best: himself.  Referring to Montaigne as an exemplary case, Foucault maintains that 
during the religious and political crisis of the sixteenth century several Renaissance writers 
rejected the Catholic confessional practices in favor of new modes of relationship to the self 
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by reactivating the ancient Stoic practices of “attempting” to write the self (or in Stephen 
Greenblatt’s terminology Renaissance self-fashioning14) rather than to “discover” the self.15  
Montaigne’s originary personal essays, speaking of kings and of the groom of his 
riding horse, constituting a formless form, that is literary and yet not confined within the 
structures of prose narrative or poetic rhyme, have left an influential legacy up until our 
times.  Virginia Woolf, commenting on the Edwardian essay in her essay “The Decay of 
Essay-writing,” declares Montaigne to be the first modern writer: “Perhaps the most 
significant of these literary inventions is the invention of the personal essay.  It is true that it 
is at least as old as Montaigne, but we may count him the first of the moderns.”16  
Comparing the public display of universal passions of the Elizabethan stage to Montaigne’s 
attempt at writing the self in isolation, Woolf, in her essay “The Elizabethan Lumber 
Room,” maintains that “the publicity of the stage and the perpetual presence of a second 
person were hostile to that growing consciousness of one’s self, that brooding in solitude 
over the mysteries of the soul.”17  For Woolf, the French Montaigne was way ahead of his 
English contemporaries.  Moreover, she sees a common ground between Montaigne and her 
own experimental modernist writing, which thematically and stylistically attempts to 
penetrate the dark complexity of internal windings.18  Not only modernist writing claims to 
share common grounds with Montaigne’s non-doctrinal writing strategies but postmodern 
writing also makes similar claims.  Jean-François Lyotard asserts that postmodern writing 
operates in the paradox of the future anterior, and in that it is fundamentally closer to the 
form of the essay.  Like Montaigne’s unassuming, “formless” essays, the postmodern writer 
works without pre-established rules “in order to formulate the rules of what will have been 
done.”19  Thus, postmodern writing has the paradoxical characteristics of the essay form; it 
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has the character of an event and of belatedness.  For Lyotard, “It seems to me that the essay 
(Montaigne) is postmodern.”20 
If in its French birth, the essay was defined by its subjective voice and digressive 
nature not shackled by established doctrines, in its English birth the essay was defined by 
the opposite qualities of impersonality and precision of scientific knowledge in order to free 
the human mind from the doctrine of the idols.  Francis Bacon, sixteenth century English 
natural philosopher, statesman and jurist, first published his collection of essays, Essays in 
1597.  Several scholars maintain that Bacon applies his famous scientific method, 
formulated in opposition to Aristotelian philosophy, also known as induction, to “civil 
knowledge” elaborated in his essays.21  Although the two original essayists are similar in 
their use of the form to attack religious doctrine in vernacular language, the literariness of 
Montaigne’s ambulatory essays and the scientificity of Bacon’s epigrammatic essays have 
defined the binary oppositional poles within which most of the subsequent materializations 
of the essay form have fallen into.  In her introduction to Bacon’s Essays, Mary Augusta 
Scott compares the style of Montaigne and Bacon’s essays:  
Again, Bacon has nothing of the attractive personality of Montaigne, a man of the 
world who made a point of finding out what the world was like from all sorts and 
conditions of men. . . .  Montaigne writes on and on about a subject in breezy 
discursiveness, like a man on horseback traversing an interesting country.  Bacon’s 
Essays reflect his experience of life, but they tell us little or nothing of his personal 
likes and dislikes.  They are austere, brief to the point of crudeness, they smell of the 
lamp.22 
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The Spartan character of the English Bacon’s essays elaborate on the need for self-
cultivation, by carefully examining the relationship between public and private life, 
ultimately choosing the former over the latter, which is the domain of the “beasts” (and 
women) and extensive learning through education, that will initiate one into the public 
domain, bringing about advancement of personal and general knowledge.23  The ethical 
dimension of Bacon’s thought is expressed in the idea of Nova Atlantis (considered a 
blueprint for the founding of America), a society based on pursuit of scientific knowledge, 
not for the citizen’s personal pleasure or for exerting his/her will to power, but, for virtuous 
living.24  In stark contrast to Bacon, Montaigne’s fashioning the self through writing invokes 
the ancient conception of ethics, dependent on aesthetics rather than knowledge (scientific or 
otherwise).  Echoing philosophical skepticism, Montaigne writes the most famous words in 
the essays, “What do I know?”25  If Bacon’s essays are “counsels civill and morall,” 
Montaigne’s are idiosyncratic, amusing, and speak of the jouissance of food, sex, friends, 
and life.  Although Bacon’s essays have left an influential legacy, it is the literary charm of 
Montaigne’s essays that have influenced generations of writers, scholars and philosophers 
up until our own times.  In keeping with Montaigne’s legacy, that he invokes in several 
interviews, the post-structuralist Foucault, in his writings on ethics, turns to the ancient 
Greeks to elaborate an ethics of the self, a relation to the self that is prior to knowledge.26 
In addition to the antithesis between the literary and the scientific character of the 
essay, the history of the “genre” has witnessed further contentious divisions and sub-
divisions.  Elena Gualtieri, in her essay “The Essay as Form: Virginia Woolf and the 
Literary Tradition,” states, “Because of its protean character, critical interpretations of the 
essay have usually attempted to trace this multiplicity back to the original antinomy of 
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Montaigne’s and Bacon’s works.  For the English tradition in particular the essay has 
remained largely defined by a split between its association with belle-lettres as the 
cultivation of style for style’s sake and its role as the main vehicle for the criticism of 
literature and the arts.”27  Moreover, in relation to France, she maintains that the tradition of 
Montaigne’s essay as a form of self-expression continues to dominate “but also has been 
used by writers such as Roland Barthes to undermine the distinction between ‘proper’ or 
creative literature and criticism as a parasitic form of activity.”28  In relation to Barthes, 
Gualtieri cites Réda Bensmaïa’s important study of Barthes as an essayist.  In his inaugural 
lecture at Collège de France, Barthes modestly declares, “I long wished to inscribe my work 
within the field of science—literary, lexicological, and sociological—I must admit that I 
have produced only [emphasis mine] essays, an ambiguous genre in which analysis vies with 
writing.”29  The internal struggle between analysis and writing, argument and metaphor, 
science and arts, in other words Bacon and Montaigne, is at the heart of the essay “genre.”  
Furthermore, this struggle is also manifested externally in the traditional view of the essay as 
a parergon to the arts.  Although the tradition has acknowledged the literary nature of 
Montaigne’s essays, the essay as a form has largely been considered a piece of criticism 
about the arts (and life), rather than itself a “fourth genre” of the arts, along with the lyric, 
the epic and the dramatic arts.  In Bensmaïa’s reading of Barthes’ essays, he argues that in 
writing “writerly” texts Barthes questions the secondary status of the form of the essay in 
relation to the arts by deconstructing the binary oppositional relationship between them.  
Bensmaïa maintains that after publication of S/Z, an essay on Honoré de Balzac’s short story 
“Sarrasine,” Barthes engages in a new program of writing, that of the “writerly text”: 
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‘writerly text’—a type of writing that, rather than creating a chasm between the 
writer and the reader, puts them in a relationship of continuum, making the reader a 
producer rather than a consumer of the text.  The text achieves this by being “‘plural’ 
and ‘broken’ (lacking ‘deep structure’ and purely ‘tactical’), constructed from non-
totalizable fragments and from exuberantly proliferating ‘details,’ calling upon an 
‘economy’ of reading.30  
Bensmaïa sees the fragmentary, paratactic and incomplete character of Barthes’ post-S/Z 
writing as being directly influenced by Montaigne’s essays.  Thus, according to Bensmaïa, 
the Montaignian essay S/Z can be read in two ways: “It can be read as a theoretical 
(reflexive) text—another one—on literature, narration, form and the like.  It can also be read 
as a ‘reflective’ text, a text that has transgressed . . . the ‘pitiless divorce,’ as Barthes says—
that the ‘literary institution’ maintains between the producer of the text and its user . . . 
between the literary text and the ‘critical’ text.”31  The essay S/Z’s relationship to the literary 
text “Sarrasine” is both conventional and transgressive; it has the character of aboutness, 
being about the short story, and subversiveness, destabilizing the very terms on which the 
relation of aboutness is formulated.  In this regard, the post-structuralist Barthes is working 
within the legacy of the Marxist literary critic György Lukács, whose dense and influential 
essay “On the Nature and Form of the Essay” also questions the parasitic character assigned 
to the essay form in relation to the arts, elaborating on the similarities and differences 
between them. 
In the first chapter of the collection of essays Soul and Form, titled “On the Nature 
and Form of the Essay,” which functions as a letter addressed to his dear friend Leo Popper 
and as a preface to the book, the young Lukács (the book was published when he was only 
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twenty-five) meditates on the principles of unity that define, not the boundary of the book he 
is writing but the “new” literary form of the essay.  What unifies the essays is not positive 
knowledge but the staging of the object itself: Lukács states that these essays are not 
“‘studies in literary history,’ but whether there is something in them that makes them a new 
literary form of its own, and whether the principle that makes them such is the same in each 
one.”32  In his study of the essayistic form, Lukács does not fall into the Russian formalist 
paradigm of valuing form over content, but rather emphasizes the dialectical relationship 
between them.  In her introduction to the book, Judith Butler shows us that even though the 
book was published before Lukács’ conversion to Bolshevism, there is already a latent 
Marxism at work here.  In his essay on the essay, Lukács lays out a historical understanding 
of the form: “These forms [essay, poem or drama] are not in place and intact prior to their 
use; they are reinvented for the purposes of conveying a very specific condition, at once 
existential and historical.”33  But in Lukács the relationship between form and the condition 
of its possibility is not purely deterministic.  If form emerges out of the necessity to convey 
a certain reality, which he calls the soul, this soul comes into being in the very act of 
expression itself. 
In my discussion of the beginnings of the form, I have shown that the debate over the 
essay’s status as art or science has been raging ever since the appearance of the essays of the 
French Montaigne and the British Bacon.  Lukács is on Montaigne’s side.  What concerns 
him in this essay is the problem of delinking the essay from the sphere of science and 
linking it to the realm of the arts.  Although Lukács’ project is Montaignian, he greatly 
troubles the romanticized dualistic positions in the debate between science and art.  In 
keeping with much of the history of essay writing, Lukács maintains that the essay’s 
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function is criticism, which for him is a form of art and not science.  He states, “I want to try 
to define the essay as strictly as is possible, precisely by describing it as an art form.”34  His 
aim is to not replace one with the other, but “with something essentially new, something that 
remains untouched . . . by scientific goals.”35  Thus, what makes criticism art and not 
science?  The difference between science and art is that “science affects us by its contents” 
and “art by its forms.”36  According to Lukács, science offers us information, facts and 
relationships, while art offers us “souls and destinies.”37  If art is defined by form, criticism 
“glimpses destiny in forms,” that is, the “soul-content which forms indirectly and 
unconsciously conceal within themselves.”38  According to Lukács, “Form is reality in the 
writings of critics; it is the voice with which they address their questions to life.  That is the 
true and most profound reason why literature and art are the typical, natural subject-matter 
of criticism.”39  Acknowledging Popper’s disdain for anarchy, Lukács assures him that the 
affinity between the essay and art is not a superficial one, that is based merely on the fact of 
being well-written, which would then include everything that is well-written.  With the same 
“gesture” or “attitude,” that is the great experience of form, they address “their questions to 
life.”  But for Lukács, art is a “typical” subject matter for the essay and not the only one, for 
life itself can be given form by the essay.  Plato’s dialogues (he considers Plato to be the 
greatest essayist, before the beginning of the essay form in Montaigne’s works), 
Montaigne’s essays, and Kierkegaard’s imaginary diaries are for him examples of essays 
that directly address their questions to life without the mediation of art. 
 Although the essay is an art form, it is not like other art forms: “the essay has a form 
which separates it, with the rigor of a law, from all other art forms.”40  Even though 
considered closer to the literary form, it has the character of invisibility in relation to all 
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other literary forms.  For Lukács, if forms of literature were compared to sunlight refracted 
in a prism, the form of the essay would be the ultra-violet rays.41  Similarly, the essay exists 
in relation of secondariness and belatedness to art, of coming after the fact.  The essay’s 
function in the present is defined by an already existing past.  In contrast to such traditional 
notions of the essay in particular, and criticism in general, Lukács proposes a creative 
function for criticism, that is not predetermined by the past, but gestures towards the 
possibility of a future, that is yet to come.  The critic, he famously says, is the pure instance 
of a precursor, who begins to create the values by which art will be judged: 
The essayist is a Schopenhauer who writes his Parerga while waiting for the arrival 
of his own (or another’s) The World as Will and Idea, he is a John the Baptist who 
goes out to preach in the wilderness about another who is still to come, whose 
shoelace he is not worthy to untie.  And if that other does not come—is not the 
essayist then without justification?  And if the other does come, is he not made 
superfluous thereby?  He is the pure type of precursor, and it seems highly 
questionable whether, left entirely to himself—i.e., independent from the fate of that 
other of whom he is the herald—he could lay claim to any value or validity.42 
Critic is preaching to a congregation yet to come.  Without the other, on whom his fate is 
dependent, of which he is the herald, s/he loses value.  Critic exists in an ethical relation to 
the other yet to come.  Like the countryman in Franz Kafka’s fable “Before the Law,” the 
critic stands before the artwork yearning for experience and judgment, for entry into the 
house of the Law.  As a precursor a critic’s function is defined by longing rather than 
fulfillment of experience and judgment in a near future.  Similarly, in Kafka’s story, the 
countryman’s longing does not achieve a state of fulfillment, of entry into Law.  What the 
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countryman fails to understand in his years of waiting, is that the law is interdependent on 
his longing.  This is captured by the haunting last lines of the story.  When he inquires of the 
gatekeeper why nobody besides himself has attempted to access the law in all these years, 
the gatekeeper responds, “No one else could ever be admitted here, since this gate was made 
only for you.  I am now going to shut it.”43  In a similar vein, as a herald, the critic’s fate and 
value lies in the longing for the other, in the coming of the other, who is not already here or 
will definitely be here in a predictable future.  Or as Said, whose conception of the critic’s 
relationship to the text and the world is influenced by Lukács’ view of the critic, says, 
“What I wish to emphasize here in conclusion is not only the critic’s role in writing as 
dialectically creating the values by which art might be judged and understood, but his role in 
creating the processes of the present, as process and inauguration, the actual conditions by 
means of which art and writing bear significance.”44  Critic’s role is that of creating values 
by which art will be judged; it is that of a preacher preaching to a people yet to come.  I will 
return to Said’s view on the function of criticism.  I will argue that Coetzee works within the 
Lukácsian and Saidian tradition in DOBY, assigning a creative function for criticism that is 
not always already determined by a past but gestures towards a future to come.  And all 
three of them are preoccupied with Montaigne. 
In the long Montaignian digression covering nearly three-hundred-year history of the 
essay form, I have tried to show, examining views of the key practitioners/theorists of the 
form—Montaigne, Bacon, Woolf, Barthes, and Lukács—, that in the Western tradition of 
essay writing two questions dominate: Is the essay form an art or a science?  And, does the 
essay have a secondary or a precursive relation to literature and other arts?  As mentioned 
above, the literary character of the Montaignian essay has left a far more influential legacy 
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than the scientificity of Bacon’s essay.  In regards to the second question, the view that the 
essay is secondary to art is still pervasive, although Barthes, Lukács, and Said have 
challenged this in different ways.  For Barthes the essay form is secondary to art as well as 
subversive in its critical capacity to deconstruct the binary opposition between them.  In 
Lukács, paradoxically reinforcing a linear logic sans teleology, the essay is precursive to art, 
holding judgment in potentia.  And Said is in agreement with Lukács. 
A key question poses itself here: What is the place of Coetzee’s DOBY in this 
tradition?  The trope of place can hardly be undermined in colonial and postcolonial writing, 
and more so in the history of South Africa, which witnessed the violent reconfiguring of 
physical and social spaces.  Therefore, more broadly, one may ask in relation to Coetzee, 
what is the place of a “no more European but not yet African” writer in this European 
tradition?  In the introduction to his book, White Writing, Coetzee describes the paradoxical 
nature of white writing in South Africa: “Even within their temporal limits [the book 
examines pre-apartheid writers], they do not constitute a history of white writing, nor even 
the outline of such a history.  Nor does the phrase white writing imply the existence of a 
body of writing different in nature from black writing.  White writing is white only insofar 
as it is generated by the concerns of people no longer European, not yet African.”45  But is 
this not the fate of all postcolonial writing?  Educated in the Western tradition, the 
postcolonial writers inhabit the paradox of what Homi Bhabha calls the hybrid space, “not 
quite/not white.”46  Within the progressive teleology of Enlightenment metanarrative, the 
above two movements will hardly be considered “identical,” as it is formulated on a 
conceptual assumption of a temporal gap between the European self and its others.  Coetzee, 
in the above quote, speaks of the resistance of the white settler writer to fully embrace 
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Africa, being quick to love the land but not its people.  In the case of a postcolonial writer, a 
term more often than not implying a writer from a former colony writing in one of the 
European languages, the experience of hybridity, at least in Bhabha’s reading, suggests an 
appropriation of the dominant metropolitan discourse and a resistance to it.  In both contrary 
instances of hybrid writing, the former suggesting resistance to impurity and the latter 
implying celebration of impurity, is not the experience of in-betweeness enabled by certain 
social privileges?  In other words, can a subaltern embody a hybrid space?  A controversial 
response says no.47  Not unlike Coetzee, who occupies a privileged position as a white 
writer in South Africa, a large majority of postcolonial writers, acting as representative 
consciousness, come from social privileges based on race, gender, ethnicity, caste, class, 
education, religion, and sexuality.  Thus, returning to specifically DOBY’s, and more 
broadly Coetzee’s place within this Western tradition, which is more complicated given his 
immigration to Adelaide, Australia, another postcolonial place, one may ask, is DOBY 
working with and/or against this Western tradition of essay writing?  What is the place of 
these essays in the tradition of essay writing?  Moreover, is DOBY a novel or a collection of 
critical essays on art and life?  Since it consists of fifty-five essays, which embody much of 
the novel, it reads like a non-fiction book.  The essay’s relation of secondariness or 
precursiveness to art is greatly complicated in DOBY, which is categorized as a novel, 
whose pages stage the eternal struggle between art and criticism, each vying for a prominent 
place in the world.  Moreover, only a few essays address their questions to art, while a large 
majority, in a Platonic vein, address in fiction their questions to life: politics, history, 
science, culture, and sex.  Are the essays in DOBY in secondary or precursive relation to the 
novel and/or life?  Additionally, Coetzee, who was a programmer for IBM before he became 
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a novelist, comfortably inhabits both the worlds of science and art.  Several scholars have 
noted the mathematical precision and sparseness of his writing style.  In DOBY, the essays 
“On Zeno” and “On Probability” address their questions to mathematics.48  The former 
meditates on the relationship between mathematical and ordinary language, and the latter on 
Einstein’s famous statement that God does not play dice, pondering on whether probabilistic 
laws are better a way to understand the world than deterministic ones.  Thus, are the essays 
art or science?  In other words, is Coetzee working within the Montaignian or the Baconian 
tradition of essay writing? 
J. C.’s essays, solicited by his German publisher, written between 12th September 
2005 and 31st May 2006, are modest attempts to address the graveness of the geopolitical 
situation since the terrible events of 11 September 2001.  Started exactly four years after the 
event, J. C., in his essays, meditates on the so-called war on terror, terrorism, torture, suicide 
bombing, colonialism, imperialism, and the fate of democracy.  These topics preoccupy him 
through much of the fifty-five essays.  But why does Coetzee choose to address these 
somber themes, in the voice of J. C., through a highly experimental aesthetics?  Moreover, 
why does he address these questions in the form of the essay embedded within the novel?  
Such generic innovations are not new to Coetzee’s oeuvre.  Like DOBY, In the Heart of the 
Country (1977) consists of numbered diary entries of the lonely spinster Magda in colonial 
South Africa.  Age of Iron (1990) is an epistolary novel in which the dying Mrs Curren 
writes a long letter to her daughter in America, who has escaped the apartheid regime.  The 
chapters in Elizabeth Costello (2003) are called “Lessons,” constituting of lectures that the 
writer Costello delivers all over the world.  Coetzee has himself delivered these fictional 
lectures of Costello in real-life situations at Princeton University, 1997-1998, for the Tanner 
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Lecture series dedicated to ethical and philosophical topics.  Two of the lectures from 
Elizabeth Costello were also published separately under the title The Lives of Animals 
(2001), a rather unusual practice.  My previous chapters also elaborate on his use of allegory 
(Waiting for the Barbarians) and parody (Foe) to disrupt realism.  But DOBY is the most 
experimental novel yet, with its tripartite division in multiple voices, making conventional 
ways of reading a page from top to bottom nearly impossible.  For the second and third 
section, a coherent narrative emerges only when each section is read horizontally.  But the 
top section, consisting only of essays, lacks a continuous narrative structure of a beginning, 
middle and end, even when read horizontally.  The reader can read the essay section in 
random order, as each essay is a self-sufficient unit.  If the second and third sections have a 
linear narrative structure, the first section, like the essay form itself is ambulatory, 
fragmentary, random and formless, with no linear structure, where J. C. can “try out,” in 
keeping with the etymological meaning of the word essais, ideas on different topics.  In 
DOBY, there exists a tension between the linearity of fiction and the non-linearity of the 
essay form.  In her wonderful book on the essay, The Essayistic Spirit, Claire de Obaldia 
notes:  
One cannot but be aware that unlike the novel, which in the course of its history has 
so quickly progressed from its status as a marginal (un- or sub-literary) genre to 
become a respectable genre, and ultimately to embody the notion of literature itself 
in most readers’ and writers’ minds, the essay has made little progress from its very 
similar starting-point and continues to be excluded from the realm of literature.49  
Given the marginal status of the essay form in relation to the novel, poetry, and drama, why 
does Coetzee employ the non-serious form of the essay, embedding it within the more 
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respectable genre of the novel, to address the tectonic shifts that the globe has witnessed in 
the past decade that have shaken the very foundations of democracy?  Are these essays in a 
secondary or a precursive relation to the novel? 
In the Western tradition, the essay has occupied a marginal position in relation to the 
dominant discourses of the literary genres.  One could even say that it exists in a subaltern 
relation to the institutionalized genres.  Since the beginnings of the form, the essay’s status 
as marginal to the other literary genres has not significantly changed.  Although 
Montaigne’s essays have been categorized as “literary” essays, the inclusion of the essays 
under the broader category of literature and its various genres has always been contentious.  
More often than not, it has been denied the status of a “genre,” which could also explain the 
paucity of scholarly studies on the origin, nature, and development of the form.  Given its 
primary function of criticism, which traditionally has meant non-imaginative rational 
thinking, it has been relegated to the position of a parergon to the other literary genres, 
rather than being one of them.  Thus, by understanding criticism as art, Lukács is not only 
assigning the essay the status of a genre addressing itself to other genres but also releases it 
from this limited function to ultimately address life itself.  He declares, “The modern essay 
does not always have to speak of books or poets” but can speak of life itself.50  Coetzee 
appropriates this marginal form into the larger novel address questions to art and life.   
The essays in the novel are fragmentary, loose, and non-linear, meandering from one 
topic to another, following no pre-established rules to grant them a unified structure.  They 
speak from a tentative subject-position that is singular and contingent, eschewing all claims 
to Universal Truth.  The “truths,” precariously staged, are the character-author’s precursive 
gestures in the dark, attempting to make sense of this world.  The truths expressed are plural 
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and slippery, inextricably tied to the here and now of historical time.  The essays fail to 
fulfill the reader’s desire for guidance by the imperial patriarch-author in an uncertain world.  
They are formless and open-ended, yearning for a future yet to come.  Within the space of a 
marginal form, Coetzee employs J. C. to render opinions that are quirky, controversial, and 
timely.  The value of the essayistic opinions and judgments presented lie not in the daunting 
knowledge of the all-knowing subject, who can effortlessly discuss any topic under the sun, 
but in the attitude of the character-author gingerly attempting to give form to life through 
art, a life that has taken a terrifying turn.  Several essays address the political upheavals of 
the last decade.  But the controversial views presented are not from the authoritarian voice 
of the author.  Echoing the philosophical skepticism of Montaigne’s motto, “What do I 
know?,” the essays speak from outside the authoritative realm of universal reason.  In the 
postcolonial vocabulary, this is also the realm of the subaltern: Gyan Prakash states, “In 
dominant discourses the subaltern appears as a figure that resides outside authorized 
categories, signifying a pure externality beyond the realm of reason.”51  The essay, as a pure 
externality to the Western project of universal reason, embodies the irruptive force of 
subaltern singularity.  From a marginal place, the essays, in DOBY, attempt to give form to 
life itself, a form that does not “capture” life in an image of thought, but mirrors the open-
ended futurity of lived experience.  In this they echo the Lukácsian function of the essayist; 
they address themselves to an ethics yet to come. 
From this marginal position the ambulatory and fragmentary essays in Coetzee’s 
DOBY interrupt the doxa, the established forms of thought and collective life.  They revolt 
against, what Said calls, “piety, heedlessness or routine.”52  Obaldia argues that the 
Montaignian essayistic spirit symbolizes a revolt against doxa (a term popularized by 
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Barthes).  Montaigne’s indeterminate essays examine and question the embodiment of 
Universal Truth in the classical texts, which his contemporaries, in keeping with the 
Renaissance orthodoxy of imitating the ancients, mostly conserved and preserved: “The 
Essais’s confrontation with the authority or ‘truth’ of tradition is intimately linked to the 
examination and subversion of given discursive structures or forms.”53  The digressive 
nature of Montaigne’s essays deliberately upset the Renaissance stylistic practice of 
repeating past discourses in a rigid, codified order, thus destabilizing their claims to 
Universal Truth.  Similarly J. C.’s ambulatory essays relentlessly question the doxa that has 
emerged and normalized around the world in the past decade.  In all democratic societies, 
public opinion, expressing the tyranny of the majority, aided by mass media, conserves 
particular truths as the Universal Truth.  In a Montaignian spirit, numerous essayistic units 
criticize the emerging established forms of thought since the onset of the global imperialist 
“war on terror” regarding torture, security state, terrorism, military humanism, human rights, 
spread of democracy, etc.  
Since the tragic events of 9/11 and the imperialist interventionist retaliation by the 
U.S. government in Iraq and Afghanistan in response to the attack on the domestic soil, the 
world has witnessed the creation of extra-legal prison camps such as Guantanamo Bay in 
Cuba and Bagram in Afghanistan to preemptively detain and torture terror suspects captured 
not only in countries U.S. is directly at war with, but anywhere across the globe.54  It should 
be noted here that the simple dualism of yester years between the Western colonizer and the 
Oriental colonized is greatly troubled by the network of the “Coalition of the Willing.”  
With the release of the photos of abuse taken at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, it was not only 
confirmed that the U.S. military systematically used torture against the detainees but there 
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also emerged a public debate over the legal status of such interrogation practices as 
waterboarding which the Bush administration and the mass media labeled as “enhanced 
interrogation techniques” and not torture.55  Tracking the U.S. public opinion on the use of 
torture and what techniques constitute torture has not been easy.  This recent study, “U.S. 
Public Opinion on Torture, 2001-2009,” assembles 30 surveys taken over the period of eight 
years and concludes that, “The mean over the eight-year period is 56.14% in opposition to 
the use of torture and just 39.43% in favor of the use of torture.”56  But the authors Darius 
Rejali and Paul Gronke also admit that the opposition to torture declines towards the end of 
the decade due to several Pew polls that consistently show the U.S. public is more evenly 
divided over the use of torture: “Pew’s mean in opposition to torture is 50.56% and the mean 
in favor is 45.78%, a much smaller number opposed than the 56.14% opposed in the mean 
of all the polls.”57  Furthermore, the study also compares U.S. public opinion polls to global 
public opinion polls with the U.S. ranking 23rd in a sample of 31 countries in favor of 
torture: “The average level of support for torture across all of these cases is 31%; the 
average support for torture among Americans in these polls is 38%.”58  South Korea (51.6%) 
and India (50.1%) are the only two countries in the survey with outright majority in favor of 
torture.  Domestic terrorism does not fully explain the support of torture in such democratic 
states as South Korea, India, and U.S.  Countries like Israel and Spain, despite facing terror 
attacks at home in the past decade, have less than 20% of the population who support 
torture.  With public opinion on torture so evenly divided in large democracies like U.S. and 
India, which have systematically used torture against terror suspects, the specter of torturing 
democracy haunts our globe.59 
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In the essay “On Machiavelli,” Coetzee’s J. C. confronts the specter of torturing 
democracy.  Describing the public opinion on the use of torture in another democracy, 
Australia, J. C. bemoans: 
On talkback radio ordinary members of the public have been calling in to say that, 
while they concede that torture is in general a bad thing, it may nonetheless 
sometimes be necessary.  Some even advance the proposition that we may have to do 
evil for the sake of a greater good.  In general they are scornful of absolutist 
opponents of torture: such people, they say, do not have their feet on the ground, do 
not live in the real world.60  
Rather than comprehending this para-doxical set of values upheld by the public in an 
advanced democracy in terms of the failure of the civil society in the era of globalization, J. 
C. refers to the persistence of the ancient Machiavellian principle that the prince’s necessity 
for self-preservation trumps morality.  He states, “The new, Machiavellian position is that 
infringing the moral law is justified when it is necessary.”61  The modern state coheres the 
contradictory positions of absolute and relative standards of value, deeming torture 
constitutionally illegal but necessary for its existence.  Machiavellian virtù, not implying 
moral goodness but power, is the basis of the monarchical and democratic states.  If the 
mantra of monarchy is necessity trumps morality, then the mantra of democracy is security 
trumps liberty, which in the post-9/11 doxa of end justifies means has normalized torture.  In 
contrast to the universal assumption that a torturing democracy is a para-doxa, Darius 
Rejali’s book, Torture and Democracy, extensively documents the fact that throughout 
history democracies never abandoned torture but adapted pre-modern torture techniques for 
our modern times.  Doing comparative analysis of modern torture techniques used by the 
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totalitarian regimes such as Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Russia and the apartheid state, and the 
democratic regimes such as American imperialist invasion of Vietnam, Iraq and 
Afghanistan, Rejali maintains that modern interrogators preferred techniques that inflicted 
pain sans scars.  Additionally, more so in democracies rather than autocratic regimes, under 
the watchful gaze of civil societies and the international human rights observers, torture 
becomes increasingly stealth, invisible and scarless: “Usually, whenever we see these clean 
techniques in the twentieth century, typically they are in the context of intensive public 
monitoring—either by churches, the press, politicians, the public or international 
organizations.  And that is why clean coercive techniques typically show up in democratic 
states.  When we watch interrogators, interrogators get sneaky.”62  J. C.’s criticism of a 
torturing democracy goes much further than Rejali’s suggestion that democracies employ 
stealth torture.  For Coetzee’s J. C. both pre-modern and modern states not only torture but 
also make it a necessary condition for the survival of the state.  The law of necessity 
legitimates the use of torture by an exemplary democracy like U. S. in its global neo-
imperialist “war on terror.”  In a democracy, the constituent power of the people as the 
original, revolutionary force is the paradoxical power to create ex nihilo new constitutional 
norms, that is, constituted power, which is an imperative act for every new nation.  The 
constituent power organizes law from a pre-legal realm.63  The threat of the constituent 
power of the people not only has the potential to give birth to a democracy but also has the 
capacity to keep it democratic.  Ironically, the Machiavellian necessity is based on a similar 
paradoxical principle.  The necessity for survival of the democratic state cannot be contained 
within the established constituted power of the nation, that is, within the checks and 
balances of the constitution.  Both the revolutionary innovation of the constituent power and 
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the necessity of self-preservation of the constituted power are based on the contrary 
principle of creation and preservation of the law from an extra-legal realm.  Torture, 
although constitutionally illegal, so the argument goes, is necessary for the self-preservation 
of the state.  Criticizing liberal intellectual’s habituated response to public wisdom as 
illogically inhabiting contradictory sets of values, Coetzee’s J. C. proposes a counter-attack 
to the para-doxa: “Ordinary life is full of contradictions; ordinary people are used to 
accommodating them.  Rather, you must attack the metaphysical, supra-empirical status of 
necessità and show that to be fraudulent.”64  What liberal intellectuals need to attack is the 
extra-legal, metaphysical character of necessity, which paradoxically preserves but cannot 
be contained within the limits of constitutional democracy.  Instead, they lament about the 
stupidity of the masses for unquestioningly upholding contrary principles. Or worse still, 
liberal intellectuals, in their discomfort with incoherent contradictions, propose a new doxa, 
a new centered structure that is contradictorily coherent.  As Jacques Derrida once famously 
said, all centered structures exhibit contradictorily coherent logic that suppress a desire, 
which is a desire to arrest free play and movement.65 
In one notable response to formulate a new doxa, a new centered structure that will 
coalesce the contradictory terms democracy and torture, a liberal intellectual, Alan 
Dershowitz, who is a law professor at Harvard Law School, in his article “Want to Torture? 
Get a Warrant,” suggests that American democracy learn lessons from Israeli democracy, 
being the only kind that has employed torture within the realms of law in “ticking bomb” 
cases.  For Dershowitz the necessity of self-preservation necessitates legalizing exceptional 
acts.  He states, “The Israeli Supreme Court left open the possibility, however, that in an 
actual "ticking bomb" case –-a situation in which a terrorist refused to divulge information 
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necessary to defuse a bomb that was about to kill hundreds of innocent civilians—an agent 
who employed physical pressure could defend himself against criminal charges by invoking 
‘the law of necessity.’”66  He goes on to recommend that in “ticking bomb” scenarios the 
American Supreme Court should allow torture but only with a warrant: “Under my proposal, 
no torture would be permitted without a "torture warrant" being issued by a judge.”67  When 
Coetzee’s J. C. warns against the all-powerful status of the law of necessity, his critique is 
directed not only at the general public but also at liberal intellectuals like Dershowitz, for 
whom the law of necessity legitimates the unconstitutional violence of torture. If the general 
public, in its naiveté, inhabits contradictions of torture and democracy, the liberal 
intellectual is able to propose a new doxa, rationalizing and synthesizing the contrary forces. 
For him, torture, which nevertheless occurs in democracies but remains invisible, can be 
disciplined by the watchful gaze of the law.  If, in the Machiavellian scenario, the law of 
necessity trumps morality, in Dershowitz’s rationalizing desire it clears the air of moral 
dilemma, as in legalizing torture not only the wrong has been righted but also the ethical and 
political status of torture as the para-doxa of the foundational, humanizing principles of 
democracy has been appropriated into the realm of the doxa.  
Walter Benjamin, in his essay “On Violence,” suggests that violence has both a law-
making and a law-preserving function: “All violence as a means is either lawmaking or law-
preserving.  If it lays claim to neither of these predicates, it forfeits all validity.”68  Law-
making violence is the foundational violence that establishes and posits a new law; law-
preserving violence conserves, maintains and enforces the law, relying for its preservation 
on the representation of the foundational violence.  In other words, the constituent power is 
the law-making power of revolutionary violence.  And the constituted power is the law-
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preserving power that demands submission to the established law through the threat of 
legitimate violence.  Within this Benjaminian framework, how do we understand the 
violence of torture?  More specifically, how do we understand the use of torture by a 
democratic state in the context of the imperialist “war on terror”?  Is it law-making or law-
preserving violence?  Is it legitimate or illegitimate violence?  Before the onset of 
democracy that resulted in the reformation of penal punishment and the disappearance of the 
spectacle of torture, in the ancien régime, Michel Foucault has argued that torture, rather 
than being an arbitrary exercise of power over the body of the condemned, was a carefully 
regulated affair, following precise legal doctrines and rituals.  He asserts, “Torture was a 
strict judicial game.  And, as such, it was linked to the old tests or trials—ordeals, judicial 
duels, judgements of God—that were practiced in accusatory procedures long before the 
techniques of the Inquisition.”69  In other words, torture had a law-preserving function.  But 
in the era of liberal democracy, the violence of torture suspends both the law-making and the 
law-preserving function.  It is a pure form of violence in the state of nature.  Torture is an 
exceptional case of violence, outsourced to exceptional, extra-legal spaces.  The argument 
goes that it is a just means, albeit an exceptional one when used by a democratic state, for 
just ends.  Thus, according to the Australian public opinion described by J. C. and the U. S. 
and World public opinion described by Rejali and Gronke, torturing a single “unlawful 
enemy combatant” to save the lives of many is considered a lesser evil.70  Thus it loses all 
claims to validity.  Torture, despite (and because of) its stealth use by democracies, is 
anathema to the ontological existence of a democracy.  Hence, although the use of torture by 
governments and its relatively broad support by their citizens is justified as necessary for the 
preservation of the state, unlike the law-preserving violence, it can never be publicly 
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accepted as legitimate violence without threatening the foundational act of a democracy: its 
constitution.  Nor does it share a noble character with the revolutionary innovation of the 
violence of law-making, although both reside in the extra-legal realm.  That is, torture does 
not create the conditions for constituting a new law.  In pointing out the relation between 
violence and law what Benjamin is emphasizing is that in law there is justification of 
violence.  But in the case of torture, a supremely illegal act in a democratic state, there can 
be no legal justification of its violence.  Torture is neither law-making nor law-preserving.  
In Benjamin, violence that possesses the function either of law-making or law-preserving, is 
termed “mythic violence.”  Violence that lacks either of these functions is termed “divine 
violence.”  Differentiating divine violence from mythic violence, Benjamin states, “This 
very task of destruction poses again, in the last resort, the question of a pure immediate 
violence that might be able to call a halt to mythical violence.  Just as in all spheres God 
opposes myth, mythical violence is confronted by the divine. . . .  If mythical violence is 
lawmaking, divine violence is law-destroying.”71  Unlike the juridical violence of both 
natural and positive law, divine violence is pure violence; it is a means without ends, 
without a legal justification.  For Benjamin, in its law-destroying capacity, divine violence 
has an expiatory character: “But in annihilating it also expiates, and a deep connection 
between the lack of bloodshed and the expiatory character of this violence is 
unmistakable.”72  The dissolution of legal violence is the dissolution of bare life.  In his 
concept of divine violence, Benjamin severs anomie (lawlessness) from law.  Extending 
Benjamin’s concept of divine violence, Giorgio Agamben calls for the sundering of law and 
life for an immanent political action: “The only true political action [is] . . . that which 
severs the nexus between law and violence.”73  But is it not the case that torture in 
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democracy has the character of divine violence?74  As I have been arguing, in the violence 
of torture within a democracy the nexus between law and violence is severed.  It is pure 
means whose ends cannot be justified as law-preserving.  It exists in a pure state of anomie.  
It is neither law-making nor law-preserving.  In the use of torture in the imperialist “war on 
terror,” the Machiavellian law of necessity has been severed from law and morality.  All 
attempts to justify the violence of torture either as a suspension of the law in order to 
preserve it (public opinion) or as a new exceptional act legalized only in “ticking bomb” 
scenarios (Dershowitz) results in dissolution of the democratic state.  
In order to preserve its democratic institutions from the anomie of torture, the 
American government outsources torture, carrying it out outside the borders of its nation-
state, in states of exception such as Guantanamo and Bagram.  In numerous essays, the 
character-author J. C., who, like the author Coetzee, emigrated from South Africa, compares 
the torture employed by the U. S. imperialist regime (an exemplary democracy) to the 
apartheid state (an autocratic regime) that systematically used torture, especially against 
black anti-apartheid activists.  In the essay, “On the hurly-burly of politics,” reporting on a 
lecture he delivered at the National Library in Canberra on the pending security legislation 
in Australia, J. C. describes ways in which the apartheid state anticipates the security state 
inaugurated by the global imperialist “war on terror”: “I went on to mention . . . that any 
journalist who reported such a disappearance might be arrested and charged with 
endangering the security of the state.  ‘All of this and much more, in apartheid South 
Africa,’ I concluded, ‘was done in the name of a struggle against terror.  I used to think that 
the people who created these laws that effectively suspended the rule of law were moral 
barbarians.  Now I know they were just pioneers, ahead of their time.’”75  While J. C. is 
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right that there are several similarities in the two regimes, especially in the profiling of 
certain ethnic and racial groups, in the creation of the security state and in the use of torture 
to preserve the state, the fundamental difference between the two regimes is the conundrum 
that a torturing democracy faces (which a totalitarian regime like apartheid did not face), of 
the destruction of its foundational act that is the constitution, that forces it to outsource 
torture to extra-legal spaces.  Torture is law-destroying, as its existence destroys the very 
idea of a constitutional democracy.  Evidence gathered through torture would be 
impermissible within U. S. civil and criminal courts.  Torture, today, is the most secretive of 
state activities, whose very existence is either denied or redefined as “enhanced interrogation 
techniques,” and when its use is revealed, as in the Abu Ghraib photos, it is generally 
claimed to be the unauthorized trespassing of a “few bad apples.”  It is interesting to note 
here that, although in Coetzee’s J. C.’s account the Australian public believes that torture, 
otherwise evil, is necessary in exceptional cases, there is no official account arguing in favor 
of torture in exceptional cases.  It is an exception to the state of exception.  Even though 
several journalists and pundits claimed that the Former Vice President Dick Cheney finally 
admitted to supporting torture in exceptional cases, Cheney himself never used the word 
torture, which he declared to be evil, but claimed to order the use of “harsh interrogation 
techniques” against terror suspects, for which he expressed “no regrets.”76  Although the 
existence of torture is an open secret, no official has been prosecuted till date given the 
claim, reiterated by several liberal media outlets, that the illegal acts never occurred, or in 
the case of Abu Ghraib were never sanctioned by the state.  Like the enemy which is 
stateless (Al-Qaeda), the illegal violence of torture is stateless too. 
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Thus, to return to J. C.’s suggestion that the intellectuals should “attack the 
metaphysical, supra-empirical status of necessità and show that to be fraudulent,” what he is 
pointing to is that in the lawlessness of torture, the Machiavellian principle of necessity for 
self-preservation has been severed from morality and law.77  Instead, the law of necessity, 
that subverts civil liberties in the name of security normalizing torture in democracies, 
exhibits a God-like metaphysical and supra-empirical nature that is invisible and 
unverifiable.  If in Benjamin the necessity of self-preservation is reified in the law-
preserving strategies of administrative violence, in the imperialist “war on terror” the 
necessity of self-preservation of liberal democracies is reified in the utter lawlessness of the 
violence of torture.  In both the law-making and the law-preserving functions, violence is 
verifiable in law.  But in the anomie of the unconstitutional torture, violence is unverifiable 
and invisible, totally severed from law and morality.  In the global “war on terror,” the law 
of necessity has a deeply religious character.  The first decade of the twenty-first century has 
seen a global resurgence of religion in international politics that is far more dynamic and 
complex than the vulgar term “clash of civilizations” suggests.  In his infamous book, Clash 
of Civilizations: Remaking of the World Order, that greatly influenced the Bush 
administration’s framing of the “war on terror” in binary terms of West vs. Islam, Samuel 
Huntington declares that post-Cold War global political conflict will be fought along 
cultural and religious fault lines, rather than ideological or economic ones: “Cultural 
communities are replacing Cold War blocs, and the fault lines between civilizations are 
becoming the central lines of conflict in global politics.”78  This myopic view of 
civilizations as monolithic, warring entities cordoned off from each other and in perpetual 
struggle for dominance, Said, correctly calls as “the clash of ignorance.”79  In emphasizing 
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the metaphysical and religious characteristics of the law of necessity, Coetzee’s J. C. is 
highlighting the return of the religious in geopolitics, which the secular forces of modernity 
were to have summarily defeated.  In response to J. C. one may ask, how should the 
intellectuals attack the law of necessity?  How should they retaliate against its religious and 
metaphysical nature?  Should they attack the necessity of necessity through art or criticism 
or both?  Should they attack it through the form of the novel or of the essay?  In Coetzee’s 
DOBY, J. C. grapples with these questions in his digressive essays throughout the novel. 
In the essays in DOBY, I suggest Coetzee attacks the law of necessity through the 
Saidian concept of “secular criticism.”  Such a criticism, as Aamir Mufti has argued, is more 
important for Said than the term postcolonial criticism in addressing the minority question.80  
For Said, “secular criticism” is a type of criticism that is anathema to a doxa, is neither a 
political nor a religious position among warring positions, is impatient of the statist law of 
necessity, and is irruptive of the imperialist character of totalizing concepts.  For Said the 
ironic, ambulatory, minor, and worldly form of the essay is the principle way in which to 
perform such a mode of criticism.  In the introduction, titled “Secular Criticism,” to his 
hugely influential collection of essays, The World, the Text and the Critic, Said states, “For 
if I am to be taken seriously as saying that secular criticism deals with local and worldly 
situations, and that it is constitutively opposed to the production of massive, hermetic 
systems, then it must follow that the essay—a comparatively short, investigative, radically 
skeptical form—is the principal way in which to write criticism.”81  Said’s view of the essay 
form is Lukácsian: “I prefer . . . [Lukács], for as Lukács develops it the critic’s position is a 
vulnerable one because he awaits and prepares for a great aesthetic revolution whose result, 
ironically enough, will render him marginal.”82   And Lukács’ project is Montaignian.  In his 
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emphasis that criticism is art and not science, Lukács echoes the literariness of Montaigne’s 
essays rather than the scientificity of Bacon’s essays.  In echo of Said, the character-author 
J. C. (and Coetzee) does the work of criticism in the formless form of the essay.  The essays 
do their work in the present and are deeply committed to their own times.  Moreover, they 
confront and interrupt the doxa that has emerged in the past decade concerning torture, 
terrorism, and the security state.  In DOBY, the incomplete and inaugural form of the essay 
is the primary antidote to the all-powerful law of necessity that has legitimated torture 
within constitutional democracy.   In the novel, criticism is not parergon to fiction and life, 
but, à la Lukács, is precursive, standing before art and life, longing for experience and 
judgment that is yet to come.  In this novel, Coetzee’s J. C.’s essays work within the 
Montaignian tradition, alongside such august figures and readers of that tradition, Lukács 
and Said.   
Given the public support of torture in several democratic countries, Coetzee’s 
character-author J. C., in the essay “On Guantanamo Bay,” meditates if art can change 
minds and hearts.  In the concluding paragraph, he declares that a ballet titled “Guantanamo, 
Guantanamo!” depicting the torture of the detainees will fail to change the disinterested 
general public: “One day it will be done, though not by me.  It may even be a hit in London 
and Berlin and New York.  It will have absolutely no effect on the people it targets, who 
could not care less what ballet audiences think of them.”83  In a world dominated by 
electronic media, the traditional arts are increasingly losing their political and social 
function.  Despite the fact that the arts are in their autumn years, in DOBY poiesis still has 
the power to resist arrestation of signification in a universal signified.  In the essay, “On 
terrorism,” J. C. ridicules the assumption of a surveillance state that all private individual 
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secrets are bytes of information.  What data mining fails to see is the poetic capacity for free 
play of signifiers that infinitely defers access to the soul of the individual: “The masters of 
information have forgotten about poetry, where words may have a meaning quite different 
from what the lexicon says, where the metaphoric spark is always one jump ahead of the 
decoding function, where another, unforeseen reading is always possible.”84  Both the 
masters of information and masters of torture fail to grasp this function of poiesis.  In this 
essay there are echoes to an earlier novel of Coetzee, Waiting for the Barbarians, a paean to 
the poietic potentia of a human for infinite invention.  In my reading of the allegorical novel 
in the first chapter, I show that the liberal magistrate fails to translate the tortured gendered 
subaltern’s body into the master codes of the Empire.  Learning from his failure, he mocks 
the assumptions of the torturers that they can hack their way to the transcendental signified 
through pain: “But with this woman it is as if there is no interior, only a surface across 
which I hunt back and forth seeking entry.  For the first time I feel a dry pity for them 
[torturers]: how natural a mistake to believe that you can burn or tear or hack your way into 
the secret body of the other.”85  
Throughout his writing career, Coetzee, through the dominant genre of the novel, has 
disrupted the metanarratives of apartheid and Empire that violently reinscribed the body of 
the subaltern into the law of the master.  Towards the autumn years of his life, Coetzee 
employs the formless form of the essay to critically think against the new, ascendant Empire 
and its regime of torture.  Although the essays are embedded in the novel, which is what 
holds them together, it is in the form of the essay that Coetzee performs the Saidian secular 
criticism.  The paratactic, ambulatory, and skeptical form of the essay is central to such a 
performance.  Toiling within this illustrious tradition, the essays address the central 
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problematic of our times: the law of necessity legitimating the lawlessness of torture within 
constitutional democracy in the global imperialist “war on terror.”  It is in the formless form 
of the essay, that is necessarily incomplete and inaugural, that the character-author (and 
Coetzee) places himself to do the work of criticism.  Moreover, the incomplete, ironic form 
of the essay is the primary antidote to the all-powerful law of necessity.  The essays do their 
work in the present and are deeply committed to their own times.  The form of the essay and 
the work it makes possible disrupts the doxa.  Working with a marginal form, Coetzee’s J. 
C. confronts the margins of history, those victims of the torture chambers.  The absent 
presence of these subaltern figures call into question the doxa.86 
Moreover, Said asserts that the critic doing the work of criticism within the form of 
the essay inaugurates an aesthetic revolution that will render him/her marginal.  The 
marginality of the critic is the result not only of the revolution yet to come but also of the 
form itself, that exists in marginal relation to the dominant genres.  DOBY stages the 
becoming-marginal of the author figure.  The becoming-marginal is occasioned both by the 
essay form and the tripartite division of each page that interrupts the character-author J. C.’s 
(and Coetzee’s) unified and continuous authorial authority.  In the subaltern form of the 
essay, the aging liberal humanist is not only struggling to address grave world-historical 
problems, but in the second section of each page of the novel we also witness the fragility of 
his aging body and the enervation of his soul in face of lust for Anya.  Meditating on 
authority in the essay “On authority in fiction,” J. C. asserts, “In the novel, the voice that 
speaks the first sentence, then the second, and so onward . . . has to begin with, no authority 
at all.  Authority must be earned; on the novelist author lies the onus to build up, out of 
nothing, such authority.”87  In the novel, the character-author (and Coetzee) struggle to earn 
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authority but each novelistic page remains discontinuous till the end.  The form of the essay 
is anathema to the Machiavellian law of necessity and to the formation of a continuous 
authorial identity and authority. 
Paul A. Bové notes that Said’s reformulation of Lukács’ thinking “reflects his own 
desire to mark the essayist’s inscription within the distributed process of historical human 
formation.  While there are many possible sources for this element in Said’s thinking, 
including his identification with the Palestinian struggle, an intellectual source very well 
might be Adams’ thinking about American democracy as Blackmur represent it.”88  Bové’s 
astute turn to Adams’ views on democracy, as a possible intellectual source for Said, is 
useful for engaging with DOBY, which confronts the historical problem of torturing 
democracy and meditates extensively on the possible futures of constitutional democracy.  
During the past decade, the hegemony of military humanism has justified perpetual war, 
torture, and preventive detention in the name of humanitarian intervention and the spread of 
democracy.  If in the nineteenth-century, no decent liberal human being could be against the 
noble and humanizing impulse of the civilizing mission, in the twenty-first century no such 
human being can be against the humanitarian impulse of the democratizing mission.  
Elaborating on the origin of democracy, in the essay “On the Origins of the State,” J. C. 
points to the irony of Western neo-imperialist ambitions of spreading democracy and 
freedom in the world:  
“Spreading democracy,” as is now being done by the United States in the Middle 
East, means spreading the rules of democracy.  It means telling people that whereas 
formerly they had no choice, now they have a choice.  Formerly they had A and 
nothing but A; now they have a choice between A and B.  “Spreading freedom” 
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means creating the conditions for people to choose freely between A and B. . . .  The 
people engaged in spreading freedom and democracy see no irony in the description 
of the process just given.89  
Graham Greene, in his trenchant criticism of the American intervention in Vietnam, in the 
novel The Quiet American, famously called this humanitarian impulse to spread democracy 
and freedom, the Empire of “good intentions.”90  Adams, in his novel, Democracy, mocks 
the post-Civil war corruption of the constituted power of American democracy that has lost 
the revolutionary force of the constituent power of its foundational document that was its 
1787 constitution.  But he, like his character, Nathan Gore, a diplomat and historian, 
commonly read as expressing Adams’ views on democracy, believed in the experiment that 
is a democracy, flawed and yet to come.  Gore, in speaking to Mrs Lee, asserts, “I believe in 
democracy. I accept it . . . I grant it is an experiment, but it is the only direction society can 
take that is worth its taking.”91  Quoting Gore’s lines, Bové notes, “For Adams, democracy 
is an essay that masses and critics together might achieve.”92  Writing in the context of the 
“war on terror” that has normalized torture within a constitutional democracy, Coetzee’s J. 
C. may not be so assertively hopeful about democracy as Nathan Gore, but, in a somewhat 
similar vein, sees a danger in embodying a supra-political position that is outside of 
democracy to critically engage with it.  Immediately after the lines on the spreading of 
democracy quoted above, J. C. queries, “Why is it so hard to say anything about politics 
from outside politics?”  In response to his own question, he states, “To strive for a 
systematic, supra-political discourse about politics is futile.”93  The danger of the 
Machiavellian principle of necessity is that it functions outside the mess of the political 
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process, inhabiting a metaphysical realm beyond the reach of politics and history.  This 
supra-political discourse necessitates torture.  
A secular criticism of democracy is possible and desirable only from within and not 
without it.  The essays in Coetzee’s novel present a secular criticism of democracy from 
within the experiment that is a democracy.  The form of the essay, which Coetzee 
deliberately employs, is central to that criticism.  It is also true that democracy, unlike other 
forms of government, provides such a space for criticism.  In this precise sense, democracy 
embodies the essayistic spirit.  The form of the essay holds in potentia the power to 
democratize democracy itself. 
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